See, e.g., Ga. Bldg. Servs. Inc. v. Perry, 387 S.E.2d 898, 905 (Ga.Ct.App. 1989) (stating that control is determined by either "title thereto" or "superior right to possession of property which is in the possession or control of another"); cf. Adams, 490 S.E.2d at 153 (holding, with little discussion, that store manager was not "owner or occupier" of retail establishment as a matter of law on summary judgment). Nevertheless, it appears that the weight of the Georgia cases recognizes that liability under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 may also be established where the individual had supervisory control over the subject premises at the time of injury. In this respect, certain cases have extended liability under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 to managers charged with maintenance duties, Lee v. Myers, 374 S.E.2d 797 (Ga.Ct.App. 1988) (holding that manager of farmer's market operated by Georgia Department of Agriculture owed duty under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 to maintain safe premises), other maintenance contractors, Gregory v. Trupp, 319 S.E.2d 122, 124 (Ga.Ct.App. 1984) (discussed below), and security personnel, FPI Atlanta, L.P. v. Seaton, 524 S.E.2d 524 (Ga.Ct.App. 1999) (holding that security service hired by residential housing complex had tort duty under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 stemming from both O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 and contract with property manager to protect tenants). In Gregory v. Trupp, 319 S.E.2d at 124, for example, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed a trial court's determination that an individual who had no possessory interest in the subject premises was not an "occupier of land," because the evidence suggested that he had a contract to mow the grass, had performed maintenance on the subject premises, and had occasionally ordered children to leave.
Accordingly, no genuine issue of material fact remained as to Food Giant's control of the premises, and the trial court erred in denying appellant Food Giant's motion for summary judgment. Cf. Gregory v. Trupp, 171 Ga. App. 299 ( 319 S.E.2d 122) (1984). In so finding, we expressly reject appellee's contention that the fact that the Food Giant sign was displayed on the premises at the time of her fall is also pertinent to this issue.
See, e.g., Poll v. Deli Mgmt., Inc., 2007 WL 2460769, at *6 (N.D.Ga. Aug. 24, 2007). The Georgia Court of Appeals acknowledged as much in Gregory v. Trupp, 171 Ga.App. 299, 300 (1984) when it noted that whether a contract maintenance man for a vacant lot-who regularly mowed grass, maintained the shrubs, cleaned trash, and ordered children off the lot-exercised sufficient control to subject himself to liability as an occupier of land under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 was a factual issue for a jury to determine, precluding a grant of summary judgment.
Id. at *4-5. For example, in Gregory v. Trupp, 171 Ga.App. 299, 300 (1984), the court reversed a summary judgment ruling because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant was an “owner or occupier” of a vacant lot when he had a contract to mow the grass, and he regularly cleaned trash from the lot, maintained the shrubs, and occasionally ordered children off the lot. The Georgia Court of Appeals held that “whether the defendant exercised such control over the vacant lot to become an ‘occupier of land' within the meaning of OCGA § 51-3-1, . . . [is a]
In Westmoreland v. Williams, 665 S.E.2d 30 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008), the Georgia Court of Appeals held that a defendant occupied a building by hosting an exclusive party inside and buzzing people in. Kmart could not exclude anyone from the lot, as parking space was shared by six businesses. In Gregory v. Trupp, 319 S.E.2d 122, 124 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984), the Georgia Court of Appeals held that a defendant might have occupied a vacant lot given that it had a contract to mow the grass; that its employees "regularly went . . . to pick up trash, trim bushes, maintain shrubs, and pick up pine cones; that [an employee] had, on a number of occasions, ordered children off the vacant lot; that, on one occasion, [an employee] called the police and had them remove a boy from the vacant lot; and that [an employee] regularly went upon the lot to pick up trash." Kmart had no contractual maintenance duties.
A number of Georgia courts have interpreted the meaning of "owner or occupier" to include those with something less than a legal possessory interest. See, e.g., Norman v. Jones Lang Lasalle Americas, Inc., 627 S. E. 2d 382, 384 n.2 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (recognizing that a property manager who was responsible for "among other things, ensuring compliance with laws, ordinances, and regulations, and inspecting, maintaining, and repairing the premises," owed a duty under § 51-3-1); Ashley v. Balcor Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 423 S.E.2d 14, 15 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (finding a question of fact as to a management company and property manager's liability under § 51-3-1); Gregory v. Trupp, 319 S.E.2d 122, 123 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that a question of fact existed as to whether a partner whose partnership owned an apartment complex exercised sufficient control over the premises to qualify as an owner or occupier); Coffer v.Bradshaw, 167 S.E. 119, 122 (Ga. Ct. App. 1932) (holding that the owner or person in charge of the property owes a duty to invitees). These cases demonstrate that a manager may, "under certain circumstances and with sufficient supervisory authority," be held liable under § 51-3-1.