Gremp v. Ramsey

3 Citing cases

  1. CEMCO, LLC v. KPSI Innovations, Inc.

    No. C23-0918JLR (W.D. Wash. Oct. 31, 2023)

    Defendants do not explain why these allegations fail to state a claim, nor do Defendants even mention RCW 19.40.051 and 19.40.041. See Gremp v. Ramsey, No. C08-0558RSM, 2009 WL 112674, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 14, 2009) (construing the defendants' silence on RCW 19.40.041 in their motion to dismiss “as an admission that [the p]laintiffs' arguments have merit”). (See generally Mot. (lacking any mention of RCW 19.40.051 or 19.40.041).)

  2. Velicer v. Falconhead Capital, LLC

    CASE NO. C19-1505JLR (W.D. Wash. Mar. 11, 2020)

    Plaintiffs must plausibly plead facts to support piercing the corporate veil. See Gremp v. Ramsey, No. C08-558RSM, 2009 WL 112674, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 14, 2009) (concluding under the facts of that case that the plaintiff adequately pleaded a claim for piercing the corporate veil). Here, Plaintiffs must plead facts sufficient to // pierce two layers of corporate veil—both Rita's and Rita's Holdings—before liability could be plausibly imposed on Falconhead.

  3. Kantor v. Bigtip, Inc.

    Case No. 2:15-CV-01871-RAJ (W.D. Wash. Aug. 8, 2016)

    Washington courts agree that "money may be the subject of conversion if it was wrongfully received by the party charged with conversion, or [if] such party was under obligation to return the specific money to the party claiming it." Gremp v. Ramsey, No. C08-558RSM, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2351, *21-22 (W.D. Wash. 2009). With that said, "[a] fundamental premise of conversion is that the property must have rightfully been in the possession of the owner."