Grici v. Mance

Full title: Donna M. GRICI v. Eric MANCE

Court: Superior Court of Connecticut

Date published: Jul 29, 2019

No. TTDCV146008673S (Conn. Super. Ct. Jul. 29, 2019)

Opinion

TTDCV146008673S

07-29-2019

Donna M. GRICI v. Eric MANCE

Bright, J.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

Bright, J.

I. INTRODUCTION

This action arises out of the end of the personal relationship between the plaintiff, Donna M. Grici, and the defendant, Eric Mance. The plaintiff and the defendant were involved in a non-marital romantic relationship between 1997 and approximately January 27, 2014, during which they lived together from February 1999, until the defendant ended the relationship. At the time that the relationship ended, the defendant had a 48 percent membership interest in Broad Brook Brewing, LLC (Broad Brook), a small, but growing, brewery located in East Windsor. On or about October 24, 2014, the plaintiff brought this action in three counts. In count one, she alleged that the parties had an agreement to share equally the defendant’s membership interest in Broad Brook. She further alleged that the defendant breached that agreement by failing to pay the plaintiff her share of the draw, income, and/or profits that the defendant received from Broad Brook and failed to share his membership interest in Broad Brook with her. In count two, she alleged a claim of unjust enrichment based on what she alleged were her substantial contributions to the development of Broad Brook. In count three, she alleged a claim of quantum meruit seeking to be compensated for the value of the work she provided to the defendant in the development of Broad Brook.

The defendant filed an answer denying the essential allegations of the complaint; in particular, he denied that the parties agreed that they jointly owned the defendant’s membership interest in Broad Brook and that the plaintiff was entitled to any compensation for any help she may have provided to the defendant regarding Broad Brook. The defendant also raised special defenses of the statute of frauds, laches, unclean hands, equitable estoppel, lack of consideration, accord and satisfaction, and offset. The defendant later amended his answer to add a counterclaim for invasion of privacy in which he alleged that, between the end of January 2014 and August 2015, the plaintiff accessed, without authorization, his e-mail accounts and those of his parents. He alleged that those accounts contained both his personal information and proprietary and confidential information concerning Broad Brook. In her answer to the counterclaim, the plaintiff neither admitted nor denied the essential allegations of the counterclaim, but left the defendant to his proof.

In July 2016, after a yearlong discovery battle over the defendant’s right to obtain financial information regarding Broad Brook, the plaintiff filed a motion to bifurcate the trial of the matter to resolve first the extent of the plaintiff’s interest in Broad Brook. The court granted the plaintiff’s motion, and in November 2016, a jury trial was held to determine whether the parties had entered into a contract which entitled the plaintiff to 50 percent of the defendant’s membership interest in Broad Brook. After a four-day trial, the jury returned a unanimous verdict for the defendant, in which it concluded that the plaintiff had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the parties had entered into a contract under which the plaintiff would receive 50 percent of the defendant’s membership interest in Broad Brook. The jury’s verdict, thus, resolved count one of the plaintiff’s complaint in favor of the defendant.

Following the jury’s verdict on count one, the parties engaged in additional discovery on counts two and three of the plaintiff’s complaint in anticipation of a trial to the court on those counts and the defendant’s counterclaim. Prior to trial, the plaintiff amended her complaint and expounded on her unjust enrichment and quantum meruit claims by alleging that her contributions to the development of Broad Brook were part of the parties’ joint retirement plan and that the defendant’s termination of their relationship entitled her to repayment for the monetary and nonmonetary contributions she made in support of the defendant between 2011 and 2014, when Broad Brook was being developed.

The plaintiff’s remaining claims and the defendant’s counterclaim were tried to the court over three days. The parties agreed that evidence admitted during the jury trial as to count one of the plaintiff’s complaint could be considered by the court when resolving the remaining claims, subject to the preservation of objections made by the parties during the jury trial. Following the court trial, the parties, after receiving transcripts from both trials, submitted post-trial briefs and reply briefs.

