Opinion
No. CV020282841-S
December 3, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT #124
I. Background
The plaintiff brought the underlying action in this case, dated November 4, 2002, in five counts against several defendants. The fourth count of the complaint seeks damages from the defendant, Meriden Hotel Partners, LLC, under a theory of "premises liability." Meriden Hotel Partners, LLC (hereinafter referred to as the defendant) filed a motion for summary judgment on count four, dated February 4, 2004, which was denied without prejudice by the court (Tanzer, J.) on July 15, 2004. The parties proceeded to conclude arbitration proceedings before Attorney Matthew G. Galligan, who rendered his opinion in favor of the defendant on July 18, 2004, finding insufficient facts to support the allegation of the defendant's negligence in the case. On September 10, 2004 the defendant refiled its motion for summary judgment. That motion is now before the court.
II. Facts
The plaintiff alleges the following pertinent facts. Justin Miller assaulted the plaintiff, Gavin Gratta, in the parking lot of the East Inn Hotel after attending a party in a private room on the premises. This assault resulted in damages to the plaintiff. Neither individual was registered as a guest of the hotel.
Justin Miller is an additional defendant in this action.
The plaintiff and Miller had been separately invited to the defendant's business premises for the purpose of attending a party where, the plaintiff alleges, alcoholic beverages were provided to Miller, who was under the age of eighteen years old at that time. While in the hotel room, a dispute arose between Miller and the plaintiff over a debt owed to a third party. The plaintiff and Miller left the hotel building, and proceeded to the parking lot where Miller allegedly assaulted the plaintiff.
III. Discussion
Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Practice Book § 17-49. "In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hertz Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co., 245 Conn. 374, 381, 713 A.2d 820 (1998).
"The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to judgment as a matter of law . . ." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Appleton v. Board of Education, 254 Conn. 205, 209, 757 A.2d 1059 (2000). "[T]he party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schilberg Integrated Metals Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 263 Conn. 245, 252, 819 A.2d 773 (2003). "A `material fact' is a fact that will make a difference in the result of the case . . . The facts at issue are those alleged in the pleadings." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mountaindale Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Zappone, 59 Conn.App. 311, 315, 757 A.2d 608, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 947, 762 A.2d 903 (2000).
A motion for summary judgment, however, is particularly "ill-adapted to negligence cases, where, as here, the ultimate issue in contention involves a mixed question of fact and law, and requires the trier of fact to determine whether the standard of care was met in a specific situation." Maffucci v. Royal Park Ltd. Partnership, 42 Conn.App. 563, 568, 680 A.2d 333 (1996), rev'd on other grounds, 243 Conn. 552, 707 A.2d 15 (1998). "A determination of negligence is necessarily one of fact." Id., 568-69. Nevertheless, "[t]he issue of whether a defendant owes a duty of care is an appropriate matter for summary judgment because the question is one of law." Pion v. Southern New England Telephone Co., 44 Conn.App. 657, 660, 691 A.2d 1107 (1997).
The plaintiff bases his claim on "premises liability." In this case the premises is a hotel. The plaintiff alleges that the East Inn Hotel was "legendary" for renting rooms where underage drinking parties and "brawls" occurred, and that the hotel failed to take the steps necessary to prevent such underage drinking and brawling from occurring. The plaintiff further alleges that the defendant either knew or should have known that it was well-known within the community for allowing underage drinking parties which resulted in violence, and that it failed in its duty to protect the plaintiff from such violence. The defendant disputes these allegations, asserting that it had recently purchased the hotel from a previous owner, and argues that it owed no such duty to the plaintiff.
The question presented is whether the facts alleged and viewed most favorably to the plaintiff would constitute a breach of a duty by the hotel to prevent an assault from being committed against a hotel business invitee. Unlike other jurisdictions where hotels and innkeepers have a special duty to business invitees to guard against personal injuries, the proprietor of a hotel or inn in Connecticut is "in the same category as any other business establishment and owes the duty of reasonable care to its patrons." Wright, Connecticut Law of Torts, (3rd Ed. 1991), section 86, p. 255. See Williams v. Milner Hotels Co., 130 Conn. 507, 511, 36 A.2d 20 (1944).
See Restatement (Second), Torts section 314A(2), p. 118, (1965).
