Opinion
14395
December 11, 1936.
Before JOHNSON, J., Spartanburg, January, 1936, Exceptions overruled and judgment affirmed.
Actions by W.W. Griffin and others, as commissioners of public works of the City of Spartanburg, and by the Magnolia Camp, Woodmen of the World, No. 28, and Charles D. West and others, as trustees, against W.J. White, as conservator of Spartan Building Loan Association. From decree of the circuit Court confirming the report of a special referee and overruling all exceptions thereto, the defendant appeals.
The following documents were directed to be reported:
The following is the face of the paid-up certificates: No. 8120
PAID-UP CERTIFICATE Spartan Building Loan Association Spartanburg, South CarolinaThis certifies that _______________ has paid for and is the holder of a Paid-Up Certificate issued by the Spartan Building Loan Association, of Spartanburg, South Carolina; and seventy-eight months from the date of issue hereof will be entitled to receive therefor the sum of One Thousand Dollars, or, at his option, upon presentation of this certificate, as hereafter specified, at the end of any six months period after date of issue, will be entitled to receive the lesser amount indicated in the table appearing on the back hereof for the respective periods following issue.
Payment of this certificate will be made upon presentation and surrender hereof, at the office of the Spartan Building and Loan Association, in the City of Spartanburg, S.C. provided the form for surrender and cancellation of this certificate, appearing on the back hereof, shall be properly signed by the person appearing to be the owner of this certificate on the records of the Spartan Building and Loan Association, the said Association reserving the right, at its option, to require sixty days' notice of intention to demand payment on any of the periods stipulated for surrender before maturity.
This certificate is transferable only on the books of the Spartan Building and Loan Association by the owner hereof in person, or by his duly authorized attorney, upon surrender of this certificate duly endorsed for transfer on the form provided.
certificate to be signed by its President and Treasurer, at Spartanburg, S.C. this _______ day of ____________________, 192 _.
Spartan Building Loan Association.
By ____________________________________
President.
____________________________________
Treasurer.
$1,000 ___________
The following is the back of the paid-up certificate:
CANCELLATION VALUES 1st 2d 3rd 4th 5th 6th Year Year Year Year Year Year 6th month ..... $683.30 $716.70 $750.00 $783.30 $816.70 $850.00 12th month .... 700.00 733.30 766.70 800.00 833.30 866.70 Value at end of seventy-eight months, $1,000.00 SURRENDER AND CANCELLATION FORMThe undersigned hereby acknowledges receipt in full of the amount stated on this certificate to be the surrender value of the same at the end of the six months period next preceding this date, and hereby surrenders this certificate for cancellation on the books of the company.
Dated at Spartanburg, S.C. this ____ day of _________, 192 _. _________________________________
In the presence of: _____________________________________________ _____________________________________________
TRANSFER FORMFor value received, I hereby sell, assign and transfer this paid-up certificate of the Spartan Building and Loan Association to _____________________________ and do hereby constitute and appoint _____________________ my attorney in fact to cause the same to be transferred on the books of the within named company.
Dated at Spartanburg, S.C. this ____ day of ______, 192 _. _______________________________
In the presence of: ____________________________________________ ____________________________________________
The report of Special Referee follows:
These were actions begun in the Court of Common Pleas for Spartanburg County by the plaintiffs herein, the first named, April 13, 1935, against the Spartan Building Loan Association, and the second August 14, 1935, against W. J. White, as conservator of said Spartan Building Loan Association.
The first complaint was brought before a conservator was appointed and later an amended complaint was served and W.J. White, as conservator, was named the defendant.
Both complaints now before the Court demand judgment against the defendant for the amounts set forth in the several complaints and ask that said judgments be ordered to be preferred as against the claims of stockholders of the said Spartan Building Loan Association in all of the assets of the association, based on the claim that the plaintiffs are creditors of the association and not stockholders.
