The MDOC has a legitimate interest in controlling costs, and religious meals are expensive. See O'Connor, 2020 WL 838084, at *3 (citing Green v. Tudor, 685 F.Supp.2d 678, 698 (W.D. Mich. 2010)); Perreault, 2018 WL 3640356, at *3 (same). Thus, the MDOC has a reason to deny religious meals to a prisoner who does not appear to be adhering to a religious diet.
Further, this very justification has been cited by numerous district courts. See, e.g., Green v. Tudor, 685 F.Supp.2d 678, 698 (W.D. Mich. 2010) (upholding a religious meal denial after an inmate purchased non-conforming food from the commissary because “[g]ranting requests for specialized diets would be expensive, diverting resources from other penological goals”); O'Connor, 2020 WL 838084, at *3 (same because “[p]rison officials have a legitimate penological interest in controlling the cost of special religious diets”); Perreault v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., No. 1:16-cv-1447, 2018 WL 360356, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 1, 2018) (same because “[i]t is well recognized that prison officials have a legitimate penological interest in controlling the cost of special religious diets”). Indeed, the Sixth Circuit has also recognized this justification.
“In general, convicted criminals are not in a position to complain about the mere unpleasantry of prison meals.” Green v. Tudor, 685 F.Supp.2d. 678, 694 (W.D. Mich. 2010); see also Stapleton v. Wilson, No. 07-cv-218-KSF, 2007 WL 3120121, at *6 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 23, 2007) (“The law is not favorable to inmates who complain about the quality of the food served to them.”)
The MDOC has a legitimate interest in controlling costs, and religious meals are expensive. See O'Connor, 2020 WL 838084, at *3 (citing Green v. Tudor, 685 F.Supp.2d 678, 698 (W.D. Mich. 2010)); Perreault, 2018 WL 3640356, at *3 (same). Furthermore, the MDOC has a legitimate interest in maintaining discipline within the prison, and “[p]ermitting a prisoner to participate in a religious diet program when he is consuming or purchasing food in violation of the tenets of his stated religion could negatively impact prison security as such could cause resentment among prisoners who adhere to their faith's dietary restrictions.” O'Connor, 2020 WL 838084, at *3; see also Ewing, 2019 WL 8105992, at *9 (quoting Perreault, 2018 WL 3640356, at *3). Accordingly, in the undersigned's opinion, Defendants have satisfied the first Turner factor. The undersigned now turns to the remaining Turner factors.
“Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of the party with the burden of persuasion ‘is inappropriate when the evidence is susceptible to different interpretations or inferences by the trier of fact.'” Green v. Tudor, 685 F.Supp.2d 678, 685 (W.D. Mich. 2010) (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 553 (1999)).
“Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of the party with the burden of persuasion ‘is inappropriate when the evidence is susceptible to different interpretations or inferences by the trier of fact.'” Green v. Tudor, 685 F.Supp.2d 678, 685 (W.D. Mich. 2010) (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 553 (1999)).
The MDOC does not establish a “state religion or religious faith” by recognizing and accommodating religious practices within the prison system. The Supreme Court “has long recognized that the government may . . . accommodate religious practices . . . without violating the Establishment Clause. ” Green v. Tudor, 685 F.Supp.2d 678, 695 (W.D. Mich. 2010) (quoting Cutter, 544 U.S. at 713-14) (internal quotation marks omitted). See, e.g., Alexander v. Michigan, No. 1:13-cv-1372, 2014 WL 2604639 at *7 (W.D. Mich. June 11, 2014) (rejecting the plaintiff's claim that defendant MDOC officials violated the Establishment Clause when they failed to recognize his religion, stating that “[t]here are several different religions that are practiced within the MDOC” and that it was incredulous to suggest that MDOC Officials “coerced Plaintiff into participating in any religious practices or took any action establishing a state religion”).
"Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of the party with the burden of persuasion 'is inappropriate when the evidence is susceptible to different interpretations or inferences by the trier of fact.'" Green v. Tudor, 685 F. Supp. 2d 678, 685 (W.D. Mich. 2010) (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 553 (1999)). IV. Analysis
"Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of the party with the burden of persuasion 'is inappropriate when the evidence is susceptible to different interpretations or inferences by the trier of fact.'" Green v. Tudor, 685 F. Supp. 2d 678, 685 (W.D. Mich. 2010) (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 553 (1999)). Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by failing to file a grievance about his allegation that GCDC provided him with Tylenol.
"Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of the party with the burden of persuasion 'is inappropriate when the evidence is susceptible to different interpretations or inferences by the trier of fact.'" Green v. Tudor, 685 F. Supp. 2d 678, 685 (W.D. Mich. 2010) (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 553 (1999)). Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment in their favor on the grounds that Plaintiff's claims are precluded by the doctrine of res judicata because of a decision on the merits in a forcible detainer action against him in Hardin District Court.