Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 01-CV-5077.
July 3, 2003.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Plaintiff Karen Graves ("Plaintiff" or "Graves") initiated the instant action alleging that Defendant Women's Christian Alliance ("Defendant" or "WCA") terminated her employment in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"). This case proceeded to jury trial on November 19, 2002. After the close of Plaintiff's case, Defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50, which the Court denied. Before the parties' closing statements, Defendant again moved for judgment as a matter of law, and we again denied the motion. On November 22, 2002, the jury rendered its verdict in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant and awarding damages in the amount of $92,008. Presently before the Court are Defendant's Motion in Support for a New Trial (Doc. No. 31), and Defendant's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (Doc. No. 32). For the following reasons, these motions will be denied.
Both motions rely on the assertion that the evidence was insufficient to support a verdict. In support of this contention, the substance of Defendant's new trial motion states:
In this case, Plaintiff readily admitted during the trial that she did not believe that her treatment (negative) received from Marilyn Rivers was discriminatory. Plaintiff acknowledged during the trial that she knew that her job was in jeopardy and that when she was terminated, she believed that her termination was because of the Day Care Center's financial problems. . . . The verdict reached by the jury clearly is against the great weight of the evidence.
* * *
Defendant maintains that the jury's damage aware [sic] is excessive and the Court should get the Plaintiff to accept a remitter or in the alternative order a New Trial if Plaintiff refuses to accept a remitter.
(Motion for New Trial, Def. Br. at 2).
Similarly, in its motion for judgment as a matter of law, Defendant argues that the evidence offered by the Plaintiff at trial was insufficient to support a jury verdict. In support of this contention, Defendant states that "the Plaintiff admitted on several occasions that she did not believe that her treatment while working for the Defendant was in fact discriminatory."
Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the grounds upon which a party may file a motion for a new trial. It provides that "[a] new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues . . . in an action in which there has been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States." Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a). The Third Circuit has indicated that where a party seeks a new trial on the basis of insufficient evidence to support a jury's verdict, a new trial is proper "only when the record shows that the jury's verdict resulted in a miscarriage of justice or where the verdict, on the record, cries out to be overturned or shocks our conscience." Klein v. Hollings, 992 F.2d 1285, 1290 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Williamson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1352-53 (3d Cir. 1991)). The burden of proof on a motion for a new trial is on the movant. Skill v. Martinez, 91 F.R.D. 498, 510 (N.J. 1981).
A motion for judgment as a matter of law is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). Rule 50(a)(1) provides:
If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue, the court may determine the issue against that party and may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the controlling law be maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on that issue.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1). A district court should grant this motion only if "viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and giving it the advantage of every fair and reasonable inference, there is insufficient evidence from which a jury reasonably could find liability." Buskirk v. Apollo Metals, 307 F.3d 160, 166 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993)).
Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1(e) provides:
Within fourteen (14) days after filing any post-trial motion, the movant shall either (a) order a transcript of the trial by a writing delivered to the Court Reporter Supervisor, or (b) file a verified motion showing good cause to be excused from this requirement. Unless a transcript is thus ordered, or the movant excused from ordering a transcript, the post-trial motion may be dismissed for lack of prosecution.
U.S. Dist. Ct. Rules E.D. Pa., Civ. R. 7.1(e). A number of courts in this District have recognized that post trial motions are subject to dismissal for failure to order a trial transcript based on this local rule. See, e.g., DiSalvo v. Lower Merion School Dist., Civ. A. 00-5463, 2002 WL 1335140, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 17, 2002) ("[U]nder Rule 7.1(e), as amended in 1995, the Court has discretion to dismiss Plaintiff's post-trial motion for lack of prosecution."); Gause v. City of Philadelphia, Civ. A. 00-1052, 2001 WL 1251215, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2001) (denying post-trial motion based on evidence allowed at trial where movant failed to order trial transcript pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(e)); Valver v. Abdullah, Civ. A. 00-1101, 2000 WL 1705772, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 2000) (denying motion for lack of prosecution pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(e)); Williams v. Rodriguez, Civ. A. 97-4338, 2000 WL 230351, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (same); Leibrand v. K-Mart, Civ. A. 97-4947, 1998 WL 229675, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (same).
Defendant has failed to comply with Local Rule 7.1(e). According to court records, Defendant neither ordered a trial transcript nor filed a verified motion showing good cause to be excused from this requirement. Although it is within the court's discretion to dismiss a post-trial motion where a party fails to comply with this local rule, we observe that it is particularly difficult, if not impossible, to properly evaluate a post-trial motion based on the sufficiency of evidence where the trial transcript have not been provided. Of necessity, an argument that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the jury's verdict requires a transcript of the testimony at trial.See Disalvo, 2002 WL 1335140, at *1 ("A transcript is necessary when the complained of error concerns the preclusion of evidence."); Gause, 2001 WL 1251215, at *3 ("[T]he absence of the relevant portion of the trial transcript leaves this Court without any basis upon which to rule on the merits of Plaintiff's Motion."); Schmidt v. Silver, 89 F.R.D. 519, 520 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (declining to grant a post-trial motion for a new trial based in part on allegations of erroneous restrictions on evidence, and explaining that "[g]iven exceptions which reference the evidence, a transcript of all the testimony and the entire charge is necessary to decide if there was error and whether any error justifies a new trial"). Under these circumstances we are compelled to conclude that Defendants motions must be denied.
If we were to attempt to deal with Defendant's motions based on our recollection of the evidence and testimony presented at trial, we would have to conclude that Defendant's motions must fail. In order to state a prima facie case for disability discrimination under either the ADA or PHRA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she (1) has a disability; (2) is qualified individual under the statutes; and (3) suffered an adverse employment decision as a result of her disability. Buskirk v. Apollo Metals, 307 F.3d 160, 166 (3d Cir. 2002). Once a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997). This burden is not heavy. The defendant need not prove that the articulated reason actually motivated the action. Id. at 500-501. Once the employer articulates a non-discriminatory reason for the action, the plaintiff must convince the factfinder that the stated reason is in fact a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 501. In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, a plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence to demonstrate weaknesses, inconsistencies, implausibilities, or contradictions in the employer's explanation for its action "so as to permit a reasonable factfinder to infer that the employer did not act for the preferred reasons." Shaner v. Synthes, 204 F.3d 494, 503 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764-65 (3d Cir. 1994)).
The evidence adduced at trial established that Graves was hired as manager of the day care center at WCA in August 1999 and was terminated effective February 25, 2000. WCA conceded that Graves was disabled. She suffered from scleroderma, a physically debilitating skin condition that is deforming and immediately apparent. WCA also conceded that Graves was a qualified individual under the ADA and PHRA, and that she was terminated. The battleground in this trial focused on the reason for Graves termination. WCA contended that the reason for the termination was that it was experiencing financial problems. Graves pointed out implausibility and inconsistencies in this explanation. She also offered testimony concerning Rivers' hostility towards her for no apparent reason. The determination of whether WCA's explanation for this termination was pretext for discrimination was purely a factual issue dependant upon which testimony was believed. The jury chose to believe that discrimination not financial problems was the reason for the termination. It is not for the Court to say that they were wrong, especially without a transcript of the trial.
For these reasons, defendant's motion for a new trial and its renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law will therefore both be denied.
An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 3rd day of July, 2003, upon review of Defendant's Motion in Support for a New Trial (Doc. No. 31), and Defendant's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (Doc. No. 32), as well as all papers filed in support thereof and in opposition thereto, it is ORDERED as follows:
1) Defendant's Motion in Support for a New Trial is DENIED.
2) Defendant's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.