Owing to the fact that the Master of Spartanburg County was a stockholder of the association, he disqualified himself, and, by consent of all parties, the issues, both of law and fact, were referred to me as Special Referee to hear and determine, and report to this Court my conclusions in reference thereto.
In pursuance of orders of reference signed by Circuit Judge M.M. Mann, October 15, 1935, in the first action, and Circuit Judge T.S. Sease, November 9, 1935, in the second action, I have held references in both actions, which were heard by me together by consent of all parties, the issues and questions involved being identical, and consent of the parties that one report should be made.
All parties were properly served and before the Court. Both plaintiffs presented in evidence consent of the State board of bank control to institute the said actions.
It appears from the testimony that W.J. White was duly appointed conservator of said Spartan Building Loan Association on May 9, 1935, with instructions to liquidate said association and disburse the proceeds in the manner provided by law, and he is now acting as said conservator.
The defendant answered in both actions, setting up in the main the same defenses, and alleged that the Spartan Building Loan Association is insolvent and is being liquidated; it also set up the provisions of its by-laws in reference to the maturity of its shares of stock and when same should be payable; that the association was insolvent at the times the notice of a demand for payment of the certificates herein set forth was made. It also set forth that the maturity of the said certificates was determined by the association according to a plan worked out by the association, whereby those who invested in said certificates, paying at the rate of $66.67 per $100.00 in advance, would receive payment of same on the same basis as those paying for a single share of stock at $1.00 per month, and that both kinds of investors were to be on the same footing of equality and share ratably between them in the assets and that the earnings of the company were equally looked to as the sole source of profit on the investment; that the holders of the paid-up certificates were not lenders of money and are not creditors of the association; that there was no definite promise to pay interest at any stated rate.
Further, defendant contends that should the contract contained in the certificates be construed to pay $1,000.00 at the end of seventy-eight months, that the said contract is usurious, in that the said amount so payable would be determined at a greater rate of interest than 7 per cent. and the right to all interest under the contract was forfeited.
The general scheme of building and loan associations differs in many of the states, and hence the decisions of the Courts are not harmonious as to the right to preferences, in that each case was decided upon the peculiar facts and by-laws of the various associations in which the question was presented to the Courts, and without the facts of each particular case, there can be no reconciling of the decisions.
I have made exhaustive research of the authorities, both in the United States and English cases, and have been unable to find a case on all fours with the issues presented here as a guide to a proper finding in this case. Under some of the decisions, the judgment was based upon a statement that "holders of full paid stock" and "installment stock" should be treated alike, and in those cases it was held that there was no priority given one different from the other on insolvency of the corporation, but that each class should pro-rate, after the payment of the claims of general creditors, in the remaining assets of the corporation. In those cases it seemed to be the contention of the parties asserting a priority that the mere act of payment in full at the outset of their stock gave them a priority over those paying in installments. There was no question that either form of certificate was not stock.
I might say at the outset of this report that the great weight of authority in most of the states and in such federal cases as I have examined that this is the rule, and that the general principle of equity, "that equality is equity," is the underlying principle governing all such cases, and it would serve no useful purpose in setting forth a list of cases upholding this doctrine, for, as I understand the contentions of the plaintiffs herein, they do not question the universality of this rule, but contend that the facts of this particular case take it out of the rule. They say their suit is based on the fact that they were creditors ab initio, and not stockholders, and if not, then, from the time of their demand for payment at the maturity of their certificates, at which time the relation of debtor and creditor would arise, irrespective of whether they were originally stockholders, which they deny, or not.
The sole issue before me under all the facts and law as I conceive it, is, what are the "paid-up certificates" in this case and what relation do the holders thereof bear to the association? Are they stockholders, and the certificates merely evidence of such relationship, differing from stockholders paying in installments only in the fact that their certificates are actually paid in advance in full, and subject to all the rights and liabilities of installment stockholders, namely, sharing in the profits of the association and bearing their proportionate share of the losses, or, are they, as plaintiffs contend, merely creditors and never stockholders or subject to any liabilities of stockholders in regard to the losses of the association?
