Opinion
Case No. 3:13-cv-211
04-08-2014
PRISCILLA GRAY, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
Judge Timothy S. Black
ORDER THAT: (1) THE ALJ'S NON-DISABILITY FINDING IS FOUND
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, AND AFFIRMED;
AND (2) THIS CASE IS CLOSED
This is a Social Security disability benefits appeal. At issue is whether the administrative law judge ("ALJ") erred in finding the Plaintiff "not disabled" and therefore unentitled to supplemental security income ("SSI"). (See Administrative Transcript at Doc. 7 ("PageID") (PageID 70-82) (ALJ's decision)).
I.
Plaintiff filed an application for SSI, alleging disability beginning September 1, 2009. (PageID 204-206). Plaintiff claims that she was disabled due to pancreatitis, depression, and a personality disorder. (PageID 72). The claim was denied initially on February 8, 2010 and upon reconsideration on July 1, 2010. (PageID 145-147, 151-157).
Pancreatitis is an inflammation of the pancreas. The most common symptoms of pancreatitis are severe upper abdominal or left upper quadrant burning pain radiating to the back, nausea, and vomiting.
On August 19, 2011, Plaintiff appeared with her attorney and testified at a hearing before the ALJ. (PageID 89-134). A vocational expert also testified. (Id.) At the hearing and in writing, Plaintiff amended the alleged disability onset date to December 31, 2010. (PageID 216). The ALJ issued his decision on September 16, 2011, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined by the Social Security Act, and therefore was not entitled to benefits. (PageID 70-82).
The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (PageID 50-55). Plaintiff then commenced this action in federal court for judicial review of the Commissioner's decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sections 405(g) and 1383(c)(3).
Plaintiff was 27 years old the day her application for SSI was filed. (PageID 80). Plaintiff only completed the eighth grade and did not receive a GED. (PageID 95). Plaintiff's relevant work includes fast food worker, order picker, and hair stylist. (PageID 80).
Past relevant work experience is defined as work that the claimant has "done within the last 15 years, [that] lasted long enough for [the claimant] to learn to do it, and was substantial gainful activity." 20 C.F.R. § 416.965(a).
The ALJ's "Findings," which represent the rationale of his decision, were as follows:
1. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 31, 2010, the amended alleged disability onset date (20 CFR 416.971 et seq).(PageID 72-81).
2. The claimant has the following severe impairments: pancreatitis, depression, personality disorder, and history of cannabis abuse (20 CFR 416.920(c)).
3. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 416.925 and 416.926).
4. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) except that she can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and she must avoid all exposure to hazards. She can never perform repetitive bending or twisting at the waist due to abdominal pain. She is limited to simple 1 or 2 step tasks (requiring little, if any, concentration) that are low stress in nature (defined as no production quotas and no over-the-shoulder supervision) and that involve no direct dealing with the general public, limited contact with coworkers and supervisors, and no teamwork.
5. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR 416.965).
6. The claimant was born on December 31, 1981, and was 27 years old, which is defined as a "younger individual age 18-49," on the date the application was filed (20 CFR 416.964).
7. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that the claimant is "not disabled," whether or not she has transferable job skills (See SSR 82-41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2).
8. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that the claimant is "not disabled," whether or not she has transferable job skills (See SSR 82-41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2).
9. Considering her age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 416.969 and 416.969(a)).
10. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, since September 29, 2009, the date the application was filed (20 CFR 416.920(g)).
While the ALJ gave Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt, she was never diagnosed with pancreatitis. Physician Scott Balonier "c[ould] not exclude early pancreatitis," but ultimately diagnosed only abdominal pain. (PageID 72).
In sum, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not under a disability as defined by the Social Security Regulations, and was therefore not entitled to SSI. (PageID 82).
