Opinion
Civil Action 03-1058 Section "T"(5).
August 18, 2004
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (Document 14) filed on behalf of the Defendant, Daimler Chrysler Services North American, LLC ("DCS"). The parties waived oral argument and the matter was taken under submission on July 28, 2004. The Court, having considered the arguments of the parties, the Court record, the law and applicable jurisprudence, is fully advised in the premises and ready to rule.
ORDER AND REASONS
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Stevy Q. Greene ("Greene"), is a former employee of DCS who claims he was transferred, demoted and denied a layoff package in retaliation for complaints about discrimination, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Green, an African-American male, completed at employment application on July 22, 1996, which included the following language:
I agree that any claim or lawsuit relating to my service with Chrysler Corporation or any of its subsidiaries must be filed no more than six (6) months after the date of the employment action that is the subject of the claim or lawsuit. I waive any statute of limitations to the contrary.
(Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 2.) Greene then worked for DCS under a contract for a brief time beginning in October, 1996. This contract contained similar language as the above.
After a period of being a contract worker, Greene began working for DCS in its New Orleans Zone office in August, 1997, as an entry level employee in the customer service (collections) department. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 2.) In the first calendar quarter of 2000, DCS began a company-wide reorganization of its customer service function, dubbed "Project Agility." During this process, the customer service functions were removed from the twenty-six (26) Zone offices located across the country and consolidated into four customer service centers, located in Troy, Michigan; Dallas, Texas; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Kansas city, Kansas. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 3.)
The New Orleans Zone, at which Greene worked, was assigned to the Kansas City Customer Service Center, effective June 2002. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 3.) The employees were given notice of the impending move and were advised that their jobs in New Orleans would not exist after the effective date of the move. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 3.) All employees, including Greene, were informed that they would have the option to transfer to Kansas City in their current positions, attempt to secure other positions within DCS through the normal posting process, or accept a lay off and the standard DCS lay off package. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 4.)
According to Geroge Tallant, Zone Manager of the New Orleans Zone from 1997-2003, after meeting with the management from the Kansas City Zone, Greene said that, although he would rather move to Dallas, Texas, he would accept the transfer to Kansas City if he was not able to secure another available position within DCS prior to his transfer date. (Tallant Aff. ¶ 12.) Thus, he declined the lay off package offer.
Because of plaintiff's attempt to find a position in Dallas, DCS agreed to hold his position in Kansas City open until June 7, 2002, at which time Greene committed to move to Kansas city and begin working at that time. Greene was paid $8,506.40 in relocation benefits by DCS, which he received on April 6, 2002, nine (9) days before he was scheduled to report for work in Kansas. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 5.)
Greene's attempt to secure a position in Dallas was unsuccessful. Despite this, he allegedly never indicated that he wished to change his decision to remain employed by DCS. (Tallant Aff. ¶ 17.) In fact, in an April 17, 2002, e-mail sent to Arnita Wilston, DCS Human Resources, Mr. Geene stated, "If you are not able to relocate me to Dallas, I will still report to Kansas City on April 22, 2002 and give 100 percent." (Def.'s Exhibit A(6).)
According to Pamela Morgan, Human Resources Consultant with DCS, plaintiff relocated to Kansas City effective June 7, 2002. (Morgan Aff. ¶ 9.) Shortly after, he went on a leave of absence and resigned his employment on June 19, 2003. (Morgan Aff. ¶ 9.)
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS OF THE COURT
A. Rule 56 Summary Judgment
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that summary judgment should be granted only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 655-56 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 912-13 (5th Cir.) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832 (1992)). When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. The nonmoving party must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (emphasis supplied); Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V RISAN, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995).
Thus, where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no "genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 588. Finally, the Court notes that substantive law determines the materiality of facts and only "facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
B. Title VII
In a Title VII race discrimination case, plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817 (1973). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that he was engaged in a protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal connection between the adverse action and the protected activity. Douglas v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations, 144 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1069 (1999); Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 705 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 932 (1997); Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781 (5th Cir. 1995).
