Opinion
Civil Action 4:19-cv-3468-SAL-TER
07-15-2021
KING GRANT-DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. PATRICIA FELKER, FRAMPTON MCLEOD GWYNETTE, P. STEVEN RUBLEE, and THOMAS W. UHDE, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Thomas E. Rogers, III, United States Magistrate Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his equal protection and due process rights. He also alleges violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq. and the Mental Health Bill of Righrs, 42 U.S.C. § 9501. Presently before the court are Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, or in the Alternative, Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 48) and Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 69). Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he was advised pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), that a failure to respond to Defendants' motion could result in dismissal of his Complaint. Plaintiff filed a Response (ECF No. 54). All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), DSC. This report and recommendation is entered for review by the district judge.
II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
This action arises out of Plaintiff's denial of mental health treatment at the Medical University of South Carolina's (MUSC) Institute of Psychiatry (the Institute). Plaintiff began receiving mental health treatment in 1974 in New York State prisons, and has continued receiving treatment outside of the prison system from the 1980s to the present. Am. Compl. p. 6 (ECF No. 14). He has been diagnosed with affliction of major depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, sleep problems, and anti-social disorder. Am. Compl. p. 6. He began receiving mental health treatment in South Carolina when he moved here from New York in 2005. Am. Compl. p. 7. From 2005 until 2013, he was treated at the Charleston/Dorchester Community Mental Health Center. Am. Compl. p. 7. In 2013, he switched to the Institute at MUSC because it required less travel time and centralized all his health care services. Am. Compl. pp. 7-8. He received treatment from various individuals while at the Institute. Am. Compl. pp. 8-9. Plaintiff was discharged from treatment at the Institute on June 22, 2018, by Lauren Tucker, M.D. Am. Compl. p. 9.
Plaintiff renewed his treatment at the Institute on April 16, 2019, with Defendant Patricia Felkner. Am. Compl. p. 10. He and Felkner communicated well and agreed on a treatment plan on April 17, 2019, which was approved by Defendant Frampton McLeod Gwynette, the Outpatient Clinic Director, on April 26, 2019. Am. Compl. p. 10. Plaintiff missed an appointment on May 22, 2019, because of a court hearing. Am. Compl. p. 11. When Plaintiff arrived for his next appointment on June 18, 2019, Felkner came to the waiting room and told Plaintiff that his case with her was closed but she would see about finding him someone else to see. Am. Compl. p. 11.
Felkner later sent Plaintiff a letter stating that it was her understanding that Plaintiff was to receive treatment at the Charleston County Mental Health Clinic in West Ashley pursuant to a court order. Am. Compl. pp. 11-12. Plaintiff delivered to Felkner a portion of a court transcript showing that the court did not order Plaintiff to receive treatment at any specific facility. Am. Compl. p. 12.
On July 19, 2019, after not receiving any information regarding reassignment to another therapist, Plaintiff went to the Institute and told the security officer at the front desk that he wanted to visit the Outpatient Clinic to check on his status. Am. Compl. p. 12. The security officer escorted Plaintiff to the clinic but interrupted him as he tried to talk, directed inhumane ultimatums at Plaintiff and repeatedly shouted at him. Am. Compl. pp. 12-13. Plaintiff eventually spoke with Gwynette, who explained to Plaintiff that Felkner had concerns about the crimes for which Plaintiff was convicted and, thus, he would not be seen at the Institute any further. Am. Compl. pp. 13-14.
Plaintiff's probation officer wrote a letter to Gwynette requesting more information regarding Plaintiff's status at the Institute and asked that the Institute consider resuming Plaintiff's treatment. Am. Compl. p. 14. The probation officer received a telephone call from Gwynette in which he explained that Plaintiff's treatment was terminated because (1) Plaintiff is agitated, rude, and demanding, (2) Plaintiff missed several appointments and the Institute has a strict no-miss policy, and (3) Felkner did not want to see Plaintiff due to Plaintiff being a registered sex offender. Am. Compl. p. 14.
On August 29, 2019, Plaintiff wrote a letter to Defendants Steven Rublee and Thomas Uhde describing his history of mental illness and treatment and his experiences at the Institute and requested that they rescind their termination of his treatment there. Am. Compl. p. 14. Neither Defendant responded to Plaintiff's letters. Am. Compl. p. 15.