II. FACTS

Having considered all of the evidence and the submissions of the parties, the court makes the following findings of fact. The parties began dating in or about 1997. On or about February 28, 1999, the parties jointly purchased a home located at 12 Slater Road in Stafford for $130,000. The parties lived there together as a couple until the defendant ended the relationship and moved out on or about January 27, 2014. At the time they purchased the Slater Road property, the plaintiff was earning approximately $42,000 per year and the defendant was earning approximately $26,000 per year. Over the course of their relationship, the disparity in their incomes increased as the plaintiff earned an MBA from the University of Massachusetts in 2001, and moved to higher paying executive positions in the insurance industry. In 2009, the plaintiff was employed by Travelers Insurance Company at a starting salary of $120,000. By 2016, her base salary at Travelers had risen to $176,000. She also was entitled to receive bonuses. By contrast, the defendant’s annual income during the parties’ relationship never exceeded $50,000. The defendant’s income came primarily from working in his parents’ printing business and a small information technology (IT) consulting business the defendant started.

When the parties began living together, the plaintiff paid approximately 60 percent of their living expenses. Over time, as her income increased, she paid a steadily increasing share of the expenses. The plaintiff viewed herself as the "primary bread winner." The parties never had any agreement as to how they would share living expenses other than that each would contribute what they could to the parties’ joint bank accounts from which the expenses were paid. During the course of the relationship, the plaintiff never complained about the defendant’s contributions to the household expenses and never told the defendant that she expected him to pay more. The plaintiff never told the defendant that she expected him some day to reimburse her for the amount she contributed to those expenses that was greater than what the defendant contributed.

During the time that they owned the Slater Road property, the parties made substantial improvements to the property in 2004 and in 2006. Most of the costs of the renovations were paid for by the parties’ refinancing the mortgage on the property. The renovations were done largely by the defendant, although the plaintiff did provide some assistance. The parties also purchased interests in two additional parcels of real estate during their relationship. In 2007, they formed Porter Management Group, LLC (Porter Management) to purchase the development rights to an industrial piece of property on Benton Drive in East Longmeadow, Massachusetts. The development rights were purchased as an investment with the parties considering the possibility that the defendant’s parents’ printing business could move there. The rights were purchased for $95,000, all of which was provided by the plaintiff. Nevertheless, the parties had equal membership shares in Porter Management. Finally, in October 2013, the parties jointly purchased a lake house in Holland, Massachusetts. The price of the house, including transactional costs, was approximately $244,000. The plaintiff provided the entire down payment of approximately $104,000, and paid all expenses associated with the property, including the mortgage and taxes.

The parties, during their relationship, also jointly purchased various personal property, the most significant of which was a Lotus sports car, which they bought for approximately $38,000. The plaintiff provided the initial $5000 down payment needed for the purchase of the car, and the parties equally shared the monthly payments thereafter until the plaintiff, at some point, used some of her bonuses from work and a gift from her father to pay off the loan.

Starting in approximately 2007, the defendant began brewing beer in a garage with two friends, Tom Rossing and Joe Dealba. After providing their beer to family and friends for approximately four years, in or about 2010 or 2011, the three friends started submitting samples of their beer to various beer competitions around the country. Their products were well-received and they won a number of awards. At the same time, they started attending beer festivals to provide tasting of their beers. In addition to the defendant, Rossing and Dealba attending these festivals, friends and family members, including the plaintiff, would attend to help serve tastings. Ultimately, the defendant, Rossing and Dealba decided to start a brewery and attempt to turn their beer brewing hobby into a business. When the defendant told the plaintiff of this plan she initially was not supportive. She expressed reservations about Rossing and Dealba as partners because they had limited business experience. She also was concerned that spending time on the brewery would prevent the defendant from expanding his IT consulting business and his parents’ printing business. Finally, the plaintiff was concerned that the business would take time away from various home projects the defendant was doing or that the plaintiff wanted him to do. In general, she viewed the brewery as a risky endeavor and was not happy about the defendant’s plan.