Once plaintiff has set forth a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action.Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082, 1087 (5th Cir. 1994). "This burden is one of production, not persuasion; it `can involve no credibility assessment.'" Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2106 (2000) (quoting St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993). The presumption of unlawful discrimination disappears once the employer offers admissible evidence that is sufficient for the trier of fact to conclude that there was a legitimate reason for the discharge. See id.
Because the ultimate burden of proving discrimination lies at all times with the plaintiff, she is then afforded the opportunity to prove that the employer's proffered reasons for termination were not true and that the true reason was, in fact, discrimination. See id. The Supreme Court ruled in Reeves that a prima facie showing of the elements of an employment discrimination claim in conjunction with substantial evidence that the employer's stated reason for termination was pretextual, could alone, with no additional evidence of discrimination being offered by the plaintiff, allow a reasonable jury to infer that the employer's motivation for the termination was discriminatory.See 120 S.Ct. at 2106. However, the Reeves Court did caution:
[t]his is not to say that such a showing by the plaintiff will always be adequate to sustain a jury's finding of liability. Certainly there will be instances where, although the plaintiff has established a prima facie case and set forth sufficient evidence to reject the defendant's explanation, no rational factfinder could conclude that the action was discriminatory. For instance, an employer would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the record conclusively revealed some other, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's decision, or if the plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer's reason was untrue and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination had occurred.Id. at 2108. Thus under Reeves, summary judgment is appropriate, even after a prima facie showing of a discrimination claim has been made, if a reasonable factfinder could not find that the employer's nondiscriminatory explanation for the termination was false.
C. Analysis of the Court
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must first prove that he was engaged in a protected activity. To be protected opposition activity, the complaint must refer to and oppose a specific employment practice in a way that enables an employer "to discern from the context of the statement that the employee opposes an allegedly unlawful employment practice."Callahan v. Bancorp Ins. Servs. Of Miss. Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 678 (S.D. Miss. 2002), aff'd 02-60269, 2003 WL 342343 (5th Cir. 2003). In Callahan, the Court found that a female plaintiff's complaints about denial of bonus and unfair treatment was not statutorily protected conduct for her retaliation claim. The Court found that because she did not complain specifically about gender-based discrimination, except for cryptic remark implying that she was not given a secretary because she was female, she failed to show that she engaged in protected activity of opposing sex discrimination.
In the present case, the plaintiff contends that an e-mail to Tom McClear and a phone conversation with Arnita Wilson were protected activity. With respect to the e-mail, this Court finds the situation similar to the events in Callahan. Greene's e-mail makes vague complaints of unfair treatment. (Def.'s Ex. A(10).) In addition, he makes the following statement, "I believe that values and equality are the backbones of any corporation culture . . . [E]quality is color blind." (Def.'s Ex. A(10).) This Court finds these broad suggestions do not rise to the level of protected activity. With respect to the telephone conversation with Arnita Wilson, the plaintiff contends that he told Ms. Wilson that "nothing had changed since she had come down to investigate the Time Coady incident in connection with which he had complained of racism to Dale Stogner, his local manager at the time." (Pla.'s Mem. Opp. Summ. J. at 4). Ms. Wilson claims that in his communications with her, Greene expressed "frustration and feelings that he was not being treated fairly and that his supervisor was showing favoritism, but Greene never claimed he was the victim of race discrimination." (Wilson Aff. ¶ 11.) However, while her notes taken during the conversation do not mention the word "discrimination," they do make reference to Tim Coady, and plaintiff argues that any mention of Coady must have been used in the context of racial discrimination. Therefore, whether or not this telephone conversation constitutes protected activity is a question of fact.