To answer this question, a careful inspection and construction of the provisions of the constitution of the association, its by-laws governing the association, the literature put out by the association in reference thereto, and the contracts themselves must be taken into consideration to define the status of these plaintiffs.
A building and loan association, generally speaking, is a mutual enterprise, all members being under the same rules, sharing in the profits equally and bearing their proportionate share of the losses. All stock in any corporation, whether building and loan or not, where the stock is what is called common stock, in contradistinction from preferred, and in building and loan associations, whether fully paid in advance or not, partake of the same characteristics.
As said by Endlich on Building Associations (2d Ed.) § 514, "All burdens shall be equally borne as well as all profits equally shared, and the rights and obligations of the participants shall be adjudged on a basis of strict mutuality, equality and fairness."
Under Section 7726, Code of Laws of S.C. it is provided that a building and loan association may issue preferred stock, if so provided in the by-laws, and such holders thereof entitled to preferences as against common stockholders.
However, the by-laws introduced in this case make no such provision, and the association could not issue preferred stock, and the so-called paid-up certificates are likewise silent as to a preference, so no help can be gained from this source in deciding the question.
As to the stock of the association, the constitution provides and sets forth the characteristics of stock as follows: "Sec. 3. The stock of this association shall have a par value of one hundred dollars per share. The association may limit the number of shares to be held by any one person at one time, and shall have power to enforce payment of all installment dues to the association from its members by such fines, forfeitures and penalties as may be fixed hereafter."
The above designation of the stock of the association and the par value of the same is the only reference to any kind of stock to be found in the constitution that can be issued by this association. However, the constitution, Section 6, provides: "That the association may accept dues from members in advance on such terms and conditions as the board of directors may direct."
As I see the effect of these two provisions taken together, the association might be authorized to issue two kinds of stock, viz., installment stock and full-paid paid stock. Under such a state of facts, plainly there could be no preference between them on insolvency, as none would have a superior equity over the other. Such stocks, whether paid in advance or on installments, would undoubtedly share in all the profits, however large, and bear their pro rata share of the losses, and each stockholder of either kind would have the right to a vote for each $100.00 of such stock held and benefit by any other incidents as such stockholder.
Under Section 5 of the by-laws, it is provided that: "Each member for each share of stock that he or she holds in any series shall pay one dollar to the treasurer for each share on the second Tuesday of each and every month until the installments and interest on loans and other receipts shall be sufficient to divide to each share of stock the sum of one hundred dollars; then shall the association redeem each and all of the said shares in any series and said series shall be wound up."
It should be noticed that the above provisions makes no guaranty as to when such stock shall mature, and such installment stock would mature when the earnings of the association for such series and other receipts would amount to $100.00 per share.
No other mention of any other kind of stock is set forth in the by-laws or any authority to issue any other kind of stock.
What is the contract of an installment stockholder with the association?
There was exhibited before me at the reference and introduced in evidence the following stock certificate, and marked E.Z., as the nature of the recognized stock certificates and as a sample of installment stock, the following:
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA Spartan Building Loan Association of Spartanburg, S.C.Number ________________________ (Seal) ____________________ Shares
Series No ___________
This is to certify that ______________________________ is entitled to _____________ Shares of Capital Stock of the Spartan Building and Loan Association of Spartanburg, S.C. transferable only on the books of the association in person or by attorney on surrender of this certificate.
Dated at Spartanburg, S.C. _____________________________
____________________________________ Treasurer. ____________________________________ President.
On the back thereof there was printed the usual assignment form of the shares of the capital stock of the association.
It will be noticed that this instrument sets forth a blank for a number, a blank for the number of shares, and the series number. It further certifies that the holder "is entitled to ________________ shares of the Capital Stock of the Spartan Building and Loan Association of Spartanburg, S.C." No maturity is stated or any other contract with the holder. It could mature only according to the scheme above set forth, according to the success of the association, and dependent upon it.