Despite the plaintiff’s reservations, the defendant, Rossing, and Dealba proceeded with their plan. They found a location in East Windsor for a brewery and tap room, obtained the necessary zoning approvals, designed a floor plan, and obtained the necessary building permit. On December 1, 2011, the defendant, Rossing, and Dealba registered Broad Brook as a Connecticut limited liability company. At the time, the defendant’s membership interest was 52 percent. The defendant’s membership was later reduced to 48 percent when Broad Brook accepted a $150,000 investment from an individual, who, in return, received a total of a 9 percent membership interest in Broad Brook. Broad Brook opened its brewery and taproom on October 3, 2013.

The plaintiff had no financial involvement with Broad Brook. She never invested any money in it. At one point, the defendant, with the plaintiff’s consent, borrowed $25,000 from the parties’ joint account to purchase equipment for the brewery. That money, however, was returned to the joint account within approximately five months. The plaintiff also was unaware of Broad Brook’s financial arrangements. For example, she did not learn until the end of 2013 that the defendant had executed a personal guarantee of Broad Brook’s line of credit from NUVO Bank and Trust Company. She also was unaware that Broad Brook had accepted a fourth investor and that, as a result, the defendant’s membership interest in Broad Brook had been diluted. The plaintiff was not happy when she learned of these circumstances. She was particularly concerned that the plaintiff’s personal guarantee would put at risk the property she owned jointly with the defendant. As a result, in or around January 2014, the plaintiff began making repeated requests to the defendant that he quitclaim to her his interest in the Slater Road and Holland, Massachusetts properties. She stated that, in return, she would identify the defendant in her will as the beneficiary of those properties.

The plaintiff eventually began to support the defendant in his efforts to open a brewery. She and the defendant talked and e-mailed regularly regarding the brewery. Those communications involved Broad Brook’s business plan, the names of its beers, the labeling of the beers, the color and style of merchandise, including t-shirts, and advertising and marketing material. She also attended and assisted the defendant, Rossing and Dealba at a number of beer festivals. Furthermore, while on vacations, the plaintiff and the defendant would visit various breweries and brew pubs to get ideas for Broad Brook. At no time, did the plaintiff tell the defendant that she expected to be compensated for the assistance she provided. The plaintiff kept no records of the time she spent or the value of the assistance she provided to the defendant. At no time, did the defendant say anything to the plaintiff that would lead her reasonably to believe that the defendant intended to compensate her for any help she provided. Instead, she helped the defendant because she loved him and wanted to support his efforts, much as she did with the printing business and the IT consulting business. The help and assistance the plaintiff provided to the defendant was typical of what one partner in a committed relationship would give to the other. Furthermore, the assistance the plaintiff provided was materially the same as that provided by other family members and friends of the defendant, Rossing, and Dealba, none of whom were employed by Broad Brook, were paid for their assistance, or expected to be paid for their assistance. The plaintiff did hope that the brewery would be successful and provide income for the plaintiff, which would inure to her benefit, and that the plaintiff’s interest in Broad Brook would become a valuable asset for the couple. Despite her hopes though, the plaintiff, on more than one occasion, commented to others that she expected Broad Brook to fail.

By December 2013, the parties’ personal relationship was fraying. The plaintiff had learned about the defendant’s personal guarantee of Broad Brook’s credit line and that Broad Brook had taken on a fourth investor. She felt betrayed that the defendant had not informed her of these events when they occurred. She also was concerned about the impact the defendant’s personal guarantee would have on her finances given that she and the defendant jointly owned several assets. As part of her efforts to protect her personal finances, upon learning of the defendant’s personal guarantee, on December 23, 2013, the plaintiff transferred $28,000 from the parties’ joint account to her personal account. Unbeknownst to the plaintiff, the defendant also had started a romantic relationship with another woman.

