Id. at 1079 n. 4. Similarly, in Great Western Savings Bank v. George W. Easley Co., 778 P.2d 569 (Alaska 1989), the trial court entered an order subordinating a construction lender's deed of trust to a general contractor's mechanics' lien. On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court ruled that, because it was affirming a money judgment against the lender, "the order of subordination can be viewed as an order in aid of collection of the judgment which is within the inherent power of the court."

Cf. Hutka, 102 P.3d at 960; Bobich, 843 P.2d at 1236. In Great Western Savings Bank v. George W. Easley Co., 778 P.2d 569 (Alaska 1989), we concluded an error "not raised in the trial court and . . . not raised on appeal" was "thus not grounds for reversing the judgment." Id. at 579.

As such, there could still be a plausible meeting of the minds as to a payment of a UCR in the 80th percentile unrelated to the Alaska law as shown by the parties' course of dealing and the alleged industry norm. See Great W Sav. Bank v. George W Easley Co., 778 P.2d 569, 577-78 (Alaska 1989) (holding that complaint alleging that defendant “had a contractual obligation to make direct payments to” plaintiff, defendant “breached this contract,” and plaintiff “suffered damages” was sufficient for purposes of pleading breach of contract claim). Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted).

Having alleged that they paid Defendant for the Policy and were damaged by Defendant's failure to meet its contractual commitment to provide coverage, Plaintiffs have met the requirements of Rule 8(a) needed to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.See Great W. Sav. Bank v. George W. Easley Co., 778 P.2d 569, 577-78 (Alaska 1989) (finding a complaint for breach of contract sufficiently stated a claim for which relief could be granted because it alleged that a contractual obligation existed, the defendant breached the contract, and the plaintiff suffered damages). Docket 26 at 5-6.

Under Alaska law, “[i]n order to assert a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff must generally allege: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) breach; (3) causation; and (4) damages.” Nicdao v. Chase Home Fin., 839 F.Supp.2d 1051, 1068 (D.Alaska 2012) (citing Great W. Sav. Bank v. George W. Easley Co., 778 P.2d 569, 577–78 (Alaska 1989) ; Winn v. Mannhalter, 708 P.2d 444, 450 (Alaska 1985) ). Under New York law, the elements of a cause of action for breach of contract are “(1) the existence of a contract between [the plaintiff] and [the] defendant; (2) performance of the plaintiff's obligations under the contract; (3) breach of the contract by [the] defendant; and (4) damages to the plaintiff caused by [the] defendant's breach.

The existence of a contract, in turn, requires “an offer including all essential terms, an unequivocal acceptance of those terms by the offeree, consideration, and an intent to be bound by the contract....” See Great W. Sav. Bank v. George W. Easley Co., 778 P.2d 569, 577–78 (Alaska 1989) (finding that a complaint was sufficient where it alleged that the parties had a contractual obligation, that the other party breached the contract, and that the plaintiff suffered damages); Winn v. Mannhalter, 708 P.2d 444, 450 (Alaska 1985) (“Causation is a required element in an action for breach of contract”); cf., e.g., Ledcor Indus. (USA) Inc. v. Virginia Surety Co., No. C09–1807RSM, 2011 WL 6140957, at *7 (W.D.Wash. Dec. 9, 2011) (stating that under Washington law, “The elements of a cause of action for breach of contract are: (1) the existence of a legal duty under the contract; (2) breach of that duty; and (3) damages proximately caused by the breach.” (citation omitted)); Gray v. Carolina Energy Solutions, LLC, No. CV–10–0698–PHX–NVW, 2010 WL 2691563, at *5 (D.Ariz. July 6, 2010) (“To establish a claim for breach of contract in Arizona, a plaintiff must prove the existence of an enforceable contract, a breach of that contract, and damages caused by the breach.”

That claim, however, would be litigated in the court of claims, not this Court. It is less clear but likely that she would have a separate claim for misrepresentation either in equity for restitution or at law for negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation. See ARCO Alaska, Inc. v. Akers, 753 P.2d 1150, 1153 (Alaska 1988); Great Western Sav. Bank v. George W. Easley Co., 778 P.2d 569, 580-81 (Alaska 1989); Turnbull v. LaRose, 702 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Alaska 1985) (non-disclosure). The United States has not consented to be sued for such claims.

And where the damage occurs may also be significant.Great W. Sav. Bank v. George W. Easley Co. , 778 P.2d 569, 577-78 (Alaska 1989) (holding that complaint alleging that defendant "had a contractual obligation to make direct payments to" plaintiff, defendant "breached this contract," and plaintiff "suffered damages" was sufficient for purposes of pleading breach of contract claim); see Nicdao v. Chase Home Fin. , 839 F.Supp.2d 1051, 1068 (D. Alaska 2012) ("In order to assert a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff must generally allege: (1) existence of a contract; (2) breach; (3) causation; and (4) damages.").Abramoff v. Shake Consulting, L.L.C. , 288 F.Supp.2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2003) (concluding that although "the finalized agreement was a prerequisite to the defendants' alleged breach, ... the act of finalizing the agreement was not itself wrongful and did not directly give rise to the plaintiff's claim").

Id. (citing Brownlee v. Vang, 206 Cal.App.2d 814, 24 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1962)).See Great W. Sav. Bank v. George W. Easley Co., 778 P.2d 569, 579 (Alaska 1989) ("It is noteworthy that appellant does not contend that equitable estoppel will not support a claim for affirmative relief. The general rule is to that effect.

"White v. State ex rel. Block, 597 P.2d 172, 176 n. 13 (Alaska 1979) (quoting 6 Harold Remington, A Treatise on the Bankruptcy Law of the United States § 2874 (5th ed. 1952)); see also Great Western Sav. Bank v. George W. Easley Co., 778 P.2d 569, 581 (Alaska 1989).White, 597 P.2d at 175-76.