Now let us contrast the written contracts held by the plaintiffs and called paid-up certificates with the above recognized and named stock certificates. These contracts were introduced in evidence in accordance with the allegations of the complaints and such contracts are identical with the exhibits attached to the complaints, and, for the sake of brevity, they will not be set forth in this report, but said exhibits are referred to and made a part of this report as fully as if set forth herein, the only difference being that the sample attached to the complaint of W.W. Griffin et al., shows a face value of $500.00 instead of a face value of $1,000.00, the actual face value of the certificates sued on and introduced in evidence, the same certificate attached to show the language of the originals introduced, irrespective of the face value shown.
The testimony shows that before any funds were invested in these certificates by the plaintiffs, that they received the printed advertisement or circular of the association as to the nature of these certificates, its promises and agreements, and relying upon these advertisements, they were induced to invest their funds in these certificates.
The statements contained in these circulars are as follows:
"PAID-UP BUILDING AND LOAN"The Spartan Building and Loan Association and the Security Building and Loan Association have operated successfully in Spartanburg for a number of years, enabling many citizens to own their homes by means of small monthly payments. Shares are paid for at the rate of $1.00 per month, maturing with $100.00 value in about 78 months.
"In order to provide additional home building funds for the long list of applicants, these associations have inaugurated an additional plan of building and loan investments whereby those who have available funds may purchase paid-up certificates, thus investing their money at a good return with absolute safety, and placing it in home building channels.
"For $66.67, a paid-up certificate may be purchased, maturing 78 months from date, the return on the investment being 7.7 per cent. The certificate may be negotiated, or will be cashed by the association at any time after six months, with interest at 5 per cent. at the end of any six months period. The cash surrender value at the end of each six months period is printed on the back of the certificate so that the owner may know the value of his certificate at any time.
"The plan herein described in no way affects the regular series of the associations, and the new certificates may be purchased at any time.
"This plan of building and loan investment is peculiarly adapted to the convenience of those having funds to loan, as they may buy these certificates at any time, and the yield is nearly 8 per cent., with no delay in waiting for a borrower, no renewals, no attorneys' fees, no recording fees, no foreclosures. The entire assets of the association consist of first mortgages on Spartanburg real estate valued at from 40 to 50 per cent. more than the amount of the mortgages.
"Certificates are available in denominations of $100.00, $500.00, and $1,000.00, at the price of $66.67 per $100.00.
"Following are the cash surrender values of a $100.00 certificate at the end of each six months period from date of purchase; the values of the $500.00 and $1,000.00 certificates being arrived at by multiplying the following figures by 5 and 10 respectively:
CANCELLATION VALUES 1st 2d 3rd 4th 5th 6th Year Year Year Year Year Year 6th month .......... $68.33 $71.67 $75.00 $78.33 $81.67 $85.00 12th month ......... 70.00 73.33 76.67 80.00 83.33 86.67 "Value at end of seventy-eight months $100.00."In consequence of this offer, Magnolia Camp, W.O.W. No. 28, paid for eight certificates on February 4, 1925, for the sum of $666.67 each, respectively, and having a surrender value of $1,000.00 at the expiration of seventy-eight months.
Early in 1932, this plaintiff made demand on the treasurer of the association for payment of the face value of the certificates, who in turn claimed the benefit of the provision requiring sixty-day notice for surrendering same and full payment. Subsequently thereafter two of the eight certificates were paid and payment of the six sued on herein was neglected. These certificates unpaid were numbered 8027, 8028, 8029, 8030, 8031 and 8032, and became due according to the face thereof on August 4, 1931, to which should be added sixty days under the requirements of the notice, all of which would then become due and payable on October 4, 1931. At the time of the payment and cancellation of the two certificates, interest accruing thereon subsequently was paid. Magnolia Camp, W.O.W. No. 28, is still the owner and holder of the six certificates and these remain unpaid as to any part thereof.