In January 2014, the parties’ relationship continued to fall apart. The defendant had already disconnected emotionally from the plaintiff, although he did not tell her so immediately. The plaintiff continued to push the defendant, with more and more urgency, to execute quitclaim deeds transferring his interests in the Slater Road, and Holland, Massachusetts properties to the plaintiff. Ultimately, on January 24, 2014, the plaintiff told the defendant that if he did not sign the documents to transfer the properties, she would go after his interest in Broad Brook. That same day, the defendant executed a deed transferring his interest in the Slater Road property to the plaintiff. Approximately, three days later, the defendant moved out of the Slater Road property and ended the parties’ relationship. He also told the plaintiff that he was romantically involved with another woman.

Thereafter, the parties divided the remainder of their joint assets. The defendant, for no consideration, transferred his interest in Porter Management and the Holland, Massachusetts property to the plaintiff. The plaintiff retained the $28,000 she had removed from the parties’ joint account. The plaintiff removed the defendant as a beneficiary from her life insurance policies and retirement accounts, and the defendant did the same. Eventually, the parties sold the Lotus and split the proceeds evenly.

Although, the defendant moved on from the plaintiff in January 2014, the plaintiff thereafter continued to seek information about the defendant and Broad Brook. Using passwords the defendant had given her during their relationship, the plaintiff, after the relationship ended, regularly accessed the defendant’s e-mail accounts associated with the printing business and his IT consulting business. The defendant discovered the plaintiff’s actions in or about April 2014. The defendant changed his passwords and the unauthorized access to his e-mail accounts stopped. The plaintiff admitted that she was in fact secretly accessing the defendant’s accounts during this time. In July 2014, the defendant received a text from the plaintiff wishing him good luck with his move. The defendant was suspicious because he had not discussed any move with the plaintiff. He became concerned that someone close to him, perhaps an employee, was providing the plaintiff with information about his personal life. It was not until approximately a year later that the defendant realized that the plaintiff had gained unauthorized access to his parents’ e-mail accounts. When he reviewed the log files for the accounts he discovered that the plaintiff had accessed personal photographs, including photographs from his honeymoon. She also had accessed Broad Brook e-mails and documents. The plaintiff’s access of the defendant’s parents’ e-mail accounts was regular and persistent.

Additional facts will be discussed as necessary.

III. DISCUSSION

A

In count two of her amended complaint, the plaintiff claims that the defendant was unjustly enriched by the support and assistance she provided him during their relationship, both generally and specifically with respect to Broad Brook. She seeks damages based on two theories. First, she claims that she is entitled to be compensated for the value of the work she provided to the defendant in connection with Broad Brook. Second, she claims that she is entitled to be reimbursed for what she spent on household expenses beyond 50 percent of those expenses from 2011 until 2014 when the defendant was working on Broad Brook.

"[W]herever justice requires compensation to be given for property or services rendered under a contract, and no remedy is available by an action on the contract, restitution of the value of what has been given must be allowed ... Under such circumstances, the basis of the plaintiff’s recovery is the unjust enrichment of the defendant ... A right of recovery under the doctrine of unjust enrichment is essentially equitable, its basis being that in a given situation it is contrary to equity and good conscience for one to retain a benefit which has come to him at the expense of another ... With no other test than what, under a given set of circumstances, is just or unjust, equitable or inequitable, conscionable or unconscionable, it becomes necessary in any case where the benefit of the doctrine is claimed, to examine the circumstances and the conduct of the parties and apply this standard ... Unjust enrichment is, consistent with the principles of equity, a broad and flexible remedy ... Plaintiffs seeking recovery for unjust enrichment must prove (1) that the defendants were benefited, (2) that the defendants unjustly did not pay the plaintiffs for the benefits, and (3) that the failure of payment was to the plaintiffs’ detriment."

"This doctrine is based upon the principle that one should not be permitted unjustly to enrich himself at the expense of another but should be required to make restitution of or for property received, retained or appropriated ... The question is: Did [the party liable], to the detriment of someone else, obtain something of value to which [the party liable] was not entitled?" (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) New Hartford v. Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority, 291 Conn. 433, 451-52, 970 A.2d 592 (2009).