On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by: (1) adopting remote opinion evidence generated prior to Plaintiff's amended disability onset date, while rejecting evidence favorable to her from the same time period, as well as rejecting all medical evidence generated during the relevant amended disability period; (2) finding that Plaintiff's disabling mental symptoms are unsupported by "objective" medical evidence; (3) failing to appropriately evaluate Plaintiff's credibility in conjunction with the substantial evidence of record and the Social Security Regulations; (4) finding Plaintiff not credible because of her "limited mental health treatment"; and (5) finding that Plaintiff's daily activities prior to her amended onset date were inconsistent with her disabling symptoms and limitations. The Court will address each alleged error in turn.
II.
The Court's inquiry on appeal is to determine whether the ALJ's non-disability finding is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). In performing this review, the Court considers the record as a whole. Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 1978). If substantial evidence supports the ALJ's denial of benefits, that finding must be affirmed, even if substantial evidence also exists in the record upon which the ALJ could have found plaintiff disabled. As the Sixth Circuit has explained:
"The Commissioner's findings are not subject to reversal merely because substantial evidence exists in the record to support a different conclusion. The substantial evidence standard presupposes that there is a "zone of choice" within which the Commissioner may proceed without interference from the courts. If the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, a reviewing court must affirm."Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994).
The claimant bears the ultimate burden to prove by sufficient evidence that she is entitled to disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a). That is, she must present sufficient evidence to show that, during the relevant time period, she suffered an impairment, or combination of impairments, expected to last at least twelve months, that left her unable to perform any job in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
A.
The record reflects that:
1. Hearing Testimony
Plaintiff testified that she had recently lost 75 pounds in two months because she was in a mental ward and was sick, stressed, and depressed. (PageID 93). She tries not to drive because of her stomach pain, and she is not sure whether she will lash out or have road rage. (PageID 95).
Plaintiff testified that she was 5'2 and weighed 137, but that her normal weight was 200 pounds. (PageID 93).
There is no evidence that Plaintiff was hospitalized in 2011 at the time of her hearing.
Plaintiff claims that she was diagnosed with pancreatitis in 2009. (PageID 96). The pancreatitis allegedly causes pain every day and lasts about an hour or more at a time. (PageID 97). As a result, Plaintiff takes medication which causes her to lie down. (Id.) She has experienced stomach pain "for years" and classifies the pain as a 10 out of 10, where she cannot stand or even walk. (PageID 105).
Plaintiff also alleged that she experienced seizures after a hysterectomy. (PageID 97). The seizures caused her to lose consciousness, but she was prescribed medication which controls the seizures fairly well. (PageID 98). She testified that from an emotional standpoint, that "gots a lot of impact on it, being a female, not being able to have kids, and don't have any kids, that's a lot of depression and stress on me, I can't - I don't know how to handle it." (PageID 120). She also underwent chemotherapy when she was 22 for uterine cancer. (PageID 119).
Plaintiff alleged that she experiences mental health problems that prevent her from sustaining work on a regular and continuing basis, including: depression, bipolar disorder, and post traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"). (PageID 98). Her bipolar disorder causes her to be happy one minute, and crying or irritable the next minute. (PageID 98-99). This causes her to have an "attitude," which had become progressively worse over the past three years. (Id.) Plaintiff's depression causes her to cry and have mood swings, and she isolates herself in her apartment and does not want to be around people. (PageID 99). Plaintiff claims that she has always had problems around people, and was actually fired by her own sister from McDonald's because she lashed out. (Id.)
Plaintiff testified that she suffers from anxiety attacks every day which are brought on by crowds. (PageID 117). Her mind races and she hears voices telling her to hurt people. (Id.) She claims that she had an anxiety attack, blacked out, and hit someone with her car. (PageID 118). Plaintiff is "irritated from any little thing," and she "don't like people looking at her, I don't like people touching me, none of that, everything irritates me." (Id.)
Plaintiff testified that she attends counseling every week at Daymont, and she also sees a psychiatrist once a month. (PageID 100). She was hospitalized in September 2010 for her psychological problems after she took some pills and slit her wrists in a suicide attempt. (PageID 101-102). Plaintiff testified that she did not seek treatment right away because she "couldn't afford no treatment, without medical they're not going to give you no treatment, I tried everything to get treatment." (PageID 102). She further testified that "there is no way for me to get help without medical. The thing was, you don't have kids you don't get medical, so medical don't get you nowhere, you don't get no help." (Id.)