On the inducements set forth in the above circular, the Spartanburg waterworks commissioners also purchased on March 31, 1928, five "Paid Up Certificates," serial Nos. 8057 to 8061, inclusive, for the sum of $666.67 for each, respectively, having a face value at maturity of $1,000.00, to wit, September 31, 1934; also on October 15, 1928, they purchased five "Paid Up Certificates," serial Nos. 8063 to 8067, inclusive, for the sum of $666.67 each, respectively, each having a face value at maturity of $1,000.00, to wit, April 15, 1935; also on May 15, 1930, they purchased five "Paid Up Certificates," serial Nos. 8075 to 8079, inclusive, for the sum of $666.67 each, respectively, each having a face value at maturity of $1,000.00, to wit, November 15, 1936, and values according to the surrender values for each six-month period for a less time than the full maturity values.
Notice and demand for payment were made by Spartanburg waterworks commission, through their superintendent, on June 21, 1933, and payment ignored. The said commission is still the owner and holder of all of the above "Full Paid Certificates."
The defendant claims that these "Full Paid Certificates" holders are stockholders of the association and should prorate with installment stockholders after the claims of general creditors are met and are not entitled to a preference over them in the assets of the association.
I find myself unable to agree with this construction of these contracts, and hold that the relation of debtor and creditor existed between the association and the holders thereof ab initio, under the constitution, by-laws, and the language of the certificates themselves, taking in connection the scheme set forth in the circulars in respect to said certificates and the inducements contained therein, and will endeavor to set forth my reason as clearly as possible.
The provisions as to stock in the association as above set forth in the constitution, Section 3, clearly relate to the issuance only of stock of a par value of $100.00 per share, payable either in installments or as advance dues, and on the face of the recognized stock certificate admitted in evidence is shown that the holder thereof was entitled to blank number of shares of the capital stock of the association, and there is also a blank to evidence the number of shares of such stock and the series in which the stock is held, each series under the scheme being separate and apart from any other series, providing in the scheme that each series shall be matured independently of any other and wound up when matured.
None of these provisions appear on the face of the "Paid Up Certificate," and no reference to stock or being entitled to any shares of stock appear. They are absolute promises to pay $1,000.00 to the holder at the end of seventy-eight months, or, at the holder's option, to pay an amount certain for each six-month period designated in the table appearing on the back thereof. There is no amount of payment appearing either on the face or back of the recognized stock certificates, and the surrender values of such stock certificates are entitled under Section 6 of the by-laws to withdraw at any time under thirty days' notice and receive only the amount paid in, less fines and penalties.
The installment values of the paid-up certificates are calculated upon a basis of 5 per cent. for part time and 7.7 per cent. for the full seventy-eight months, if not canceled or withdrawn before maturity.
If the association had deemed these paid-up certificates as shares of stock, fully paid in advance, for instance, each one of the $1,000.00 certificates designated as entitling the holder to ten shares of the capital stock, it could have issued them under such conditions by amending the constitution and by-laws and they would have been notice to the holder of his relation to the association, and the holders would be entitled under such certificates to no preference over the other.
It seems from some of the adjudicated cases, in which no preference was allowed, the certificates were called "Full Paid Stock Certificates," and the judgment as to their non-priority was based on the fact that they were stockholders, paying only in advance. The constitution of the association forbids the issuance of stock except stock of a par value of $100.00 for each share, or at least it provides for the issuance of only that kind of stock, and the certificates in the instant case call for a par value of $1,000.00 at maturity. It may be true that the association intended to mature these certificates out of earnings, but this would not of itself change their character.
I am inclined to find rather that these certificates were issued under the last provision of the by-laws, known as Section 30, which provides:
"The board of directors is authorized to borrow money, when in their judgment it is to the best interest of the association, on such terms and conditions and security as to them may seem wise. They are also authorized to issue deposit certificates to bear interest at no greater rate than five per cent. per annum."
The installment values of these certificates are determined at a rate of 5 per cent., but at that rate they would not mature in seventy-eight months, but at approximately 7.7 per cent.
