§ 13-4-11(A)-(B); N.M. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 2015-NMSC-023, ¶¶ 13-15. While "[d]etailed procedures in a state statute or regulation are not, by themselves, sufficient to create a property interest," substantive restrictions on discretion will do so. Greene v. Barrett, 174 F.3d 1136, 1140 (10th Cir. 1999). The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiffs have a property interest in CBA-level wages and benefits created by the NMPWMWA and protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects persons from state-imposed deprivations "of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Greene v. Barrett, 174 F.3d 1136, 1140 (10th Cir. 1999). The clause "has two components: procedural due process and substantive due process."

This disposition of the claim was correct if Mr. Robbin's claim here is that he had a property right to continued employment as a non-exempt employee provided by the state of New Mexico that could only be deprived with due process, and that his right was violated when Defendant Rael demoted him without due process. Cf. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (requiring "'some kind of a hearing' prior to the discharge of an employee who has a constitutionally protected property interest in his employment")); Greene v. Barrett, 174 F.3d 1136, 1140 (10th Cir. 1999) ("[W]e recently held that a state statute or regulation can create a protected property interest in a particular employment status or rank if it places substantive restrictions on the discretion to demote an employee, such as providing that discipline may only be imposed for cause." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

As Appellants have waived any argument they may have had that Tri-State received adequate process after the city retained its bond, the proper inquiry under the clearly established prong is simply whether Tri-State's property interest in the bond was clearly established. See, e.g., Kingsford v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 247 F.3d 1123, 1126 (10th Cir. 2001) (affirming the denial of qualified immunity "[b]ecause the law on which [plaintiff] relies for his property interest due process claim was clearly established at the time of the events underlying this suit"); Greene v. Barrett, 174 F.3d 1136, 1142 (10th Cir. 1999) (addressing whether plaintiffs "asserted property right was clearly established"); Patrick v. Miller, 953 F.2d 1240, 1244 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that plaintiff must prove "he had a clearly established property interest" in order to defeat qualified immunity on a procedural due process claim). "Ordinarily, in order for the law to be clearly established, there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains."

Id. at 256. See Greene v. Barrett, 174 F.3d 1136, 1142 (10th Cir.1999). The court noted that a seizure of a person for emergency mental health evaluation involves the same liberty interest that is implicated in a criminal arrest and is therefore subject to the protections of the Fourth Amendment.

Once executive-branch officers assert a qualified immunity defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiffs to demonstrate that the officers (1) violated a federal right (2) that was clearly established at the time of the incident. Greene v. Barrett, 174 F.3d 1136, 1142 (10th Cir.1999). Because we conclude the defendants' protective sweep did not violate the Fourth Amendment, we hold the plaintiffs fail their burden.

When faced with a qualified immunity defense, the plaintiff must establish "(1) that the defendant's actions violated a federal constitutional or statutory right; and (2) that the right violated was clearly established at the time of the defendant's actions." Greene v. Barrett, 174 F.3d 1136, 1142 (10th Cir. 1999). Our discussion in the previous section indicates the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis has been satisfied by Mr. Beedle's allegations that the Hospital, through the actions of Mr. Wilson and Mr. King, violated Mr. Beedle's First Amendment rights by bringing the malicious libel action against him.

If there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute, we determine whether the district court correctly applied the substantive law. Green v. Barrett, 174 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted). Title VII makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . religion."

U.S. Const. amend. V. The Amendment therefore requires an individual to prove that he or she was deprived of a protected interest and that the deprivation occurred without the "appropriate" level of process. See Greene v. Barrett, 174 F.3d 1136, 1140 (10th Cir. 1999). Here, the district court assumed that FLLC's members had a protected property interest in the terms and conditions of their grazing permits, but held that the Forest Service provided FLLC's members with all of the process that they were due.

See doc. 22 at 30-31. To prove that his asserted property right was clearly established, plaintiff relies primarily on the language of the Village Code and three cases within the Tenth Circuit - Robbin v. City of Santa Fe, 583 Fed.Appx. 858 (10th Cir. 2014) (unpublished), Robert v. Winder, 16 F.4th 1367 (10th Cir. 2021), and Green v. Barrett, 174 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 1999). See doc. 22 at 30.