Plaintiff testified that she sees Dr. Barnes at Drew Health Center about once a month for her pancreatitis. (PageID 103-104). She suffers side effects from her medication, including nightmares, blurry vision every morning when she wakes up, and headaches. (PageID 104). She testified that she is currently taking Ativan, Zyprexa, Lexapro, and Abilify. (PageID 118-119). Plaintiff indicated that she "done been on so many types of different medicines because they trying to get some kind of medicine to work with my body." (PageID 104-105). The medicines cause her to lie down in the fetal position, which is the only position she is comfortable in. (PageID 106). Plaintiff was also prescribed sleeping pills, but they do not help her sleep. (Id.) When asked why she takes them if they don't help, she replied that she had told them plenty of times, and that her sleeping pills had been switched plenty of times. (Id.) When asked whether any of these problems are getting better, getting worse, or staying about the same, Plaintiff explained that "they're getting worse." (PageID 107).
Plaintiff testified that she can probably walk three blocks, stand for 20 minutes, and sit for an hour or an hour and a half due to her stomach pain. (PageID 108). She can only lift 10 pounds. (PageID 109). She does not take public transportation because people usually drive her car for her. (Id.) Plaintiff testified that she does not cook, sweep, mop, or vacuum because her sister and others do that for her. (PageID 110). Her cousin lives next door and checks on her and drives her car. (PageID 111). Plaintiff does not do any shopping because she does not like being in the store. (Id.) She testified that the last time she went to the grocery store was "six months ago." (Id.) Plaintiff also does not attend church or the movies and does not participate in sports, exercise, or yard work/gardening. (PageID 112). She does not drink alcohol or use drugs. (PageID 113). She testified that she had used only marijuana in the past, but that she graduated from Daymont's drug class and was clean for over six months. (PageID 114). Plaintiff testified that she cannot get out of bed until about 3:00 in the afternoon and then she typically goes next door to her cousin's place to lie on the couch, but does not watch any television. (PageID 116).
Vocational expert ("VE") Suman Srinivasan testified that an individual expected to be absent from work even on a once-per-week basis, or as many as four times per month, would not be able to maintain employment. (PageID 127). The VE indicated that all of the jobs she identified in her testimony would require an individual to be able to complete a normal workday and workweek by performing at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number or length of rest periods. (PageID 128). The VE further testified that all of the jobs identified in her testimony would require an individual to work in proximity to others and to accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors. (Id.)
2. Physical Impairments
The record indicates multiple emergency room visits due to extreme abdominal pain, seizures, overdoses, back pain, bleeding, and other major problems. (See, e.g., PageID 342, 349, 456-582). Plaintiff also underwent a hysterectomy and chemotherapy for cancer. (PageID 97).
3. Psychological Impairments
The record contains treatment notes from an inpatient hospitalization and several emergency room visits for symptoms of depression and suicidal ideation. (See PageID 1-78, 480-488, 584-590, 764-799).
4. Consultative Examining and Reviewing State Agency Opinions
The record indicates that Plaintiff was evaluated by both examining and non-examining state agency consultants, including Dr. Harris on January 25, 2010; Dr. Finnerty on February 4, 2010; and Dr. Bolz on June 21, 2010. (PageID 366-371, 372-389, 390-398). However, none of these opinions were generated during the time of Plaintiff's amended onset date of December 31, 2010.
Plaintiff's visits to Daymont were ordered as part of her probation. (PageID 780).
A January 2011 Individualized Service Plan and Individualized Treatment Plan from Daymont identified Plaintiff's "problems" as follows: cannabis dependence, self-report of having alcohol and other drug related problems, few friends, no support people, homeless, unemployed, no income, legal issues, and anger issues. (PageID 791). At her Initial Psychiatric Evaluation, Plaintiff was noted to be hostile, avoidant, irritable, anxious, agitated, constricted, and depressed, with borderline cognition. (PageID 782). Plaintiff was assigned a Global Assessment of Functioning ("GAF") score of 50, indicating serious impairments. (PageID 782). In April 2011, Plaintiff was diagnosed with depression, anxiety, hallucinations, suicidal/homicidal ideation, mood swings, paranoia, insomnia, racing thoughts, and anger. (PageID 773).