In support if its motion for summary judgment, the defendant cites authority to support the exclusion of criminal conduct from actionable negligence claims, based upon a proximate cause analysis. In Medcalf v. Washington Heights Condominium Ass'n, Inc., the court reasoned that "[a]s a general rule, the act of a third person in committing an intentional act or crime is a superseding cause of harm to another resulting therefrom . . . In such a case, the third person has deliberately assumed control of the situation, and all responsibility for the consequences of his act is shifted to him." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Medcalf v. Washington Heights Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 57 Conn.App. 12, 17, 747 A.2d 532 (2000). In addition, the defendant cites premises liability cases, where landlords were not found to be negligent in their security measures or were otherwise not held liable where certain criminal conduct was not foreseeable. For example, in Stanley v. Meriden Housing Authority, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, Docket No. CV00 0274035 (August 27, 2002, Gilardi, J.), summary judgment was granted in favor of the defendant landlord because there was no evidence to suggest that security measures in that case were defective, leading to an assault of the plaintiff in that case. Similarly, in Spencer v. Nesto, 46 Conn.Sup. 566, 764 A.2d 244 (May 19, 2000, Robinson, J.), another case involving the premises liability of a landlord, the court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding that a landlord's duty should not extend to the protection of third parties against criminal acts.
In Spencer v. Nesto, 46 Conn.Sup. 566, 27 Conn. L. Rptr. 212 (2000), the defendant-landlord sought a motion for summary judgment on the ground that he had no duty to protect a passersby from criminal acts and thus, was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The court stated in relevant part that: "As a general rule, a private person does not have a duty to protect another from a criminal attack by a third person. We recognize that this rule has sometimes in the past been applied in landlord-tenant law . . . Among the reasons for the application of this rule to landlords are: judicial reluctance to tamper with the traditional common law concept of the landlord-tenant relationship; the notion that the act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or crime is a superseding cause of the harm to another resulting therefrom; the oftentimes difficult problem of determining foreseeability of criminal acts; the vagueness of the standard which the landlord must meet; the economic consequences of the imposition of the duty; and conflict with the public policy allocating the duty of protecting citizens from criminal acts to the government rather than the private sector." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 574. Quoting Kargul v. Sandpiper Dunes Ltd. Partnership, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 505600, 1991 (January 29, 1991, Axelrod, J.) ( 3 Conn. L. Rptr. 154).
However, as the defendant acknowledges in its brief, our appellate courts have recognized an exception for intervening criminal acts to the extent that they are found to be foreseeable and within the scope of risk created by negligent conduct. See Medcalf v. Washington Heights Condominium Ass'n, Inc., supra. 57 Conn.App. 17-18. In Stewart v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 234 Conn. 597, 662 A.2d 753 (1995), our Supreme Court held that the defendant failed in its duty to protect its customers from a foreseeable danger in its parking garage. The court held that an action for damages was permissible in light of past, known criminal conduct on the premises. Similarly, in the present case the plaintiff alleges that underage drinking parties occurred regularly at the hotel and that the defendant knew or should have known of the danger of fighting in connection with such parties.
There, a store patron was murdered in the store parking lot.
"As applied to this case, the jury reasonably could have found that the particular harm involved, Javery's robbery and murder, had been within the foreseeable scope of the risk because the prior robberies that occurred in the garage were crimes with a natural propensity to escalate into physical violence, including murder . . . [A] jury reasonably could have concluded that the defendant had both actual and constructive notice that robbery and its associated violent consequences were likely to occur in its garage . . . Consequently, in this instance, jurors reasonably could have concluded that the intervention of Williams had been within the foreseeable scope of the risk created by the defendant's negligent conduct and thus was not a superseding cause. Accordingly, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence of causation to support the jury's verdict." Stewart v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., supra, 234 Conn. 613.
The court begins its analysis by determining whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty as a business invitee. The defendant here is in the hotel business, and as such is subject to a duty to business invitees. According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, an invitee is a business visitor "who is invited to enter or remain on land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor of the land." Restatement (Second), Torts section 332(3), p. 176, (1965). Official comments to the Restatement further refine this definition and indicate that "[i]t is not necessary that the visitor shall himself be upon the land for the purposes of the possessor's business. The visit may be for the convenience or arise out of the necessities of others who are themselves upon the land for such a purpose. Thus those who go to a hotel to pay social calls upon the guests . . . are business visitors, since it is part of the business of the hotelkeeper . . . to afford the guest . . . such conveniences." Id., comment (d).
