Opinion
C. A. 2:23-06551-BHH-MHC
03-27-2024
Joseph N. Grate, Plaintiff, v. State of South Carolina, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry United States Magistrate Judge
This is a civil action filed by Plaintiff Joseph N. Grate, a pro se litigant. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), pretrial proceedings in this action have been referred to the assigned United States Magistrate Judge. In an Order entered February 21, 2024, Plaintiff was advised of material deficiencies in his Complaint and given the opportunity to file an amended Complaint. ECF No. 6. On March 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. ECF No. 9.
I. BACKGROUND
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff appears to allege claims about the results of a case he brought in state court. His statement of the facts is that:
The Defendant deprived Plaintiff of Due Process, by its insistence upon its nonadherence to SCRCP Rule 12(a), throughout the State's Judicial involvement in an action initiated by Plaintiff in Georgetown County Magistrate Court, 06/15/2020. To date, Defendant in that June 2020 action has not answered the Complaint. SCRCP Rule 12(a), requires a defendant to serve his answer within 30 days after the service of the complaint upon him. The State Judiciary has steadfastly refrained from adhering to that rule, from June 15, 2020, to date. The result for Plaintiff is the loss of Real Estate related Revenue for the period from June 15, 2023, to date.ECF No. 9 at 2 (errors in original).
As relief, Plaintiff requests:
1. The relief hoped for is a refund of all filing fees paid to the State and Federal
Court System;
2. A fair adjudication of the [] issues from which this case emanated;
3. Compensation in the amount that is commensurate with the value of all that is incorporated within the U.S. Democratic System and its Rule of Law Proclamation, in particular;
4. Compensation for lost Real Estate related Revenue ($62,000.00, as of November 15, 2023, plus $1000.00 per month from November 15, 2023, through the duration of this matter). All claims are predicated upon the belief that plaintiff was wronged/harmed by the Courts, thus depriving him of the use and benefit of his property.
5. Any and all additional relief that the court finds just and equitable.Id. at 8-9 (errors in original).
Records from Georgetown County indicate Plaintiff filed a Notice to Quit (case number 2020CV221050515) against Jameka Cohen (Cohen) in June 2020. After a hearing on July 28, 2020, the magistrate ruled in Cohen's favor, finding that “[Plaintiff Grate] requested proof of insurance and [Defendant Cohen] provided such documents in court.” Plaintiff appealed (case number 2020CP2200896) to the Georgetown Court of Common Pleas which affirmed the magistrate's decision on April 8, 2021. Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals for South Carolina which filed an unpublished opinion (No. 2023-UP-118) on March 22, 2023, affirming the circuit court's affirmance of the magistrate's order. It specifically held Plaintiff abandoned his argument that the magistrate court erred in ruling Cohen's production of her insurance information satisfied his complaint, Plaintiff abandoned his arguments regarding the circuit court's denial of his motion for admission of best evidence and his motion for recusal, and Plaintiff's argument concerning the court reporter was not appropriate for direct appeal. The Supreme Court of South Carolina denied Plaintiff's petition for writ of certiorari on November 15, 2023, and the remittitur was filed on February 1, 2024. See Georgetown County Fifteenth Judicial Circuit Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Georgetown/Public Index/PISearch.aspx [search case numbers above] (last visited Mar. 25, 2024).
