Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Ct. No. BC406026 Ronald M. Sohigian, Judge.
Cedric Greene, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
O’Melveny & Myers, Michael G. McGuinness, Adam J. Karr, Kymberleigh Damron-Hsiao, and Ryan W. Rutledge for Defendant and Respondent.
CHAVEZ, J.
Cedric Greene (appellant) appeals from an order sustaining a demurrer to appellant’s second amended complaint (SAC) filed against Volunteers of America Los Angeles (respondent). Appellant contends that the order should be reversed because his SAC did not state a cause of action for personal humiliation, and because respondent’s demurrer did not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Respondent is a nonprofit organization that provides services and free shelter to thousands of people annually. Respondent operates the Drop-In Center, a facility that temporarily housed appellant, in the heart of Skid Row.
1. The original complaint and the first demurrer
Appellant filed his original complaint on January 22, 2009. The complaint alleged one cause of action for negligence and contained the following allegations:
“Plaintiff was in custody from the dates of August 5, 2008, to January 19, 2009. Within these dates, Defendants’ [sic] were opening the mail of Plaintiff and returning his mail to the sender’s location in a damaged condition. As a result of Plaintiff’s then situation, an agreement was reached between both parties that he could receive his mail from that stated address location (628 San Julian Street, Los Angeles, California 90013). However, the agreement did not state for them to open his mail, read, or return to sender’s location in damaged condition. Plaintiff seeks the damages stated in his complaint.”
On March 20, 2009, respondent filed a demurrer to appellant’s complaint. Respondent argued that plaintiff’s complaint was ambiguous and unintelligible pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (f), and that plaintiff failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action pursuant to section 430.10, subdivision (e). The demurrer was heard on April 24, 2009, at which time the trial court sustained the demurrer on the grounds stated with leave to amend. Specifically, the court stated, “It’s impossible to ascertain what he’s alleging by way of the theory or set of facts against the [respondent].”
2. The first amended complaint and the second demurrer
On April 29, 2009, appellant filed a first amended complaint (FAC). The FAC alleged a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. However, the factual allegations remained nearly identical to those set forth in appellant’s original complaint. Appellant asserted:
“Plaintiff received permission from the Defendant’s [sic] to receive and pick up mail that was addressed to him at the Defendant’s location (628 San Julian Street, Los Angeles, California 90013). A situation had come before Plaintiff that prevented him from receiving or picking up his mail. Within the time that he could not receive or pick up mail that had been addressed to him, it was discovered that mail that had been addressed to him was being opened and read by employee’s [sic] of the Defendant’s without the concent [sic] of Plaintiff. It was furthermore discovered that incoming mail addressed to him had been returned to its sender in a [sic] opened and damaged condition. Defendant’s [sic] knowingly and intentionally committed the acts stated in the complaint.”
On May 27, 2009, respondent filed a demurrer to the FAC. Respondent argued that the FAC suffered from the same infirmities as the original complaint.
The demurrer was heard on June 19, 2009. Appellant appeared and argued that he had stated causes of action based on Code of Civil Procedure section 421. Appellant further argued that he had properly stated damages “based on privacy invasion, [and] mental anguish.” The trial court rejected appellant’s arguments and sustained respondent’s demurrer in its entirety pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivisions (e) and (f). The court again granted appellant leave to amend.
Code of Civil Procedure section 421 entitled “This code prescribes the form and rules of pleadings” states: “The forms of pleading in civil actions, and the rules by which the sufficiency of the pleadings is to be determined, are those prescribed in this code.”
3. The SAC and the third demurrer
Appellant filed the SAC on June 26, 2009. The SAC appeared to state three causes of action: intrusion; invasion of privacy; and public disclosure of private facts. Once again, the allegations in the SAC did not substantially change. Appellant alleged:
As respondent has pointed out, the SAC was somewhat unclear as to which causes of action appellant intended to assert. On the first page, appellant listed “intrusion” and “invasion of privacy” as the “type” of complaint, and listed “personal humiliation” as a form of damages. However, in section 10 of the complaint, which specifically refers to “causes of action, ” appellant checked “intentional tort” and specified only “Public Disclosure of Private Facts.”
“Greene received permission from the Defendant’s [sic] to receive and pick up mail that was addressed to him at the Defendant’s location (628 San Julian Street, Los Angeles, California 90013). A situation had come before Greene that prevented him from receiving or picking up his mail. Within the time that he could not receive or pick up mail that had been addressed to him, it was discovered that mail that had been addressed to him was being opened and read by employee’s [sic] of the Defendant’s [sic] without the concent [sic] of Plaintiff. It was furthermore discovered that incoming mail addressed to Greene had been returned to its sender in a [sic] opened and damaged condition. Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages in the amount stated in his complaint, based on the causes of actions [sic] that are before the Court.”
