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Gresham v. Napel

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN NORTHERN DIVISION
Feb 6, 2012
Case No. 2:11-cv-520 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 6, 2012)

Opinion

Case No. 2:11-cv-520

02-06-2012

MICHAEL GRESHAM, Plaintiff, v. R. NAPEL et al., Defendants.


Honorable Robert Holmes Bell


OPINION DENYING LEAVE

TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS - THREE STRIKES

Plaintiff Michael Gresham, a prisoner incarcerated at Marquette Branch Prison, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Because Plaintiff has filed at least three lawsuits that were dismissed as frivolous, malicious or for failure to state a claim, he is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The Court will order Plaintiff to pay the $350.00 civil action filing fee within twenty-eight (28) days of this opinion and accompanying order, and if Plaintiff fails to do so, the Court will order that his action be dismissed without prejudice. Even if the case is dismissed, Plaintiff will be responsible for payment of the $350.00 filing fee in accordance with In re Alea, 286 F.3d 378, 380-81 (6th Cir. 2002).

Discussion

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), which was enacted on April 26, 1996, amended the procedural rules governing a prisoner's request for the privilege of proceeding in forma pauperis. As the Sixth Circuit has stated, the PLRA was "aimed at the skyrocketing numbers of claims filed by prisoners - many of which are meritless - and the corresponding burden those filings have placed on the federal courts." Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1286 (6th Cir. 1997). For that reason, Congress put into place economic incentives to prompt a prisoner to "stop and think" before filing a complaint. Id. For example, a prisoner is liable for the civil action filing fee, and if the prisoner qualifies to proceed in forma pauperis, the prisoner may pay the fee through partial payments as outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). The constitutionality of the fee requirements of the PLRA has been upheld by the Sixth Circuit. Id. at 1288.

In addition, another provision reinforces the "stop and think" aspect of the PLRA by preventing a prisoner from proceeding in forma pauperis when the prisoner repeatedly files meritless lawsuits. Known as the "three-strikes" rule, the provision states:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under [the section governing proceedings in forma pauperis]if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The statutory restriction "[i]n no event," found in § 1915(g), is express and unequivocal. The statute does allow an exception for a prisoner who is "under imminent danger of serious physical injury." The Sixth Circuit has upheld the constitutionality of the "three-strikes" rule against arguments that it violates equal protection, the right of access to the courts, and due process, and that it constitutes a bill of attainder and is ex post facto legislation. Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 604-06 (6th Cir. 1998); accord Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1178-82 (9th Cir. 1999); Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 723-26 (11th Cir. 1998); Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 821-22 (5th Cir. 1997).

Plaintiff has been an extremely active litigant in the federal courts in Michigan. The court has dismissed more than three of Plaintiff's actions for failure to state a claim. See Gresham v. Caruso et al., No. 2:10-cv-195 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 11, 2011); Gresham v. Paine et al., No. 1:10-cv-1146 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 8, 2011); Gresham v. Caruso et al., No. 1:10-cv-1038 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 26, 2011); Gresham v. Verville et al., No. 2:10-cv-198 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 19, 2011); Gresham v. Mich. Dep't of Corr. et al., No. 2:07-cv-241 (W.D. Mich. June 9, 2008). In addition, the Court previously has denied Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis because he has three strikes. See Gresham v. LaChance et al., 2:11-cv-231 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 12, 2011); Gresham v. Canlis et al., No. 2:11-cv-179 (W.D. Mich. June 9, 2011); Dennis v. Canlis, No. 2:11-cv-186 (W.D. Mich. June 6, 2011).