The Global Assessment of Functioning ("GAF") is a numeric scale (0 through 100) used by mental health clinicians and physicians to rate subjectively the social, occupational, and psychological functioning of adults, e.g., how well or adaptively one is meeting various problems-in-living. A score of 41-50 indicates serious symptoms (e.g., suicidal ideation, severe obsessional rituals, frequent shoplifting) or any serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., no friends, unable to keep a job, cannot work).
On July 15, 2011, licensed counselor Jessica Finney indicated that Plaintiff's combination of physical and mental impairments greatly restricts Plaintiff's functional capacity. (PageID 801). Ms. Finney noted that Plaintiff experiences anxious feelings during group discussion where she would shut down and not talk in order to avoid fighting and crying. (PageID 802). She further indicated that Plaintiff "has been treated as an adult since the age of two" and that she "has problems with taking suggestions and following orders." (Id.) Ms. Finney also observed that Plaintiff "suffers from low self-esteem where she has problems with life in general" and that she has a short temper and has been fired from previous jobs. (PageID 803). Ms. Finney opined that Plaintiff could not respond appropriately to supervision, co-workers, and customary work pressures, nor could she sustain attention and concentration on her work to meet normal standards of work productivity and work accuracy. (PageID 804). Ms. Finney stated that Plaintiff feels like people are out to get her and hears voices telling her to hurt someone or herself. (Id.) She has a short attention span, is easily distracted, becomes unstable, and wants to be alone. (PageID 804-805).
Ms. Finney opined that Plaintiff could not sustain attention and concentration on her work to meet normal standards of work productivity and work accuracy. (PageID 804). Further, Plaintiff could not understand, remember, and carry out simple work instructions without requiring very close supervision, and she cannot behave in an emotionally stable manner. (PageID 804-805). Ms. Finney further indicated that Plaintiff could not do any of the following:
• relate predictably in social situations;(PageID 806-810).
• demonstrate reliability;
• maintain concentration and attention for extended periods;
• perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be punctual within customary tolerances;
• complete a normal work day and work week without interruption from psychologically and/or physically based symptoms and perform at a consistent pace without unreasonable numbers and length of rest periods;
• respond appropriately to changes in a routine work setting;
• get along with co-workers or peers without unduly distracting them or exhibiting behavior extremes;
• sustain ordinary routine without special supervision;
• work in coordination with, or in proximity to, others without being unduly distracted by them; and
• accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors.
B.
First, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred in adopting evidence generated prior to her amended disability onset date, while rejecting evidence favorable to her from the same time period.
The record indicates that Plaintiff amended her alleged onset date after she was confronted by the ALJ with evidence that she had not been forthcoming about when she stopped working. Plaintiff initially testified that she had not worked since 2009. However, the ALJ presented evidence that she had earned income in 2010. (PageID 130). After being presented with this evidence, Plaintiff admitted that she had been working as a hair stylist out of her home. (Id.) When questioned about how she was able to work as a hair stylist given her alleged inability to deal with others, Plaintiff testified that she only worked for "select people" and that she needed the money. (PageID 82). Plaintiff explained that she did not know why she stopped working as a hair stylist and suggested that it was because she had a small apartment and she had "people running around," including clients' children. (PageID 131). Accordingly, the record supports a finding that Plaintiff amended the alleged onset of disability date, not because her condition changed, but because it was the last day that she admitted to performing substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b) (if a claimant is performing substantial gainful activity, she is not considered disabled).
Based on these facts, Plaintiff's alleged disability onset date was clearly not tied to her alleged disability, it was tied to her work activity. While the ALJ did discount some evidence prior to Plaintiff's alleged onset date, and rely on other evidence, the ALJ has the duty and discretion to weigh the evidence. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 399, 400 (1971). Moreover, the age of the evidence was not the only reason the ALJ discounted some of the evidence. For example, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff's 2009 hospitalization coincided with daily illegal drug use. (PageID 77, 325).
