Opinion
No. 05-09-01075-CR
Opinion Filed July 30, 2010. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F08-59314-H.
Before Justices MORRIS, MOSELEY, and LANG.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Bryant Ladale Green waived a jury and pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault of a child younger than fourteen years of age. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i) (Vernon Supp. 2009). After finding appellant guilty, the trial court assessed punishment at twenty years' imprisonment and a $1000 fine. In a single point of error, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to a twenty-year prison term. We affirm. The background of the case and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties, and therefore we limit recitation of the facts. We issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.4 because the law to be applied in the case is well settled. Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion and violated the objectives of the Texas Penal Code by sentencing him to prison because the sentence is not necessary to prevent the recurrence of his criminal behavior. Appellant asserts he committed the offense only because he was "high on cocaine," and he never sexually abused any child when not using drugs. Appellant argues the trial court erred by failing to consider rehabilitation in assessing punishment, and should have given appellant deferred probation and sex offender and drug treatment. The State responds that appellant has failed to preserve his complaint for appellate review and, alternatively, the record does not show that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the twenty-year sentence. Appellant did not complain about the sentence either at the time it was imposed or in his motion for new trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Castaneda v. State, 135 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.) (for error to be preserved for appeal, the record must show appellant made a timely request, objection, or motion). After sentencing, appellant did not object to the sentence, and his motion for new trial complained that the "verdict" was "contrary to the law and the evidence." Thus, appellant has not preserved this issue for our review. Even if appellant had preserved error, however, his argument still fails. As a general rule, punishment that is assessed within the statutory range for the offense is not excessive or unconstitutionally cruel or unusual. Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). In this case, the trial court imposed punishment within the statutory range for the offense. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.32, 22.021(e) (Vernon Supp. 2009). We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assessing the twenty-year sentence. See Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (as long as a sentence is within the proper range of punishment, it will not be disturbed on appeal). We overrule appellant's sole point of error. We affirm the trial court's judgment.