Id. at 1013-14. As to that element, this court, like the parties here, found two decisions particularly instructive, the decision of the Iowa Supreme Court in Sain v. Cedar Rapids Community School District, 626 N.W.2d 115 (Iowa 2001), and the decision of the Iowa Court of Appeals in Greatbatch v. Metropoloitan Federal Bank, 534 N.W.2d 115 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995): In Sain, the Iowa Supreme Court explained the necessary duty more fully.
This is the fundamental requirement to support the imposition of a duty, which is essential for all negligence claims."); Greatbatch v. Metropolitan Federal Bank, 534 N.W.2d 115, 117 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995) (also recognizing that "the duty to use reasonable care in supplying information applies only to persons engaged in the business or profession of supplying information to others"). Similarly, the Iowa Court of Appeals has observed that "[n]o clear guideline exists to define whether a party is in the business of supplying information."
Sain, 626 N.W.2d at 124. Iowa courts have narrowed the scope of the Restatement (Second) of Torts by limiting the situations in which a duty arises under section 552. See Greatbatch v. Metro. Fed. Bank, 534 N.W.2d 115, 117 (Iowa App. 1995). "One limitation is that the duty to use reasonable care in supplying information applies only to persons engaged in the business or profession of supplying information to others.
The court, not the jury, decides whether defendants were "in the business of supplying information" as a matter of law, in light of the facts, because the defendants' duty is always a matter for the court to decide. See, e.g., Fry, 554 N.W.2d at 265 (in a negligent misrepresentation case, the court wrote, "Whether such a duty exists is always a question of law for the court."); Greatbatch v. Metropolitan Fed. Bank, 534 N.W.2d 115, 116 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995) (in a negligent misrepresentation case, the court wrote, "Whether a duty exists to impose an obligation on a defendant to conform to a standard of care for the benefit of the plaintiff is an issue of law for courts to resolve"); Leonard v. State, 491 N.W.2d 508, 509 (Iowa 1992) (in a case involving the duty of a mental hospital to a person subsequently injured by a patient released from the hospital, the court wrote, "Whether, under a given set of facts, such a duty exists is a question of law."). Although the Iowa Supreme Court has indicated that "professional purveyors" of information, such as accountants, abstractors, or attorneys, whose product is information, often are "in the business of supplying information," Fry, 554 N.W.2d at 265, these are not the only categories of persons against whom the claim will lie.
; Greatbatch v. Metropolitan Fed. Bank, 534 N.W.2d 115, 116 (Iowa.Ct.App.1995) (in a negligent misrepresentation case, the court wrote, " Whether a duty exists to impose an obligation on a defendant to conform to a standard of care for the benefit of the plaintiff is an issue of law for courts to resolve" );
Two decades after adopting the tort, we began to narrow our approach, finding the "duty ... is generally not applicable to a retailer in the business of selling and servicing his merchandise." Meier v. Alfa–Laval, Inc. , 454 N.W.2d 576, 581 (Iowa 1990) ; see alsoGreatbatch v. Metro. Fed. Bank , 534 N.W.2d 115, 117 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) ("Although the language of the Restatement (Second) of Torts supports a broad view of the types of businesses covered by the tort, our appellate cases reflect a rather narrow scope." (Footnote omitted.)).
The Iowa courts have consistently rejected negligent misrepresentation claims based upon information that banks provided to prospective borrowers or guarantors in a loan transaction. See Sturm v. Peoples Trust Sav. Bank, 713 N.W.2d 1, 2, 5 (Iowa 2006); Greatbatch v. Metro. Fed. Bank, 534 N.W.2d 115, 118 (Iowa App. 1995); Haupt, 514 N.W.2d at 909-10 (Iowa 1994). We see no difference between that type of arms-length transaction and U.S. Bank's sale of a loan portfolio to an unrelated party in this case.
Plaintiffs' comments in this regard are entirely gratuitous. First, the Court notes that Plaintiffs highlight Great Batch v. Metropolitan Federal Bank, 534 N.W.2d 115, 116 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995), as requiring the Court to determine whether a defendant is in the business of supplying information "after considering the facts that exist in connection with the interaction between the two parties." Pls.' Resistance Br. at 16.
See Larsen v. United Fed. Savs. Loan Ass'n, 300 N.W.2d 281, 287 (Iowa 1981) (savings and loan company owed duty to home buyer where it assumed responsibility for appraisal); McCracken v. Edward D. Jones Co., 445 N.W.2d 375, 382 (Iowa App. 1989) (investment broker liable for false information supplied to investor). Where the defendant is not in the business of supplying information, and the parties deal at arm's length in a commercial transaction, our courts have refused to recognize a duty arising under section 552. See Freeman v. Ernst Young, 516 N.W.2d 835, 838 (Iowa 1994) (no liability for representations made by seller pursuant to sale of business); Haupt v. Miller, 514 N.W.2d 905, 910 (Iowa 1994) (claim against bank officer involved in arm's-length negotiation of loan guarantee with bank customer not actionable); Meier v. Alfa-Laval, Inc., 454 N.W.2d 576, 581-82 (Iowa 1990) (no cause of action for negligent misrepresentation against seller of retail merchandise); Greatbatch v. Metropolitan Fed. Bank, 534 N.W.2d 115, 118 (Iowa App. 1995) (bank not liable where product supplied was loan, not information concerning processing of loan). The court of appeals recently summarized the nature of the threshold inquiry that must be made to determine whether a duty arises under section 552:
Their businesses involve making, selling and servicing products, and any information provided during the course of the business is incidental.Fry, 554 N.W.2d at 266 (quoting Greatbatch v. Metro. Fed. Bank, 534 N.W.2d 115, 117 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995)). Accordingly, Simplot is entitled to summary judgment on North Liberty's negligent-misrepresentation claim.