The nature of the duty owed to such business invitees is further described in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, as follows: "A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his business purposes is subject to liability to members of the public while they are upon the land for such a purpose, for physical harm caused by . . . intentionally harmful acts of third persons . . . and by the failure of the possessor to exercise reasonable care to (a) discover that such acts are being done or are likely to be done, or (b) give a warning adequate to enable the visitors to avoid the harm, or otherwise to protect them against it." Restatement (Second), supra, section 334. "A showing of proximate cause is nevertheless required," Wright, Connecticut Law of Torts, (3rd Ed. 1991), section 49, p. 123; see also Doe v. Manheimer, 212 Conn. 748, 758-59, 563 A.2d 699 (1989), in order for the plaintiff to prevail in his case against the defendant.
Under the facts alleged in this case, both the plaintiff and Miller held the status of business invitees while attending an underage drinking party at the defendant's hotel. Under such a circumstance, the court must analyze this case in light of the fundamental purposes of the tort compensation system. See Monk v. Temple George Associates, LLC, 82 Conn.App. 660, 846 A.2d 933 (2004); cert granted 270 Conn. 903, 853 A.2d 520 (2004). The court must therefore consider the "compensation of innocent parties, shifting the loss to responsible parties or distributing it among appropriate entities, and deterrence of wrongful conduct . . . It is sometimes said that compensation for losses is the primary function of tort law . . . [but it] is perhaps more accurate to describe the primary function as one of determining when compensation [is] required . . . An equally compelling function of the tort system is the prophylactic factor of preventing future harm . . . The courts are concerned not only with compensation of the victim, but with admonition of the wrongdoer . . . Imposing liability for consequential damages often creates significant risks of affecting conduct in ways that are undesirable as a matter of policy. Before imposing such liability, it is incumbent upon us to consider those risks." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lodge v. Arett Sales Corp., 246 Conn. 563, 578-79, 717 A.2d 215 (1998).
In Monk, the Appellate Court upheld the trial court decision to grant summary judgment on behalf of the defendant, an owner of a parking lot where the plaintiff had been assaulted. The plaintiff had parked her car in the lot for a fee, and was therefore a business invitee. Her assailant was her husband's ex-girlfriend, who had verbally confronted the plaintiff in a nightclub, as she had done in the past, and then followed her to the parking lot where she physical assaulted the plaintiff. After considering the fundamental policy objectives of the tort compensation system, the court in Monk found that the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff as a matter of law under the circumstances of this particular attack. Monk v. Temple George Associates, supra, 82 Conn.App. 665.
The rationale of the court in Monk was stated by the court, in pertinent part, as follows: "To impose a legal duty on the defendants under the circumstances of this case would (1) be tantamount to imposing strict liability on a parking lot owner or operator for any injury occurring on its property no matter what the circumstances, (2) not act as a deterrent, given the unique circumstances of the attack at issue, where a known attacker attacked the plaintiff because of a personal dispute that arose two years earlier and (3) shift the cost of the plaintiff's harm to parties who were not directly, if at all, responsible for the injuries. The policy goals of the tort compensation system would, therefore, not be met if we were to permit a legal duty to be imposed on the defendants." Monk v. Temple George Associates, supra, 82 Conn.App. 564-65.
The present case is distinguishable from Monk. Primarily, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant knew or should have known that its premises were being used for underage drinking parties where violent acts had occurred in the past, and it is the public policy of this state to discourage and prevent underage drinking. An additional distinction here is that the alleged dispute in this case arose and was concluded on the defendant's premises. Therefore, the goals of the tort compensation system of deterrence, in particular, as well as the goal of shifting liability to parties responsible for a plaintiff's harm, albeit indirectly in the present case, would be met if the alleged facts were found to be true and the trier of fact were to find proximate cause in this case.
See General Statutes sections 30-86 et seq., and 14-227g.
In Stewart, our Supreme Court would not reverse a jury determination on the question of proximate cause, unless the intervening criminal act "was not foreseeable as a matter of law." Stewart v. Federated Department Stores, Inc., supra, 234 Conn. 611. In light of the legal duty of the defendant hotel to its business invitees, the question of whether the defendant knew or should have known that its premises was used for underage drinking parties, and whether an assault in this case was within the scope of the risk associated with such parties raises a disputed question of material fact to be determined by the trier of fact.
The motion for summary judgment is therefore denied.
BY THE COURT
Mark H. Taylor, Judge