This conclusion is reinforced by the Legislature's making diversion a felony and by the decisional authorities in other jurisdictions. (Great W. Sav. Bank v Easley Co., 778 P.2d 569 [Alaska]; Zemon v Lufthansa German Airlines, 699 P.2d 1274 [Alaska].) In both of the cited authorities, the Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed judgments for punitive damages where the evidence allowed the jury to find tortious conduct entailing outrageous behavior in misapplying funds entrusted for the payment of construction costs.

We have consistently maintained that "[p]unitive damages are not recoverable for breach of contract unless the conduct constituting the breach constitutes an independent tort." ARCO Alaska, Inc. v. Akers, 753 P.2d 1150, 1153 (Alaska 1988); see also Great Western Savings Bank v. George W. Easley Co., 778 P.2d 569, 580 (Alaska 1989) ("punitive damages are not normally allowed on a breach of contract claim unless the conduct would also be a tort"); Walt v. State, 751 P.2d 1345, 1354 (Alaska 1988) (punitive damages unavailable because claimant "assert[ed] no recognizable tort claims"); Wien Air Alaska v. Bubbel, 723 P.2d 627, 630-31 (Alaska 1986). Thus, it would seem that we must decide whether Racine's hybrid action is a "tort" for purposes of determining the availability of punitive damages.

Id. (citing Brownlee v. Vang, 206 Cal.App.2d 814, 24 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1962)).See Great W. Sav. Bank v. George W. Easley Co., 778 P.2d 569, 579 (Alaska 1989) ("It is noteworthy that appellant does not contend that equitable estoppel will not support a claim for affirmative relief. The general rule is to that effect.