This Court carefully reviewed both the evidence that the ALJ considered and the evidence that the ALJ rejected and finds that even if the ALJ considered all of the evidence predating Plaintiff's alleged disability date, there is still substantial evidence supporting a finding that Plaintiff is not disabled.
C.
Next, Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ erred by finding that her disabling mental symptoms were unsupported by "objective" medical evidence.
Plaintiff argues that the record does contain objective evidence of her severe mental impairments both before and after the amended onset date. Specifically, she was noted to have depression with suicidal thoughts in October 2009 and her records reference a previous suicide attempt in 2004 with an indication that she became very depressed with GAF scores as low as 30 and 35. (PageID 290-365, 480-488, 584-590, 764-799). The Court does not dispute the fact that Plaintiff has a significant mental health history. However, these facts all predate the alleged onset date. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521 (Plaintiff must have an impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limit her ability to perform basic work-related activities for twelve consecutive months).
A GAF score of 21-30 indicates behavior considerably influenced by delusions or hallucinations or serious impairment, in communication or judgment (e.g., sometimes incoherent, acts grossly inappropriately, suicidal preoccupation) or inability to function in almost all areas (e.g., stays in bed all day, no job, home, or friends). A score of 31-40 indicates some impairment in reality testing or communication (e.g., speech is at times illogical, obscure, or irrelevant) or major impairment in several areas, such as work or school, family relations, judgment, thinking, or mood (e.g., depressed adult avoids friends, neglects family, and is unable to work; child frequently beats up younger children, is defiant at home, and is failing at school).
The opinion by substance abuse counselor Jessica Finney is not an "acceptable medical source" as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(a), and, consequently, her opinions are not "medical opinions" pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(a)(2). Regardless, the ALJ evaluated Ms. Finney's assessment. (PageID 79-80). See Social Security Ruling 06-03p (explaining that the factors found at 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d), including the degree to which the opinion is supported or consistent with the other evidence, are the basic principles that apply to consideration of all opinions). The ALJ found that Ms. Finney's opinion was inconsistent with and unsupported by the evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(4). Specifically, Ms. Finney stated that Plaintiff would be unable to perform a number of basic work-related activities. (PageID 803-09). However, the treatment notes from Daymont documented no more than a depressed and anxious mood, irritability, and difficulty with attention and concentration. (PageID 80). Furthermore, the ALJ noted serious inconsistencies in Ms. Finney's assessment. Although Ms. Finney stated that Plaintiff was incapable of many activities, she found that Plaintiff had only a moderate deficiency in concentration, persistence, and pace, and slight difficulties with activities of daily living and maintaining social functioning. (PageID 809-10).
There is simply insufficient evidence as of the alleged onset date (December 31, 2010), that Plaintiff had disabling mental symptoms. Moreover, Dr. Harris, who evaluated Plaintiff on January 25, 2010, reported only mildly paranoid ideation and no evidence of delusions, obsessions, or recent hallucinations. (PageID 76). Dr. Harris found that while Plaintiff exhibited limited motivation, she was only mildly impaired in her ability to understand and follow instructions. (PageID 79). Dr. Wills, a psychiatrist, saw Plaintiff on April 5, 2011, noting depression and some difficulties with attention and concentration, but no impairment in judgment or insight, logical thought processes, and no evidence of hallucinations, delusions, or homicidal or suicidal ideation. (PageID 76). On April 14, 2011, Dr. Wills noted a normal mental status examination. (PageID 76-77). Subsequent progress notes contain no significant mental findings. (PageID 77). Additional progress notes from Daymont show Plaintiff is in treatment and taking psychotropic medications, and that stabilization and improvement is expected with continued treatment compliance and sobriety. (PageID 79).
Plaintiff did have one episode of decompensation in September 2009 (before the alleged onset date), but even that hospitalization did not meet the two-week "extended duration" requirement of Section 12.00(C)(4).