If the maturity values of $1,000.00 at seventy-eight months is an ultra vires contract, then the association is estopped from asserting the same, as the statements set forth in their circulars, which induced these plaintiffs to purchase them control, irrespective of by-laws, and our Supreme Court, in the case of Williamson v. Eastern B. L. Ass'n, 54 S.C. 582, 32 S.E., 765, 71 Am. St. Rep., 822, holds, quoting syllabus: "When the certificate of stock and the circular of a building and loan association provide that stock shall mature in a definite number of months and the by-laws of the association state the contrary, the circular and certificate will prevail at instance of stockholder who contracted with reference to circular and certificate."
Also, in case of Bedford B. Ry. Co. v. McDonald, 17 Ind. App. 492, 46 N.E. 1022, 60 Am. St. Rep. 172, the rule is that where a private corporation has entered into a contract not immoral in itself and not forbidden by statute, and it has been in good faith performed by the other party, the corporation will not be heard on a plea of ultra vires.
Many of the cases in the English Chancery Courts and some of the American cases hold even in recognized full paid stock certificates that, "When the holders of prepaid stock receive a specified dividend or percentage of interest only and share neither in the profits nor losses, the better opinion is that an agreement that such stock shall be preferred in the distribution of assets is valid and binding even in cases of insolvency, on the ground that the transaction is not a creation of stock, but a loan." 6 Am. Eng. Decisions in Equity, 432 and cases cited.
While the above opinions refer specifically to stock providing for express preferences, yet the parallel as to the paid-up certificates in the instant case, which promise sums fixed, based on an interest rate, would tend to show that they would not be entitled to share in profits and must be construed to be loans.
A case very similar to the instant case is found in the Missouri reports, which holds as follows: The holder of a certificate lawfully and authoritatively issued by a building association, showing that he has paid a certain sum on which he is entitled to interest, and which is to be redeemable at its face value, and that such holders by the acceptance of the certificate waived all benefits in the earnings of the organization above the interest, is a creditor and entitled to priority of payment before the assets are distributed among the stockholders, such certificate being a direct obligation for the payment of money and not a certificate of stock. State v. Phoenix Loan Ass'n, 86 Mo. App. 301.
The next question to be decided, if the foregoing conclusions of law are erroneous under the state of facts presented, is the effect of the notice and demand for payment made by these plaintiffs before admitted insolvency or while the association was a going concern.
The conservator was appointed to take over this association on May 9, 1935. In the early part of 1932 the plaintiff, Magnolia Camp, W.O.W. No. 28, made demand upon the association for payment of the eight certificates held by it and sixty-day notice was claimed by the treasurer. Some time later two of the certificates were paid, but no payment of the six herein sued on was made.
Likewise, on June 21, 1933, the plaintiff, Spartanburg waterworks, made demand for payment of the fifteen certificates held by them, but payment was not made.
The plaintiffs contend that even if the relationship of the holders of the paid-up certificates was that of stockholders, that when they made demand for payment and cancellation of their certificates, that they ceased to be stockholders and the relationship between them and the association was that of debtor and creditor, and that if the association is now insolvent, that they are entitled to a preference over installment stockholders.
This seems to be the law in this State, as in the case of Moore v. Southern Mut. Building Loan Association, 50 S.C. 89, 27 S.E., 543, 545, cited to sustain their contention, such seems to be the holding of the Court. This was a case in which the plaintiffs were recognized stockholders and attempted to be paid the withdrawal value of their stock. It appears that the association was a foreign building and loan association doing business in this State, and a Receiver was appointed within four months from the time of making demand and a week after suit was filed.
The Court said, "Acceptance of notice of withdrawal terminates membership in the association. The member at once assumes the position of a creditor, and may recover the amount due in assumpsit, but the judgment and the execution will be controlled by the Court, as justice and right may require."
I construe this last clause to mean that the Court will control the judgment to the extent that the suit creditor would not obtain a preference over other creditors in like situation, but that all creditors would share ratably and in proportion.