Plaintiff seeks to invoke the statutory exception for a prisoner who is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. The Sixth Circuit has recognized the standard previously adopted by other circuit courts:

While the Sixth Circuit has not defined the term "imminent danger" for purposes of this section, other Circuits have held that to meet the requirement, the threat or prison condition "must be real and proximate" and the danger of serious physical injury must exist at the time the complaint is filed. See, e.g., Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2003); Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 313 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc). Thus a prisoner's assertion that he or she faced danger in the past is insufficient to invoke the exception. Id. Other Circuits also have held that district courts may deny a prisoner leave to proceed pursuant to § 1915(g) when the prisoner's claims of imminent danger are "conclusory or ridiculous," Ciarpaglini, 352 F.3d at 331, or are "'clearly baseless' (i.e. are fantastic or delusional and rise to the level of 'irrational or wholly incredible).'" Gibbs v. Cross, 160 F.3d 962, 967 (3d Cir.1998) (quoting Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)).
Rittner v. Kinder, 290 F. App'x 796, 797-98 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Vandiver v. Vasbinder, 416 F. App'x 560, 561-62 (6th Cir. 2011) (imminent danger must be contemporaneous with the complaint's filing); Pointer v. Wilkinson, 502 F.3d 369, 371 n.1 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that assertions of past danger do not satisfy the imminent-danger exception).

Plaintiff's claims are somewhat difficult to decipher but they appear to stem from his 2009 allegations of rape. Plaintiff alleges that, on July 10, 2009, he was raped by employees of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC). Plaintiff filed an action regarding the rape in Gresham v. Granholm et al., Case No. 2:09-cv-231 (W.D. Mich.). Because Plaintiff filed Case No. 2:09-cv-231, and other actions in the district court, he argues that Defendants are involved in a conspiracy to retaliate against him. Plaintiff states (verbatim):

Imminent danger shown due to the force/excessive force used to medicate Plaintiff against his will so he would be unable to litigate or file actions competently in court. This action involves a conspiracy that shocks the conscience of mankind. Plaintiff Gresham is falsily imprisoned Case No. 10-2083 lower ct No. 2:09-cv-229 is due for remand. The smaller but relevant issue here to link the conspiracy to retaliate is over years from 2006 through 2011. MDOC agents have retaliatorily transferred Mr. Gresham to numerous facilities Case No. 2:10-cv-197 is an exhibit as Case No. 2:10-cv-239 in addition due to Mr. Greshams crime of incarceration & prison officials disbelief he was innocent he was raped 7/10/09 Case No. 2:09-cv-231 is an exhibit an attempt to cover up said rape ensued but Mr. Gresham made it to a hospital where a metal object was left in his body over 2 ½ weeks with the intent to kill him by deliberate indifference and gross negligence . . . .
(Compl., docket #1, Page ID#4) (emphasis added.) Plaintiff also alleges that several MDOC staff members have attempted to kill him and sexually assault him. He further claims that razors have been placed in his food loaf, and he has been labeled as mentally ill and involuntarily treated with psychotropic drugs. Plaintiff's allegations are wholly unsupported. Moreover, Plaintiff provides that these actions occurred "from 2006 through 2011." (Id.) Assertions of past danger do not satisfy the imminent-danger exception. Rittner, 290 F. App'x at 797-98; Pointer, 502 F.3d at 371 n.1. Accordingly, Plaintiff's allegations do not fall within the exception to the three-strikes rule because he does not allege facts establishing that he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury.

In light of the foregoing, § 1915(g) prohibits Plaintiff from proceeding in forma pauperis in this action. Plaintiff has twenty-eight (28) days from the date of entry of this order to pay the entire civil action filing fee, which is $350.00. When Plaintiff pays his filing fee, the Court will screen his complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). If Plaintiff fails to pay the filing fee within the 28-day period, his case will be dismissed without prejudice, but he will continue to be responsible for payment of the $350.00 filing fee.

____________

ROBERT HOLMES BELL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SEND REMITTANCES TO THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS:
Clerk, U.S. District Court
399 Federal Building
110 Michigan Street, NW
Grand Rapids, MI 49503

All checks or other forms of payment shall be payable to "Clerk, U.S. District Court."


Summaries of

Gresham v. Napel

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN NORTHERN DIVISION
Feb 6, 2012
Case No. 2:11-cv-520 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 6, 2012)
Case details for

Gresham v. Napel

Case Details

Full title:MICHAEL GRESHAM, Plaintiff, v. R. NAPEL et al., Defendants.

Court:UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN NORTHERN DIVISION

Date published: Feb 6, 2012

Citations

Case No. 2:11-cv-520 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 6, 2012)

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