Opinion
CIV-22-722-J
11-14-2022
STEVE O'NEAL GREEN, Petitioner, v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
AMANDA MAXFIELD GREEN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Petitioner, a state pre-trial detainee appearing pro se,has filed a Petition for a writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. 1). United States District Judge Bernard M. Jones referred this matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). (Doc. 6). As set forth fully below, the undersigned recommends that the Court DISMISS the Petition pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Petitioner's pending Motion (Doc. 15) should be DENIED AS MOOT.
A pro se litigant's pleadings are liberally construed “and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991); see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). But the court cannot serve as Petitioner's advocate, creating arguments on his behalf. See Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).
Citations to the parties' filings and attached exhibits will refer to this Court's CM/ECF pagination.
I. Screening
The Court must review habeas petitions and summarily dismiss a petition “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief....” Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases.“[B]efore acting on its own initiative, a court must accord the parties fair notice and an opportunity to present their positions.” Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 210 (2006). This Report and Recommendation provides Petitioner with notice, and he can present his position by objecting to the recommendation. See Smith v. Dorsey, 30 F.3d 142, 1994 WL 396069, at *3 (10th Cir. July 29, 1994) (noting no due process concerns with the magistrate judge raising an issue sua sponte where the petitioner could “address the matter by objecting” to the report and recommendation).
The Rules may be applied to habeas petitions filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Rule 1(b), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases.
II. Factual and Procedural Background
Petitioner is a pre-trial detainee currently being held at the Blaine County Jail in Watonga, Oklahoma. (Doc. 1, at 1). On April 26, 2022, Petitioner was charged with rape by instrumentation. (Id.); see Blaine County District Court, Case No. CF-2022-41.Petitioner's bond was set at $50,000, and a competency evaluation was ordered. (Id.) On September 14, 2022, Petitioner was found not competent, and bond was reduced to $15,000. (Id.) Petitioner's case has been stayed, and Petitioner was temporarily committed to receive treatment to regain competency. (Id.) His next bond appearance is set for November 17, 2022. (Id.)
https://www.oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx?db=blaine&number=CF-2022-00041&cmid=4037 (Docket Sheet) (last visited November 13, 2022). The undersigned takes judicial notice of the docket sheets and related documents in Petitioner's state criminal proceedings. See United States v. Pursley, 577 F.3d 1204, 1214 n.6 (10th Cir. 2009) (exercising discretion “to take judicial notice of publicly-filed records in [this] court and certain other courts concerning matters that bear directly upon the disposition of the case at hand”) (citation omitted).
On June 3, 2022, Petitioner filed a Writ of Mandamus before the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”), regarding matters in his pending criminal case. See OCCA, Case No. MA-2022-510.The OCCA declined jurisdiction and dismissed the matter for failing to give notice to the adverse party. (Id.)
https://www.oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx?db=appellate&number=MA-2022-510&cmid=133062 (Docket Sheet) (last visited November 13, 2022).
On August 1, 2022, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for a writ for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1). However, the undersigned liberally construes the Petition as a habeas petition brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Walck v. Edmondson, 472 F.3d 1227, 1235 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[A] state court defendant attacking his pretrial detention should bring a habeas petition pursuant to the general grant of habeas authority contained within 28 U.S.C. § 2241.”). Although not entirely clear, it appears Petitioner raises four grounds for relief: “Speedy trial Rule 48(b)” (Ground One); “5thAmend[ment] U.S. Constitution Speedy trial Rule 48(a)” (Ground Two); “presenting a charge to a grand jury” and “bringing a defendant to trial” (Ground Three); and “5th Speedy trial 48(b) = unnecessary delay presenting a charge to grand jury = bringing a defendant to trial” (Ground Four). (Doc. 1, at 8, 9, 11, 13). He also alleges he is innocent of the criminal charges. (Id. at 4, 16). As relief, Petitioner seeks “Rule 48(a) dismissal,” “the right to a speedy trial,” and the “right to counsel at trial.” (Id. at 8, 15).