Plaintiff alleges in his amended complaint that his medical records reveal that Felkner entered a discharge summary in Plaintiff's case stating that the reason for his discharge was because he is a registered sex offender and the clinic treats children. Am. Compl. p. 15. Plaintiff also later learned that the Institute has liaisons between the patient and providers at the Institute to help manage complaints, but Plaintiff was never advised of the availability of such liaisons. Am. Compl. pp. 15-16.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendants move to dismiss this action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) and/or 12(b)(6). Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to move for judgment on the pleadings after the pleadings are closed. Thus, because Defendants filed the present motion after they filed their answers, Rule 12(c) is the proper standard for review. As a practical matter, however, the standard is almost identical to the standard employed in considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion “with the key difference being that on a 12(c) motion, the court is to consider the answer as well as the complaint.” Cont'l Cleaning Serv. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 1999 WL 1939249, *1 (M.D. N.C. 1999) (internal quotations omitted); see also Burbach Broad. Co. v. Elkins Radio Corp., 278 F.3d 401, 405-06 (4th Cir.2002). In addition to the complaint, the factual allegations of the answer are taken as true, to the extent “they have not been denied or do not conflict with the complaint.” Pledger v. North Carolina Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 7 F.Supp.2d 705, 707 (E.D. N.C. 1998); Jadoff v. Gleason, 140 F.R.D. 330, 331 (M.D. N.C. 1991) (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1368 (3d ed.2004)). Such a motion should be granted when, accepting the facts set forth in the pleadings, the case can be decided as a matter of law. Tollison v. B & J Machinery Co., Inc., 812 F.Supp. 618, 619 (D.S.C.1993). See also S & S Const., Inc. of Anderson v. Reliance Ins. Co., 42 F.Supp.2d 622, 623 (D.S.C.1998).
The United States Supreme Court has made clear that, under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Expounding on its decision in Twombly, the United States Supreme Court stated in Iqbal:
[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require “detailed factual allegations, ” but it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.”
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 556, 557, 570) (citations omitted); see also Bass v. Dupont, 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir.2003).
The court may consider documents attached to a complaint or motion to dismiss “so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic.” Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir.2009) (citing Blankenship v. Manchin, 471 F.3d 523, 526 n. 1 (4th Cir.2006)). If other matters outside the pleadings are presented to the court on a Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 12(c) motion, the court in its discretion may determine whether to accept the materials and convert the motion to one for summary judgment under Rule 56 or simply not consider the materials. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d); Wells-Bey v. Kopp, No. ELH-12-2319, 2013 WL 1700927, at *5 (D.Md. Apr. 16, 2013) (quoting 5C Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1366, at 159 (3d ed. 2004)). The undersigned declines to consider the documents submitted by either party and will treat this motion as one for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c).
The undersigned has entered herewith an Order denying Plaintiff's Motion to Amend his Amended Complaint (ECF No. 46) as futile.
IV. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights to due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, which are actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)). A legal action under § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707, 119 S.Ct. 1624, 143 L.Ed.2d 882 (1999). To be successful on a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988).
1. Due Process
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that the deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest in life, liberty, or property may only be done through due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1; see also Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 (1972). “To state a procedural due process violation, a plaintiff must (1) identify a protected liberty or property interest and (2) demonstrate deprivation of that interest without due process of law.” Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 2015). Plaintiff alleges that his mental health treatment at the Institute was terminated without due process. Thus, the first step in analyzing this claim is to determine whether Plaintiff has a protected liberty interest in receiving mental health treatment.
The Supreme Court explained in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989), that the Due Process Clause “is phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security. It forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property without ‘due process of law,' ” but it does not “impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not come to harm through other means.” Id. at 197, 109 S.Ct. at 1004. Thus, “‘[a]s a general matter, a State is under no constitutional duty to provide substantive services to those within its borders.'” Id. at 197, 109 S.Ct. at 1003 (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2458, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982)). The DeShaney Court further explained that the Due Process Clause “generally confer[s] no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual” and thus “the State cannot be held liable under the Clause for injuries that could have been averted had it chosen to provide them.” Id.
There are “certain limited circumstances, ” however, in which “the Constitution imposes upon the State affirmative duties of care and protection to particular individuals, ” DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198, 109 S.Ct. at 1004, such as when the state takes a prisoner into custody, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), or involuntarily commits a patient to a state mental institution, see Youngberg, 457 U.S. 307, 102 S.Ct. 2452 - Ed. 2d 28 (1982). In these circumstances the state creates a “special relationship” which gives rise to “a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for [her] safety and general well-being, ” DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200, 109 S.Ct. at 1005.
