Opinion
Nos. 72-352 and 72-379
Decided February 7, 1973.
Law libraries — Moneys payable to law library associations — R.C. 3375.50 — Provisions uniformly operable throughout state — Fines and penalties of municipal courts — Police courts or mayor's courts not included.
1. The term "municipal court," as it appears in amended R.C. 3375.50, effective November 9, 1959, refers to statutory municipal courts, and does not include police courts or mayor's courts.
2. R.C. 3375.50, requiring that moneys collected by a municipal court accruing from fines and penalties, forfeited bail bonds and forfeited recognizances, shall be paid to the trustees of the county law library association, has uniform operation throughout the state, notwithstanding some counties of the state have no municipal court.
APPEALS from the Court of Appeals for Darke County.
The Greenville Law Library Association is organized under R.C. 1713.28.
There are no statutory municipal courts within the geographical borders of Darke County. There is a Common Pleas Court with probate and juvenile divisions, and there are two county courts with jurisdiction over the entire county. There are various mayors' courts in the municipalities of the county, including those in Ansonia and Bradford, which are directly involved in this action.
The Greenville Law Library Association filed a complaint in the Common Pleas Court of Darke County, Ohio, against the cities and villages and their respective mayors located within the geographic confines of that county seeking a declaratory judgment, in which R.C. 3375.50 would be interpreted as requiring such municipalities to pay a portion of their mayor's court receipts from fines and bond forfeitures to the county treasurer for use by the Greenville Law Library Association.
Because of the language in R.C. 3375.50 and because of a letter from the Bureau of Inspection and Supervision of Public Offices the various municipalities refused to pay any part of the receipts of the mayors' courts to the trustees of the Greenville Law Library Association.
The trial court found in favor of the Greenville Law Library Association, appellee herein. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting. The cause is before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Mr. Hugh A. Staley, for appellee.
Mr. R.K. Wilson, for appellants in case No. 72-352.
Messrs. Goubeaux Goubeaux and Mr. Lee A. Bixler, for appellant in case No. 72-379.
The first question before the court requires an interpretation of R.C. 3375.50, effective November 9, 1959, and which, in the parts pertinent to this cause, reads as follows:
"All moneys collected by a municipal corporation accruing from fines and penalties and from forfeited deposits, forfeited bail bonds, and forfeited recognizances taken for appearances, by a municipal court for offenses and misdemeanors brought for prosecution in the name of a municipal corporation under a penal ordinance thereof, where there is in force a state statute under which the offense might be prosecuted, or prosecuted in the name of the state, except a portion of such moneys, which plus all costs collected monthly in such state cases, equal the compensation allowed by the board of county commissioners to the judges of the municipal court presiding in police court, clerk and prosecuting attorney of such court in state cases, shall be retained by the clerk of the municipal court, and be paid by him forthwith, each month, to the board of trustees of the law library association in the county in which such municipal corporation is located."
Also pertinent to the resolution of the question here presented is R.C. 733.40, effective October 13, 1953, and reads as follows:
"All fines, forfeitures, and costs in ordinance cases and all fees collected by the mayor, or which in any manner come into his hands, or which are due such mayor or a marshal, chief of police, or other officer of the municipal corporation, any other fees and expenses which have been advanced out of the treasury of the municipal corporation, and all money received by such mayor for the use of such municipal corporation, shall be paid by him into such treasury on the first Monday of each month. At the first regular meeting of the legislative authority each month, the mayor shall submit a full statement of all money received, from whom and for what purposes received, and when paid into the treasury. Except as otherwise provided by Sections 3375.50 to 3375.52, inclusive, of the Revised Code, all fines, and forfeitures collected by the mayor in state cases, together with all fees and expenses collected which have been advanced out of the county treasury, shall be paid by him to the county treasury on the first business day of each month. All court costs and fees collected by the mayor in state cases shall be paid by him into the municipal treasury on the first business day of each month."
A review of the history of R.C. 3375.50 reveals that by its amendment of that section on November 9, 1959, the General Assembly deleted reference to "police court and mayor's court" as they appeared in R.C. 3375.50 prior to such amendment.
The trial court and the majority in the Court of Appeals found, in effect, that the General Assembly intended to say "courts of a municipality" when it said "municipal courts." Such an interpretation is not permissible under the rules of construction adopted by this court in Malone v. Indus. Comm. (1942), 140 Ohio St. 292, 299, wherein the court said:
"* * * When an existing statute is repealed and a new statute upon the same subject is enacted to include an amendment, as in this case, it is presumed that the Legislature intended to change the effect and operation of the law to the extent of the change in the language thereof."
From the foregoing, we find that the term "municipal court," as it appears in R.C. 3375.50, refers to statutory municipal courts, and does not include police courts or mayors' courts.
The second question presented is whether R.C. 3375.50 as now interpreted by this court, would then be a general law which did not have uniform operation throughout the state and would therefore be in conflict with Section 26, Article II, and Section 2, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution.
From the record herein it appears that there are 25 counties in this state which have no statutory municipal courts, and this is urged as an argument that the law in question does not have uniform operation.
It is our conclusion that R.C. 3375.50 has uniform operation throughout the state and that the fact that some counties have no municipal court does not affect such uniform operation. It is further found that this statute is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable and is constitutional.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, therefore, reversed and final judgment is rendered for each of the appellants.
Judgment reversed.
O'NEILL, C.J., HERBERT, CORRIGAN, STERN, CELEBREZZE and W. BROWN, JJ., concur.
YOUNG, J., of the First Appellate District, sitting for P. BROWN, J.