On July 13, 2009, respondent demurred to the SAC on the same grounds set forth in the demurrers to the two previous complaints. On July 20, 2009, appellant filed a motion to strike respondent’s demurrer on the ground that it was untimely. On August 10, 2009, appellant filed an untimely opposition to the demurrer.
On August 18, 2009, respondent’s demurrer and appellant’s motion to strike were heard. The court held that respondent’s demurrer had been timely submitted, and sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. The court indicated that it declined to consider any late-filed documents. In addition, the court noted that appellant had failed to cure the defects in his complaint. Specifically, appellant pled “no ultimate facts... to show how [appellant] was damaged or that the information was private or that there was any harm or damage done to [appellant].” In sum, the allegations were “all a series of conclusions which are not sufficient to raise an issue.”
On August 24, 2009, appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the court’s order of August 18, 2009. The matter was heard and denied on September 15, 2009.
On September 15, 2009, appellant filed a notice of appeal.
Pursuant to appellant’s request, the trial court action was dismissed on November 9, 2009.
DISCUSSION
I. Standards of review
“On appeal from a dismissal following the sustaining of a demurrer, this court reviews the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts stating a cause of action under any legal theory. [Citation.]” (Los Altos Golf & Country Club v. County of Santa Clara (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 198, 203.) When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, “we decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has abused its discretion and we reverse.” (City of Dinuba v. County of Tulare (2007) 41 Cal.4th 859, 865.)
“In reviewing the granting of a demurrer, we review the trial court’s result for error, and not its legal reasoning. [Citation.]” (Davies v. Sallie Mae, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1086, 1090.)
II. The complaint fails to state a cause of action
Appellant’s SAC attempted to assert three causes of action: intrusion, invasion of privacy, and public disclosure of private facts.
In order to state a claim for invasion of privacy, appellant must allege an intentional intrusion, physical or otherwise, upon his solitude and seclusion or his private affairs or concerns. In addition, appellant must show that the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. (Miller v. National Broadcasting Co. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d, 1463, 1482.) Similarly, a claim for intrusion must allege an intentional intrusion into a place, conversation, or matter as to which the plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy, as well as the highly offensive nature of such intrusion. (Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 272, 286.) Appellant’s complaint fails to specify the circumstances of an alleged intentional intrusion, fails to indicate what private affairs or concerns were compromised, and fails to state facts implying that the alleged intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
In order to state a cause of action for public disclosure of private facts, appellant was required to allege: (1) public disclosure, (2) of a private fact, (3) which would be offensive and objectionable to the reasonable person, and (4) which is not of legitimate public concern. (Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 200, 214.) Appellant has failed to allege a public disclosure of any private fact. Because appellant has failed to allege what private fact was purportedly disclosed, it is impossible to ascertain whether such a fact would be offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person, or whether such a fact might be of legitimate public concern.
The facts alleged by the plaintiff fail to set forth facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action under any legal theory. The sustaining of respondent’s demurrer was therefore proper under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e).
III. Appellant’s arguments do not warrant reversal
Appellant makes two arguments in support of reversal of the trial court’s ruling. First, appellant argues that the trial court’s ruling must be reversed because “the court erred in finding that Appellant asserted a claim for personal humiliation.” As noted above, it was difficult to determine exactly what causes of action appellant was attempting to assert in the SAC. In its minute order dated August 18, 2009, the trial court acknowledged the uncertainty, stating: “The plaintiff here appears to be asserting a claim for intrusion, invasion of privacy and personal humiliation.” (Italics added.)
Appellant fails to illuminate the significance of the court’s purported error in defining the causes of action that appellant was attempting to assert. We conclude that any such error is irrelevant. Appellant failed to state a cause of action under any legal theory therefore the demurrer was properly sustained.
Appellant also asserts that the respondent’s demurrer “did not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense.” This assertion is also irrelevant. A demurrer is an objection to a defect in the complaint. Respondent’s objections to appellant’s SAC were well taken, and appellant failed to cure the defects described by the trial court.
IV. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant leave to amend
Appellant has not specifically challenged the trial court’s failure to grant him leave to amend. However, we note that this ruling was not an abuse of discretion. Appellant was granted two opportunities to cure the defects in his complaint. On both occasions, he provided allegations which were essentially identical to the original allegations. Under the circumstances, the trial court acted within its discretion when it determined that providing further leave to amend would be futile. (See, e.g., Oddone v. Superior Court (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 813, 823.)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Each side to bear their own costs of appeal.
We concur: BOREN, P. J., ASHMANN-GERST, J.