The court turns first to the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant was unjustly enriched by the value of the assistance she gave to him regarding Broad Brook. Arguably, the plaintiff’s input benefited the defendant. The plaintiff regularly discussed with the defendant various aspects of the business and the plaintiff provided her input, some of which the defendant accepted and used in connection with Broad Brook. Nevertheless, the plaintiff has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the failure to pay for such assistance was unjust. The defendant was starting a new business venture and discussed the aspects of the business with the person with whom he was in a committed relationship. Partners in such relationships typically do not expect to be compensated for providing such assistance, and there is nothing unjust in failing to pay for such help and support. The same is true with respect to the plaintiff’s accompanying the defendant at beer festivals, brewery tours, and similar events. It is noteworthy that other family members and friends of the members of Broad Brook provided similar assistance to the defendant and the other members of Broad Brook, without any expectation of compensation.

Furthermore, the failure to pay the plaintiff for such assistance was not to her detriment. At the time she provided assistance to the defendant, she did so out of love for and in support of the defendant. His success and happiness were what she received in return for that help. In addition, although the plaintiff may have hoped that the business might someday financially enrich their lives, she expressed doubts to others that it would do so. Thus, as she did not expect to receive anything from Broad Brook, providing the defendant with assistance was not to her detriment.

Overall, considering the circumstances and conduct of the parties, the plaintiff has failed to prove that the defendant was unjustly enriched by whatever assistance she gave him with Broad Brook.

Second, the plaintiff claims that she is entitled to be reimbursed for the disproportionate share of living expenses she incurred between 2011 and 2014 when the plaintiff was developing Broad Brook. This claim is without merit. During the entirety of the parties’ relationship they understood that the plaintiff was paying most of their living expenses because she made substantially more money than the defendant did. During the relationship, she never expected to be reimbursed for such expenses. Furthermore, the defendant’s efforts to develop Broad Brook did not result in the plaintiff having to incur any greater obligation regarding living expenses. The defendant continued to work at his parent’s printing business and as an IT consultant. His income and contributions towards the parties’ living expenses did not change materially during the years of 2011 and 2014 from what they were prior to that period. Finally, unmarried couples typically may not make a claim for reimbursement of living expenses absent an express or implied agreement that they would share the expenses in a particular manner. See Boland v. Catalano, 202 Conn. 333, 340-42, 521 A.2d 142 (1987). In the present case, the only agreement and expectation was that the parties would contribute what they could to the household expenses. The plaintiff failed to present credible evidence that the defendant failed to meet that expectation.

Finally, the manner in which the parties divided their joint assets at the end of their relationship confirms that the defendant has not been unjustly enriched. Despite the fact that he was a joint owner of the Slater Road and Holland, Massachusetts properties, and an equal member in Porter Management, he transferred his interests in all three assets to the plaintiff for no consideration. He also made no claim to the $28,000 the plaintiff unilaterally transferred from the parties’ joint account to her personal account in December 2013. The plaintiff having received the lion’s share of the parties’ joint assets, there is nothing unjust about her not also receiving additional compensation that never was contemplated by the parties.¹

1 The plaintiff argues that the value of the assets she received from the defendant was minimal given the amounts invested in the assets and the costs of selling them. The court does not find the plaintiff’s evidence in support of this argument credible. The value of the Slater Road property increased significantly during the time the parties owned it. Much of the increase in value was due to renovations personally undertaken by the defendant. In addition, after the defendant transferred his interests to the plaintiff, she had sole control over the decision to sell the assets and at what prices. The court is not persuaded that it is equitable for her to be able to use that discretion and then complain that what she received was insufficient and that she is entitled to receive even more from the defendant.

Judgment shall enter for the defendant on count two of the plaintiff’s amended complaint.

B

In count three of her amended complaint, the plaintiff asserts a claim of quantum meruit. Relying on the same facts alleged in count two, the plaintiff claims that she is entitled to the fair value of the assistance she provided to the defendant relating to Broad Brook and to a reimbursement for living expenses between 2011 and 2014.