III. The Court Should Dismiss the Habeas Petition Pursuant to the Younger Abstention Doctrine.
Under the Younger abstention doctrine, federal courts are to abstain from exercising jurisdiction to interfere with state proceedings when the following three requirements are met:
(1) There is an ongoing state criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding, (2) the state court provides an adequate forum to hear the claims raised in the federal complaint, and (3) the state proceedings involve important state interests, matters which traditionally look to state law for their resolution or implicate separately articulated state policies.Winn v. Cook, 945 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 2019) (citing Chapman v. Oklahoma, 472 F.3d 747, 749 (10th Cir. 2006).Additionally, “Younger governs whenever the requested relief would interfere with the state court's ability to conduct proceedings, regardless of whether the relief targets the conduct of a proceeding directly.” Joseph A. ex rel. Corrine Wolfe v. Ingram, 275 F.3d 1253, 1272 (10th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). Exceptions exist for “bad faith or harassment,” prosecution under a statute that is “flagrantly and patently” unconstitutional, or other “extraordinary circumstances” involving irreparable injury. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 50-54 (1971) (quotations omitted); Amanatullah v. Colo. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 187 F.3d 1160, 1165 (10th Cir. 1999). However, Petitioner has a “heavy burden” of establishing an exception to the Younger abstention doctrine. Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 885, 889 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
“Younger abstention is jurisdictional.” D.L. v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 497, 392 F.3d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 2004). “[A] court may raise the issue of abstention sua sponte.” D.A. Osguthorpe Family P'ship v. ASC Utah, Inc., 705 F.3d 1223, 1231 (10th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted); see also Sanchez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 307 Fed.Appx. 155, 157 (10th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that both Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent “have acknowledged the authority of a federal court to address application of the Younger doctrine sua sponte”).
The Court should conclude that abstention is appropriate in this matter. Petitioner's criminal charges are pending in the Blaine County District Court, and the claims asserted in the instant habeas Petition directly relate to those proceedings. (Doc. 1). Thus, the Court should conclude that Petitioner's criminal case is “ongoing” under Younger. See, e.g., Carter v. Colorado, 2011 WL 2457773, at *3 (D. Colo. June 17, 2011) (finding that § 2241 petitioner's state criminal proceedings were “ongoing” for the purposes of Younger when petitioner had been found incompetent to stand trial and state criminal case was stayed pending petitioner's commitment to regain competency).
Second, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the state criminal proceeding is not an adequate forum to hear his claims, which primarily relate to his constitutional right to a speedy trial and his innocence. Petitioner can and did pursue state court relief in the form of his Writ for Mandamus and various motions before the Blaine County District Court. See Blaine County District Court, Case No. CF-2022-41 (see footnote 4); see also OCCA, Case No. MA-2022-510 (see footnote 5). Petitioner complains of his lack of trial counsel, but Petitioner has had representation by an Oklahoma Indigent Defense System (OIDS) attorney since his arraignment. See Blaine County District Court, Case No. CF-2022-41 (see footnote 4). See also Miller v. State, 29 P.3d 1077, 1080 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001) (ensuring that counsel is provided for indigent defendants); see generally Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1355. Thus, state court proceedings will provide ample opportunity for Petitioner to present his federal constitutional claims as well as his claims of innocence, and he has made no specific showing to the contrary. As a result, the Court should conclude that the second element of the Younger doctrine is met.
As to the third Younger requirement, “state criminal proceedings are viewed as ‘a traditional area of state concern.'” Winn, 945 F.3d at 1258; see Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975) (injunction against state criminal-enforcement activities “seriously impairs the State's interest in enforcing its criminal laws, and implicates the concerns for federalism which lie at the heart of Younger”); Green v. Whetsel, 166 Fed.Appx. 375, 376 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Oklahoma has an important interest in enforcing its criminal laws through criminal proceedings in the state's courts.”) (quotation marks omitted); Fisher v. Whetsel, 142 Fed.Appx. 337, 339 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Oklahoma's important interest in enforcing its criminal laws through proceedings in its state courts remains axiomatic.”).
Finally, Petitioner does not allege any bad faith, harassment, or other extraordinary circumstances. In sum, Younger requires the Court to abstain while Petitioner's criminal charges are pending in state court, and Petitioner has not met the heavy burden to show otherwise. See Carter, 2011 WL 2457773, at *5 (dismissing § 2241 petition under Younger).
IV. Recommendation and Notice of Right to Object.
For these reasons, it is recommended that the Petition (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED without prejudice to the re-filing. Petitioner is advised of the right to file an objection to this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of Court by December 5, 2022, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72. Petitioner is further advised that failure to timely object to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate review of both factual and legal issues contained herein. Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge and terminates the referral unless and until the matter is re-referred.