Accordingly, the ALJ properly found that Plaintiff's disabling mental symptoms were unsupported by objective medical evidence.
D.
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred in failing to find that she was credible. "The ALJ's credibility determinations are entitled to great deference because the ALJ has the unique opportunity to observe the witness's demeanor while testifying." McFlothin v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 299 F. App'x 516, 523 (6th Cir. 2008).
Jones v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 476 (6th Cir. 2003) ("an ALJ is not required to accept a claimant's subjective complaints and may properly consider the credibility of a claimant when making a determination of disability.").
The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff's allegations were not entirely credible. Specifically, the ALJ found that: (1) Plaintiff's alleged pain was inconsistent with the evidence; (2) there was no objective evidence supporting several of Plaintiff's allegations of physical limitations; (3) her alleged symptoms were inconsistent with statements she made to her doctors; (4) she was involved in a contemporaneous worker's compensation claim, and her desire to gain from worker's compensation may explain why the record simply does not support "serious incapacitation consistent with disability for Social Security purposes," and (5) there was evidence of drug-seeking behavior. (PageID 99).
For example, Plaintiff initially indicated on a Work Background Report that she had not worked since August 2010, but she testified at the hearing that she last worked in September 2009. (PageID 78). After being presented with evidence of her work history, she admitted working out of her home as a hair stylist in 2010, earning almost $14,000. (Id.) Furthermore, although she complained of auditory hallucinations at the August 19, 2011 hearing, she told Dr. Harris on January 25, 2010, after her initial disability onset date, that she had not experienced such symptoms in three to four years. (Id.)
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly discounted Plaintiff's testimony relating to the severity of her mental impairments based on Plaintiff's "limited mental health treatment." (PageID 77). However, this was only one of the factors the ALJ considered, and it was not "a determinative factor in [the] credibility assessment." Blankenship v. Bowen, 874 F.2d 1116, 1124 (6th Cir. 1989).
The ALJ also determined that Plaintiff's reported activities conflicted with her claims of debilitating symptoms. Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 348 (6th Cir. 1993) (ALJ may consider household and social activities in evaluating complaints of disabling pain or other symptoms). Plaintiff told Dr. Harris that she cleaned her apartment, washed laundry, and was able to manage her finances. (PageID 28, 369). Plaintiff also reported that she could perform personal care, cook simple meals, and do household chores. (PageID 77, 241-42). She testified that she visited friends and relatives and took a trip to Alabama. (PageID 77, 112-113). The ALJ therefore discounted Plaintiff's subjective complaints because they conflicted with her reported activities. Plaintiff maintains that this evidence was generated almost a full year prior to her amended onset date and thus is not relevant to whether she was disabled as of December 31, 2010. However, Plaintiff did not amend her alleged onset date because her condition worsened. Rather, she did so because the ALJ confronted her with evidence that she continued working after the original alleged onset date. (PageID 130-33). Accordingly, the fact that the ALJ considered statements that were made before December 2010 does not necessarily decrease their probative value.
Plaintiff argues that the fact that she took a trip to Alabama for her great-grandmother's funeral does not establish that she travels and is able to perform daily activities. This Court does not disagree. However, the trip to Alabama was only one of multiple activities the ALJ considered. There is sufficient evidence in the record (i.e., Plaintiff's work history) that supports the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff was not credible.
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While Plaintiff may disagree with the ALJ's decision, his decision is clearly within the "zone of choices" afforded to him. See Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) ("The substantial evidence standard allows considerable latitude to administrative decision makers. It presupposes that there is a zone of choice within which the decision makers can go either way, without interference."). The issue is not whether the record could support a finding of disability, but rather whether the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence. See Casey v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's assignments of error are unavailing. The ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence and is affirmed.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT the decision of the Commissioner, that Priscilla Gray was not entitled to supplemental security income, is found SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, and AFFIRMED. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly, and as no further matters remain pending for the Court's review, this case is CLOSED.
__________________________
Timothy S. Black
United States District Judge