Id. at 1079 n. 4. Similarly, in Great Western Savings Bank v. George W. Easley Co., 778 P.2d 569 (Alaska 1989), the trial court entered an order subordinating a construction lender's deed of trust to a general contractor's mechanics' lien. On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court ruled that, because it was affirming a money judgment against the lender, "the order of subordination can be viewed as an order in aid of collection of the judgment which is within the inherent power of the court."

) 778 P.2d 569 (Alaska 1989). Id. at 581.

A plaintiff must also show that they suffered damages. See Great W. Sav. Bank v. George W. Easley Co., 778 P.2d 569, 577-78 (Alaska 1989) (holding that alleging a contractual obligation, a breach of that obligation, and a suffering of damages is sufficient under Alaska's notice-pleading standard to state a claim for breach of contract and survive a motion to dismiss). Whether a breach of contract has occurred is a question of fact.

Id. at 32. Great W. Sav. Bank v. George W. Easley Co., J.V., 778 P.2d 569, 577 (Alaska 1989). The Kellys have sufficiently plead that they had a contract with loanDepot and they suffered damages.

Cf. Hutka, 102 P.3d at 960; Bobich, 843 P.2d at 1236. In Great Western Savings Bank v. George W. Easley Co., 778 P.2d 569 (Alaska 1989), we concluded an error "not raised in the trial court and . . . not raised on appeal" was "thus not grounds for reversing the judgment." Id. at 579.

However, Alaska is a notice pleading state. Alaska R. Civ. P. 8(a); see also Great Western Savings Bank v. George W. Easley Co., 778 P.2d 569, 577 (Alaska 1989). Civil Rule 8(a) requires only a "short and plain statement of the claim" that will give the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Great Western, 778 P.2d at 577.

See supra Part A. 1. As for the estoppel argument, the general rule is that equitable estoppel will not support a claim for affirmative relief.Great Western Savings Bank v. George W. Easley Co., J.V., 778 P.2d 569, 579 (Alaska 1989). We have, however, noted that there is contrary authority, and employing equitable estoppel as a basis for monetary relief is not plain error.

Although the district court determined there was no genuine issue of material fact relevant to whether Hawthorne had acted willfully or maliciously, these are not elements of an unfitness of premises or breach of contract claim. See Newton v. Magill, 872 P.2d 1213, 1217 (Alaska 1994) (requiring "reasonable care" for actions under A.S. § 34.03.100); Great W. Sav. Bank v. George W. Easley Co. J.V., 778 P.2d 569, 577-78 (Alaska 1989) (breach of contract action). For purposes of adjudicating Ellison's claim, it is irrelevant that Ellison would need to establish these elements to ensure that any damage award would be nondischargeable in bankruptcy.

As such, there could still be a plausible meeting of the minds as to a payment of a UCR in the 80th percentile unrelated to the Alaska law as shown by the parties' course of dealing and the alleged industry norm. See Great W Sav. Bank v. George W Easley Co., 778 P.2d 569, 577-78 (Alaska 1989) (holding that complaint alleging that defendant “had a contractual obligation to make direct payments to” plaintiff, defendant “breached this contract,” and plaintiff “suffered damages” was sufficient for purposes of pleading breach of contract claim). Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted).

Having alleged that they paid Defendant for the Policy and were damaged by Defendant's failure to meet its contractual commitment to provide coverage, Plaintiffs have met the requirements of Rule 8(a) needed to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.See Great W. Sav. Bank v. George W. Easley Co., 778 P.2d 569, 577-78 (Alaska 1989) (finding a complaint for breach of contract sufficiently stated a claim for which relief could be granted because it alleged that a contractual obligation existed, the defendant breached the contract, and the plaintiff suffered damages). Docket 26 at 5-6.