Here, Plaintiff was not a prisoner in custody or an involuntary patient at a state mental institution, nor was he otherwise in the custody of the state. He was receiving outpatient mental health treatment at MUSC. He was not ordered to receive treatment at MUSC. Rather, he chose to receive treatment there as it was more convenient than the facility where he was previously treated. The Fourth Circuit has not specifically addressed whether an individual has a protected liberty interest in receiving outpatient mental health treatment. However, other courts have held that no such liberty interest exists. See Biggs v. Legrand, No. 15CV452TSL-RHW, 2016 WL 6127406, at *8-9 (S.D.Miss. Oct. 20, 2016), affd sub nom. Biggs by & through Biggs v. Legrand, 706 Fed.Appx. 820 (5th Cir. 2017)(holding that a former state mental hospital patient had no protected liberty interest in continued treatment after being discharged from the hospital. Once discharged, “she no longer had any liberty interest in receiving substantive services from the state.”); JL v. New Mexico Dep't of Health, 165 F.Supp.3d 996, 1011 (D.N.M. 2015) (holding that “upon termination of an involuntary commitment, the corresponding duty to provide substantive services that arose upon commitment necessarily also ceases, and the general rule that a state has no duty to provide its citizens with affirmative services or protection again controls”); Clay v. DeBoer, No. 1:15-CV-880, 2015 WL 5593426, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 21, 2015) (concluding that “[b]ecause Petitioner has no liberty interest in parole, it follows that he has no interest in any particular condition of that parole, such as placement in an outpatient treatment program). Absent a protected liberty interest, no due process violation can occur. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a due process claim.
2. Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits “governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike.” Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992)). “To survive a motion to dismiss an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to demonstrate plausibly that he was treated differently from others who were similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of discriminatory animus.” Equity In Athletics, Inc. v. Dep't of Educ., 639 F.3d 91, 108 (4th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). Once a plaintiff shows differential treatment and animus, the court proceeds to determine whether the disparate treatment is justified, employing the requisite level of scrutiny. Morrison, 239 F.3d at 654.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants prohibited his participation in mental health services at the Institute “while not rejecting other individuals convicted of sex crimes nor rejecting other individuals in the general public due to criminal convictions, from participating in mental health treatment services there.” Am. Compl. p. 20. He alleges that Defendants “knowingly and intentionally or purposefully committed such state action against” him. Am. Compl. p. 20. Plaintiff does not allege that he was denied services because of his criminal convictions or his sex offender status because he specifically alleges that others within those categories were not denied treatment. Further, although he summarily alleges that their denial of treatment was intentional, he does not identify the discriminatory animus held by these Defendants that caused them to deny him treatment. Thus, the facts alleged by Plaintiff are insufficient to plausibly state a claim for an equal protection violation. See Kerr v. Marshall Univ. Bd. of Governors, 824 F.3d 62, 81 (4th Cir. 2016) (finding district court's dismissal of Equal Protection claim to be proper where there was “no allegation of overt discriminatory animus”). Accordingly, dismissal of this claim is appropriate.
The Amended Complaint does not contain allegations of how he was treated differently from those similarly situated based on a protected trait.
B. Title II of the ADA
Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination against individuals on the basis of disability by public entities, including when an individual is “excluded from the participation in or ... denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of the public entity ....” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. To state a claim under this statute, a plaintiff must allege that: “(1) they have a disability; (2) they are otherwise qualified to receive the benefits of a public service, program, or activity; and (3) they were denied the benefits of such service, program, or activity, or otherwise discriminated against, on the basis of their disability.” Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. Lamone, 813 F.3d 494, 502 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 498 (4th Cir.2005)).
As an initial matter, only public entities are subject to the provisions of Title II of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132; see also City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S.Ct. 1765, 1773 (2015) (“Only public entities are subject to Title II.”). The term “public entity, ” as it is defined within the statute, does not include individuals. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1). Consequently, no individual may be held liable under Title II of the ADA. Barnes v. Young, 565 Fed.Appx. 272, 273 (4th Cir. 2014) (noting that Title II does not provide for individual capacity suits against state officials). The only Defendants named in this action are individuals, and Plaintiff specifically alleges that they are being sued in their personal capacities. Thus, dismissal of Plaintiff's Title II ADA claim is appropriate.