"[Q]uantum meruit [is a form] of the equitable remedy of restitution by which a plaintiff may recover the benefit conferred on a defendant in situations where no express contract has been entered into by the parties ... [It is] available to a party when the trier of fact determines that an implied contract for services existed between the parties, and that, therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to the reasonable value of services rendered ... The implied contract, however, does not have to be one implied in fact ... Rather, it may be an implied in law contract ... In distinction to an implied [in fact] contract, a quasi [or implied in law] contract is not a contract, but an obligation which the law creates out of the circumstances present, even though a party did not assume the obligation, and may not have intended but in fact actually dissented from it ... It is based on equitable principles to operate whenever justice requires compensation to be made ... With no other test than what, under a given set of circumstances, is just or unjust, equitable or inequitable, conscionable or unconscionable, it becomes necessary in any case where the benefit of the doctrine is claimed to examine the circumstances and the conduct of the parties and apply this standard." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Parnoff v. Mooney, 132 Conn.App. 512, 519, 35 A.3d 283 (2011).

As noted in Part IIIA of this opinion, there was no implied contact in fact between the parties. The plaintiff never expected to receive compensation for her services, and the defendant never gave the plaintiff any reason to believe that she would be compensated. As to whether there is an implied in law contract, the equitable considerations that applied to the plaintiff’s claim of unjust enrichment apply with equal force to the plaintiff’s quantum meruit claim. Thus, the same facts and circumstances of the present case that lead the court to conclude that the plaintiff was not unjustly enriched, also lead the court to conclude that the plaintiff is not entitled to compensation under her quantum meruit claim. In fact, any compensation of the plaintiff would be decidedly inequitable.

Judgment shall enter for the defendant on count three of the plaintiff’s amended complaint.

C

The court turns now to the defendant’s invasion of privacy counterclaim. The defendant claims that the plaintiff invaded his privacy by accessing, without authorization, his and his parent’s e-mail accounts, and secretly reviewing the plaintiff’s private communications and photographs, as well as Broad Brook’s proprietary and confidential documents. The plaintiff does not dispute her unauthorized access, but justifies her access of the defendant’s e-mail accounts by arguing that the defendant never expressly told her not to use the passwords to those accounts that he previously had provided her.

"Our Supreme Court has observed that ‘the law of privacy has not developed as a single tort, but as a complex of four distinct kinds of invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff, which are tied together by the common name, but otherwise have almost nothing in common except that each represents an interference with the right of the plaintiff to be [left] alone.’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Foncello v. Amorossi, 284 Conn. 225, 234, 931 A.2d 924 (2007). The four categories of invasion of privacy are: ‘([1]) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another; ([2]) appropriation of the other’s name or likeness; ([3]) unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life; or ([4]) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public.’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., quoting Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., 188 Conn. 107, 127-28, 448 A.2d 1317 (1982); see also 3 Restatement (Second), Torts, Invasion of Privacy § 652A, p. 376 (1977). ‘[P]rivacy actions involve injuries to emotions and mental suffering, while defamation actions involve injury to reputation.’ Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., supra, at 128 n.19, 448 A.2d 1317." Davidson v. Bridgeport, 180 Conn.App. 18, 29, 182 A.3d 639 (2018). The defendant’s counterclaim falls into the first category.

The court concludes that the plaintiff’s actions of accessing, without authorization, for more than a year, the e-mails of the defendant and his parents was an unreasonable intrusion upon the defendant’s seclusion. He had no interest in sharing the private details of his personal life and business life with the plaintiff after their relationship ended. The fact that the plaintiff sought to learn such details through secret searches of various private e-mail accounts is evidence that she knew that she was accessing information about the defendant that he had no intention of otherwise sharing with her. Her justification, as to the defendant’s e-mail accounts, that the defendant never told her not to use his passwords and did not immediately change them when the relationship ended is meritless. The plaintiff should have reasonably concluded that once her relationship with the defendant ended, there was no legitimate reason for her to access his e-mail accounts. Any reasonable person would have similarly understood that the defendant neither invited nor wanted such intrusions into his privacy. Furthermore, the plaintiff’s intrusions were continuous and specifically targeted at gathering information about the defendant’s new personal relationship and Broad Brook. The plaintiff’s invasion of the defendant’s privacy was both unreasonable and substantial.