In this case the defendant contends that they remained stockholders until their stock was actually canceled, but the Court said that this position was untenable, for after the plaintiffs had done all that they were required to do to entitle them to claim the withdrawal value of their stock, the association could not be allowed to defeat such claims by delaying or refusing to formally cancel the certificates of stock.
Therefore, under all the facts of this case, the charter provisions, by-laws, and the certificates as evidence of the contract, I am compelled to the conclusion that these plaintiffs are creditors and entitled to a preference in the distribution of the assets, pro rata with other creditors in like situation and general creditors, over the rights of installment stockholders. The failure of the constitution and by-laws to define the nature of the paid-up certificates and the rights of the holders, or to designate them as stock certificates entitling the holder to a definite number of shares, should in the case of doubt be resolved against the association in favor of those investing their money in same. Certainly under the notice of demand for payment, they became creditors on maturity of the notice, under the authority of the case of Moore v. Southern, etc., Ass'n, supra.
The plaintiffs are entitled to judgment in the following sums as fixing the value of their claims:
Magnolia Camp, W.O.W. No. 28, $6,000.00, together with interest thereon from August 4, 1931, to July 1, 1934, at 7 per cent. per annum and at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum until May 9, 1935, at which date a conservator was appointed.
W.W. Griffin et al., constituting the board of public works of the City of Spartanburg, S.C. $5,000.00 on certificates Nos. 8057, 8058, 8059, 8060, 8061, together with interest thereon at 6 per cent. from October 1, 1934, to May 9, 1935.
Five thousand dollars on certificates Nos. 8063, 8064, 8065, 8066, 8067, together with interest from April 15, 1935, at 6 per cent.
On certificates Nos. 8075, 8076, 8077, 8078, 8079, the holders are entitled to judgment in the sum of $4,083.50, which is calculated on the surrender value of same at the end of the six-month period before the appointment of the conservator, to wit, November 15, 1934, the same being four and one-half years from date of issue; also interest on said amount at 6 per cent. from November 15, 1934, to May 9, 1935.
The above amounts to be paid by the conservator on the liquidation of the association, or prorated by him with the claims of all creditors established, if the funds in his hands are insufficient to pay all creditors in full, after all costs of these proceedings and costs of liquidation are deducted.
Respectfully submitted,[Signed] J.B. ATKINSON, Special Referee. Jan. 8, 1936.
Messrs. S.R. Watt and C.E. Daniel, for appellant.
Messrs. R.B. Paslay and Evans, Galbraith Holcombe, for respondents, cite: Construction of written instrument: 54 S.C. 582; 32 S.E., 765. As to contracts being ultra vires: 60 A.S.R., 172; 56 S.C. 280; 34 S.E., 409; 81 S.C. 10; 61 S.E., 1027; 100 S.C. 1; 84 S.E., 112; 176 S.C. 318; 180 S.E., 188; 155 S.C. 488; 152 S.E., 644. Insolvency: 155 S.C. 222; 152 S.E., 425; 9 C.J., 991; 265 U.S. 365; 68 L.Ed., 1067; 178 S.C. 252; 182 S.E., 758; 165 S.C. 404; 173 S.C. 172; 175 S.E., 273. Stockholder becomes creditor at maturity: 56 A., 294; 9 C.J., 936, 944; 56 Ark. 335; 18 L.R.A., 129; 172 N.Y., 508; 50 S.C. 89; 27 S.E., 543.
December 11, 1936. The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Appeal from decree of Hon. J. Henry Johnson, presiding Circuit Judge, confirming report of Hon. J.B. Atkinson, Special Referee, and overruling all exceptions thereto.
This Court adopts as its opinion the report of the Special Referee, which will be reported. In addition, there will be reported copy of "Paid-up Certificate" appearing folios 115-118; "Cancellation Values," folio 119; "Surrender and Cancellation Form," folio 120, and "Transfer Form," folio 121.
Exceptions overruled and judgment affirmed.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE STABLER and MESSRS. JUSTICES CARTER, BONHAM and FISHBURNE concur.