Plaintiff must next prove that he suffered an adverse employment action. Only "ultimate employment decisions," such as hiring, granting leave, discharge, promoting, and compensating, satisfy the "adverse employment action" element of a prima facie case of retaliation. Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 512 (5th Cir. 1999); Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 708 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 932 (1997); Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 771-82 (5th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff contends that his transfer to Kansas City was not a lateral move, but rather a "huge step back to an entry level position." (Pla.'s Mem. Opp. Summ. J. At 6.) He argues that his job duties and responsibilities were downgraded. For example, in New Orleans, plaintiff states that he would make advanced decisions on the 48th day as to further handling of the account. (Greene Aff. ¶ 4.) He could decide to refinance or extend the loan; send a repossession agent to the customer's account in order to attempt to collect; or initiate a legal repossession proceedings by filing out the preliminary paperwork before turning the account over to a collection attorney (Greene Aff. ¶ 4.) In contrast, in Kansas City he would be working only accounts 20-40 days past due and then forwarding the accounts on to others once they were more than 40 days old. (Greene Aff. ¶ 4.) It is this change in duties which Greene categorized as a demotion, an adverse employment action.
The defendant submits that Greene's transfer to Kansas City was not a demotion, but rather a lateral transfer in which Greene was given the same position, the same pay, with the same job duties. The function of the Customer Service Representative (CSR), in New Orleans and Kansas City, was to cure delinquencies. The defendant argues that, at best, a change in the way delinquent accounts were handled among the CSRs in the New Orleans Zone and the way they were handled in the Kansas City Zone was an intermediate employment decision.
Jeff Andrew Glazer, manager of the New Orleans Customer Service Department, described the job duties of the CSR and stated that the division of labor among employees within the department changed from time to time based on the delinquency of the Zone. (Glazer Depo. pp. 24-25.) Glazer's testimony contradicts plaintiff's unsupported characterization of the difference between his duties as a CSR in New Orleans and Kansas City:
Q: So you're telling me that if someone, a customer service representative, leaves New Orleans, goes to Kansas City, and is no longer permitted to handle an account up to and through repossession, there's no reduction in responsibility; is that what you're telling me?
A: To the best of my knowledge, no, because they would be handling more accounts.
Q: So wouldn't you agree with me then, that the responsibilities, if you're not handling the matter up and through repossession, would be at a lower level?
A: No, I would not agree with you.
Q: Why not?
A: Because your main position there is to cure delinquent accounts. And it doesn't matter if you're curing them at 5 days, 30 days, 90 days. Your responsibility is still to cure that account.
(Glazer Depo. pp. 24-25.)
The Court finds this testimony persuasive and finds that plaintiff's conclusory statements to support his contention that his transfer to Kansas City was a demotion is contradicted by evidence in the record. For these reasons, this Court finds that plaintiff does not satisfy the second element required to prove his prima facie case of retaliation.
Finally, plaintiff must prove there is a causal connection between the adverse action and the protected activity. Plaintiff argues that his complaints to various managers in his company were the cause of his transfer to Kansas City. He contends that George Tallant, his zone manager, informed him that he would be the only person to be transferred to Kansas City because he had gone over Tallant's head to complain.
However, the defendant contends, and this Court agrees, that Mr. Greene's transfer was a result of Project Agility's transfer of the entire customer service function of the New Orleans Zone, which was communicated to the employees in 2000, years before Greene complained of unfairness. Plaintiff, as well as his fellow employees, was offered three options as a result of Project Agility: (1) accept the lay off package; (2) transfer to Kansas City; (3) obtain some other position through the normal posting process. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. At 8.) It is undisputed that plaintiff agreed to move with his job function to Kansas City, effective June 7, 2002, signed a statement to that effect dated April 18, 2002, and accepted relocation money in April, 2002. (Greene Aff. 4/18/02.) Plaintiff attempted to secure a position in Dallas through the company's online positing notification system, which proved unsuccessful. At this time he transferred to Kansas City. There is no evidence that plaintiff would have obtained any position in Dallas but for his alleged protected conduct. Therefore, plaintiff does not satisfy the final element.
This Court finds that, for the reasons stated above, plaintiff failed to satisfy his obligation to present a prima facie case of retaliation, i.e. to satisfy all three elements. Because the Court finds that the prima face case has not been made, it does not find it necessary to discuss the six month limitations period. As there are no genuine issues of material fact, Defendant, Daimler Chrysler, is entitled to summary judgment.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of the Defendant, DAIMLER CHRYSLER, be and the same is hereby GRANTED.