Having concluded that the plaintiff did invade the defendant’s privacy, the court will address the appropriate remedy. The defendant asks both for damages and equitable relief in the form of an injunction prohibiting further unauthorized access to the defendant’s and his parents’ e-mail accounts and a return of any materials the plaintiff copied from those accounts. The plaintiff argues that the defendant is not entitled to damages because his prayer for relief attached to his counterclaim did not seek damages. She further argues that equitable relief is not necessary because any access has been prevented by changes to the passwords to the accounts in question and because she has no materials from those accounts in her possession. As to the question of damages, the defendant concedes that his prayer for relief does not expressly request damages, but argues that his request for "such other relief ... as is just and proper" is sufficient to cover an award of damages.

Our Supreme Court recently addressed the question of whether the language used by the defendant in his prayer for relief is sufficient to support a request for an award of damages. "Although the plaintiff requested ‘[s]uch other and further relief as in law or equity may appertain, ’ the trial court properly concluded that a more specific request was necessary to put the defendants on notice that the plaintiff was seeking some other form of relief besides dissolution and winding up. As the Appellate Court has explained, a catchall prayer for relief such as" ‘such other relief as the court deems necessary and just’ is too amorphous to be a claim for money damages." Solomon v. Hall-Brooke Foundation, Inc., 30 Conn.App. 129, 134, 619 A.2d 863 (1993); see also Stern v. Connecticut Medical Examining Board, 208 Conn. 492, 501, 545 A.2d 1080 (1988) ("In an ordinary civil case, the general rule is that a prayer for relief must articulate with specificity the form of relief that is sought ... A party who fails to comply with this rule runs the risk of being denied recovery" [citations omitted]). Styslinger v. Brewster Park, LLC, 321 Conn. 312, 315 n.2, 138 A.3d 257 (2016). Such a rule protects a defendant who may make strategic decisions in a case based on his or her perceived exposure to damages. For example, as the defendant notes, the plaintiff engaged in no discovery regarding the defendant’s counterclaim. Had she known that the defendant intended to seek damages, she may have. In any event, this court is bound by the holdings of our Supreme Court and Appellate Court. Applying those holdings to the facts of this case, the defendant is not entitled to damages. His prayer for relief did not specifically request damages and his catchall request for such other relief as is just and proper is insufficient.

As to the defendant’s requests for equitable relief, the defendant has not presented sufficient evidence that the e-mail accounts at issue are currently in any danger of unauthorized access by the plaintiff. The defendant changed the passwords for the accounts and there was no evidence that there have been any attempts at unauthorized access since he did so almost four years ago. Consequently, the court declines to order the injunctive relief requested by the defendant. The court will, however, order the plaintiff to return to the defendant any materials she printed, downloaded, or otherwise copied from the e-mail accounts she improperly accessed. The plaintiff has no right to such materials and the defendant has substantial interest in having any such materials returned to him. The materials shall be produced to the defendant’s counsel within 60 days of the date of this decision, along with an affidavit from the plaintiff confirming that she has fully complied with the court’s order. The plaintiff is further ordered to destroy and/or delete any physical or electronic copies of any materials returned to the defendant, and to certify in her affidavit of compliance that she has done so. To the extent that the plaintiff has no materials to produce, her affidavit of compliance must so state.

IV. CONCLUSION

Judgment is entered for the defendant on all counts of the plaintiff’s amended complaint. Judgment is entered for the defendant on his counterclaim. The relief awarded to the defendant is limited to this court’s order that the plaintiff return to the defendant any materials she printed, downloaded, or otherwise copied from the e-mail accounts she improperly accessed. The materials shall be produced to defendant’s counsel within 60 days of the date of this decision, along with an affidavit from the plaintiff confirming that she has fully complied with the court’s order. The plaintiff is further ordered to destroy and/or delete any physical or electronic copies of any materials returned to the defendant, and to certify in her affidavit of compliance that she has done so. To the extent the plaintiff has no materials to produce, her affidavit of compliance must so state.