In order to state a cause of action against a landlord for negligent failure to repair a dangerous or defective condition, the tenant need only allege that the landlord had either actual or constructive knowledge of the condition or of a statutory code violation for a sufficient time in which to make a correction. See Grant v. Thornton, 749 So.2d 529, 532 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Siegel v. Deerwood Place Corp., 701 So.2d 1190 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Bennett M. Lifter, Inc. v. Varnado, 480 So.2d 1336 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). The landlord filed its motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the alleged improper maintenance was not the direct or legal cause of the tenant's injuries as a matter of law.
Section 83.51 “has been said to create a statutory warranty of habitability.” Grant v. Thornton, 749 So.2d 529, 531 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (citing Bennett M. Lifter, Inc. v. Varnado, 480 So.2d 1336 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)). Nonetheless, in their Reply, Defendants contend that the lease agreement clearly sets forth the intention to limit liability, and they point to case law noting that “clauses in contracts limiting liability are valid and enforceable provided the intention to limit liability is made clear in the contract.”
Additionally, Defendant correctly notes that Plaintiff has presented no authority for the existence of a warranty of habitability in Florida outside the context of housing; indeed, it has been held that no such warranty exists for vehicles. See Maddox v. Fleetwood Motor Homes of Ind., Inc., No. 8:05-cv-1248-T30-TBM, 2005 WL 2062763, at * 1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 22, 2005) ("Florida law does not acknowledge the existence of a separate implied warranty of habitability or workmanship for motor vehicles."); cf. Grant v. Thornton, 749 So. 2d 529, 531 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (noting, in case involving apartment, that section 83.51, Florida Statutes, entitled "Landlord's obligation to maintain premises," "has been said to create a statutory warranty of habitability"). There is no provision for such a warranty in Florida's version of the Uniform Commercial Code, and it is difficult to fathom the supposed existence of an implied warranty at common law of "habitability of a motor home."
In Florida, many negligence actions that are predicated upon the defendant's knowledge apply the “actual or constructive knowledge” standard. See, e.g., Freeman v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 954 So.2d 45, 46–47 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (owner's duty to maintain his or her premises in a reasonably safe condition); Williams v. Joseph L. Rozier Machinery Co., 135 So.2d 763, 765 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961) (retailer of a defective product); Grant v. Thornton, 749 So.2d 529, 532 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (negligence against landlord). We see no reason to depart from the majority view incorporating actual or constructive knowledge into the elements of the tort here at issue, particularly in light of our legislature's declaration that “sexually transmissible diseases constitute a serious and sometimes fatal threat to the public and individual health and welfare of the people of the state and to visitors to the state.” § 384.22, Fla. Stat. (2013).
Prior to the accident, the club was required, by law, to install the sprinkler system and otherwise comply with the code. See Grant v. Thornton, 749 So.2d 529 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (reasoning that the owner of property has a duty to comply with applicable codes; it will not be a defense to argue that owner was unaware of his obligation or that he was unaware of non-compliance); Del Risco v. Industrial Affiliates, Ltd., 556 So.2d 1148 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (holding that owners and lessors of commercial buildings have a non-delegable duty to comply with fire safety codes). That the club chose not to comply with the 1998 mandate until the fire marshal's inspection is not grounds for relieving the club of the responsibility.
The trial court refused to give the instruction because it concluded that lack of notice of a building code violation was not a defense. While this may be accurate, see Grant v. Thornton, 749 So.2d 529, 532 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), nevertheless a property owner has no duty to warn of an open and obvious condition which is not in itself dangerous, see Williams v. Madden, 588 So.2d 41, 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). To be liable, a property owner must still have superior knowledge, either actual or constructive, to the plaintiff concerning any dangerous conditions on the property.