This Court may take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government websites. See Tisdale v. South Carolina Highway Patrol, No. 0:09-1009-HFF-PJG, 2009 WL 1491409, at *1 n. 1 (D.S.C. May 27, 2009), aff'd, 347 Fed.Appx. 965 (4th Cir. 2009); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., No. 05-4182, 2008 WL 4185869, at * 2 (E.D. La. Sept. 8, 2008) (noting that courts may take judicial notice of governmental websites including other courts' records).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Although Plaintiff is not proceeding in forma pauperis, this filing is nonetheless subject to review pursuant to the inherent authority of this Court to ensure that a plaintiff has standing; subject matter jurisdiction exists; and the case is not frivolous. See Ross v. Baron, 493 Fed.Appx. 405, 406 (4th Cir. Aug. 22, 2012); Ferguson v. Wooton, 741 Fed.Appx. 955 (4th Cir. 2018) (collecting cases and explaining that “[f]rivolous complaints are subject to dismissal pursuant to the district court's inherent authority, even when the plaintiff has paid the filing fee” and that “dismissal prior to service of process is permissible when a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a patently frivolous complaint”); Smith v. Kagan, 616 Fed.Appx. 90 (4th Cir. 2015) (“Frivolous complaints are subject to dismissal pursuant to the court's inherent authority, even when the plaintiff has paid the filing fee.”); Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-364 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that although 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) was not applicable where a pro se party filed an appeal and paid the filing fee, the court had “inherent authority, wholly aside from any statutory warrant, to dismiss an appeal or petition for review as frivolous”). “[I]t is well established that a court has broad inherent power sua sponte to dismiss an action, or part of an action, which is frivolous, vexatious, or brought in bad faith.” Brown v. Maynard, No. L-11-619, 2011 WL 883917, at *1 (D. Md. Mar.11, 2011) (citing cases). Therefore, a court has “the discretion to dismiss a case at any time, notwithstanding the payment of any filing fee or any portion thereof, if it determines that the action is factually or legally frivolous.” Id. As such, this case is subject to review pursuant to the inherent authority of this Court to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction exists and that the case is not frivolous. See, e.g., Carter v. Ervin, No. 14-0865, 2014 WL 2468351 (D.S.C. June 2, 2014); Cornelius v. Howell, No. 06-3387, 2007 WL 397449, at *3 (D.S.C. Jan. 8, 2007), report and recommendation adopted, 2007 WL 4952430 (D.S.C. Jan. 30, 2007), aff'd, 251 Fed.Appx. 246 (4th Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff paid the filing fee. See receipt number 4000016319.
Pre-screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is inapplicable in pro se, non-prisoner, fee-paid cases. See Bardes v. Magera, No. 2:08-487-PMD-RSC, 2008 WL 2627134, at *8-10 (D.S.C. June 25, 2008) (finding persuasive the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Benson v. O'Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999), that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) is inapplicable to actions that are not pursued in forma pauperis).
This Court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Lack of Jurisdiction
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, see Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994), and a district court is charged with ensuring that all cases before it are properly subject to such jurisdiction. In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). The Amended Complaint filed in this case is subject to summary dismissal without service of process because it fails to state a claim which this Court may consider under its federal question jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or its diversity jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Plaintiff has not asserted diversity jurisdiction as a basis for federal court jurisdiction. A district court may have jurisdiction of a civil action “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000...and is between - (1) citizens of different States...” 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Moreover, Plaintiff has not alleged complete diversity. See Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372-374 (1978) (Complete diversity of parties means that no party on one side may be a citizen of the same State as any party on the other side). Here, Plaintiff and Defendant both appear to be citizens of South Carolina. See ECF No. 9 at 1.
Plaintiff appears to be attempting to assert federal question jurisdiction. See ECF No. 9 at 1-2. However, in response to the question asking him to list the specific federal statutes, federal treaties, and/or provisions of the United States that are at issue in this case, he merely wrote:
1. 42 USC § 1983 - (Due Process by re: Civil Procedure violation, per SCRCP 12(a))
2. 28 USC App fed. R Civ P Rule 4 Summons - (violation by disposition to SCRCP 12(a))
3. United States Constitution, Article III, Section 2ECF No. 9 at 2 (errors in original). Plaintiff has not identified what and how any federal statute or provision of the United States Constitution was allegedly violated.
Although Plaintiff references 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (§ 1983), that statute ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States,” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). It is unclear to what Plaintiff refers in writing “28 USC App fed R Civ P Rule Summons[.]” To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to allege that the defendant in the state court case violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, he has not alleged any facts to indicate that this federal rule applied to the case he brought in the South Carolina state (not federal) court.
Plaintiff may be attempting to allege that his due process rights were violated because the defendant in the state court case allegedly violated the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure by failing to file an answer within thirty days, which Plaintiff claims was required under South Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a). However, any such claim should be summarily dismissed for lack of federal court jurisdiction. In asserting such a claim, Plaintiff is attempting to appeal the decision of the state court. Federal district courts do not hear “appeals” from state court actions. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476-82 (1983) (a federal district court lacks authority to review final determinations of state or local courts because such review can only be conducted by the Supreme Court of the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1257); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); see also Hulsey v. Cisa, 947 F.3d 246 (4th Cir. 2020). To rule in favor of Plaintiff on claims filed in this action or to provide him the relief he appears to request may require this court to overrule and reverse orders and rulings made in the state court. Such a result is prohibited under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Davani v. Virginia Dep't. of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 719-720 (4th Cir. 2006); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293-294 (2005); Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va., 122 F.3d 192, 201 (4th Cir. 1997).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is applicable both to claims at issue in a state court order and to claims that are “inextricably intertwined” with such an order. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284. Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to indicate that this is a case where the federal complaint raises claims independent of, but in tension with, a state court judgment such that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would not be an impediment to the exercise of federal jurisdiction. See Vicks v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 676 Fed.Appx. 167 (4th Cir. 2017) (district court erred in applying Rooker-Feldman doctrine to bar appellants' claims where the claims did “not seek appellate review of [the state court] order or fairly allege injury caused by the state court in entering that order”); Thana v. Bd. of Licenser Comm'rs for Charles Cty., Md., 827 F.3d 314, 320 (4th Cir. 2016) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not an impediment to the exercise of federal jurisdiction when the federal complaint raises claims independent of, but in tension with, a state court judgment simply because the same or related question was aired earlier by the parties in state court).
Appeals of orders issued by lower state courts must go to a higher state court, not to a federal district court. Only the Supreme Court of the United States may review (review is discretionary by way of a writ of certiorari and is not an appeal of right) a decision of a state's highest court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257; Ernst v. Child and Youth Servs., 108 F.3d 486, 491(3d Cir. 1997). This Court cannot sit in judgment of a state court decision, and must dismiss Plaintiff's claims concerning the state court decisions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Moore v. Commonwealth of Virginia Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 3:15CV515, 2016 WL 775783, at *5 (E.D. Va. Feb. 25, 2016).
Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff is requesting injunctive relief, his request is barred by the federal Anti-Injunction Act (Act) which provides that “[a] court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283. “[A]ny injunction against state court proceedings otherwise proper ... must be based on one of the specific statutory exceptions [in the Act] if it is to be upheld.” Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 287 (1970). State-court proceedings “should normally be allowed to continue unimpaired by intervention of the lower federal courts, with relief from error, if any, through the state appellate courts and ultimately [the United States Supreme Court].” Id. The Act “is an absolute prohibition against any injunction of any state-court proceedings, unless the injunction falls within one of the three specifically defined exceptions in the Act.” Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 630 (1977). Plaintiff has alleged nothing to suggest that one of the exceptions to the Act's prohibition against federal-court intervention into state-court proceedings applies or allows that relief. Thus, Plaintiff's requests for injunctive relief should be summarily dismissed under the Anti-Injunction Act.
B. State Law Claims
Plaintiff may instead be attempting to allege claims under South Carolina law. However, as he fails to establish jurisdiction as to any federal claim, only the state law claims would remain, and federal courts are allowed to hear and decide state-law claims only in conjunction with federal-law claims, through the exercise of “supplemental jurisdiction.” See 28 U.S.C. §1367; Wisconsin Dep't of Corrs. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 387 (1998). Of course, a district court may have jurisdiction of a civil action “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000...and is between - (1) citizens of different States...”. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. However, as noted above, Plaintiff has not alleged complete diversity of the parties.
Thus, there is no complete diversity and Plaintiff may not bring his claims pursuant to § 1332. As Plaintiff has asserted no valid federal claim and there is no diversity jurisdiction, this Court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; see also United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); Tigrett v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 290 F.3d 620, 626 (4th Cir. 2002) (affirming district court's dismissal of state law claims when no federal claims remained in the case); Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 1999)(“[T]he Constitution does not contemplate the federal judiciary deciding issues of state law among non-diverse litigants”).
IV. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that this action be dismissed without prejudice,without issuance and service of process, and without further leave to amend. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 796 (4th Cir. 2022) (holding that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend ... the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”).
See Platts v. O'Brien, 691 F. App'x. 774 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing S. Walk at Broadlands Homeowner's Ass'n v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d 175, 185 (4th Cir. 2013) (“A dismissal for ... [a] defect in subject matter jurisdiction[] must be one without prejudice because a court that lacks jurisdiction has no power to adjudicate and dispose of a claim on the merits.”).
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the following page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. \0 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).