In addition, Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to show that he was qualified to receive the treatment provided at the Institute or that he was denied those benefits because of his disability.Plaintiff alleges that his probation officer was told by Gwynette that Plaintiff's treatment was terminated because (1) Plaintiff is agitated, rude, and demanding, (2) Plaintiff missed several appointments and the Institute has a strict no-miss policy, and (3) Felkner did not want to see Plaintiff due to Plaintiff being a registered sex offender. With respect to the no-miss policy, Plaintiff does not allege that he did not miss appointments, only that he was unaware of the policy. Plaintiff's violation of the policy would render him unqualified to receive treatment at the facility.
Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff has a disability.
Even if Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to show that he was qualified to receive the services provided at the Institute, his allegations are insufficient to show that he was denied treatment because of his disability. Plaintiff alleges to be disabled due to affliction of major depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, sleep problems, and anti-social disorder. Plaintiff does not allege that his treatment was terminated because of these disorders. In fact, the Institute is a mental health treatment facility and, thus, it strains logic that Plaintiff's treatment was discontinued because he was afflicted with the very illnesses the Institute treats.
Based on the allegations in the complaint, it was noted on three different occasions that the discontinuation of Plaintiff's treatment was based upon his status as a sex offender. First, when Plaintiff visited the Institute on July 19, 2019, to check on the status of his treatment, he was told by Gwynette that Felkner had concerns about his criminal convictions. Second, in a telephone conversation with Plaintiff's probation officer, Gwynette stated that Plaintiff's treatment was terminated in part because of Felkner's concerns regarding his sex offender status. Third, in Plaintiff's medical records, Felkner entered a discharge summary stating that the reason for his discharge was because he is a registered sex offender and the clinic treats children. However, sex offender status does not qualify as a disability under the ADA. See Al-Wahhab v. VA, No. 7:18-CV-00197, 2018 WL 3614212, at *2 (W.D. Va. July 27, 2018) (citing Shaw v. Smith, 206 Fed.Appx. 546, 547-48 (7th Cir. 2006)); 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (providing that the term “disability” does not include “sexual behavior disorders”). Thus, these allegations are insufficient to allege that Plaintiff's treatment was terminated because of his disability.
As to Gwynette's statement to the probation officer that Plaintiff's treatment was terminated because he agitated, rude and demanding, Plaintiff alleges that his medical records reveal that he always behaved respectfully towards therapists and staff members, but to the extent he did exhibit any adverse behavior, it was a result of his “mental symptoms.” However, poor or unacceptable behavior, even if “precipitated by mental illness does not present an issue under the ADA.” Darcangelo v. Verizon Maryland Inc., No. CIV. WDQ-02-816, 2005 WL 1367083, at *4 (D. Md. June 7, 2005), aff'd, 189 Fed.Appx. 217 (4th Cir. 2006)(holding in the employment context that when an employer fires an employee because of the employee's unacceptable behavior, the fact that the behavior was precipitated by mental illness does not present an issue under the ADA); see also Jones v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 192 F.3d 417, 429 (4th Cir. 1999)(“The law is well settled that the ADA is not violated when an employer discharges an individual based upon the employee's misconduct, even if the misconduct is related to a disability.”)
Finally, Plaintiff includes allegations that his treatment was terminated because he violated the Institute's no-miss policy. Plaintiff alleges that he missed an appointment on May 22, 2019, because he had a civil court appearance on the same day as the appointment. As stated above, Plaintiff alleges that he was unaware of the no-miss policy. These allegations are insufficient to show that the termination of his treatment was because of his disability.
In sum, as stated above, to be successful on this claim, Plaintiff must plead allegations establishing a factually plausible claim that he was denied benefits or services “by reason of [his] disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Plaintiff alleges only that he has a disability and that he was denied the benefits of a public service. None of the facts alleged by Plaintiff are sufficient to allege that his treatment at the Institute was discontinued because of, or “on the basis of, ” Lamone, 813 F.3d at 502, or “by reason of, ” 42 U.S.C. § 12132, his major depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, sleep problems, or anti-social disorder. Thus, Plaintiff's allegations are insufficient to raise the possibility of relief under Title II of the ADA beyond the speculative level. Therefore, dismissal is proper.
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants withheld his rights under the Mental Health Bill of Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 9501. However, numerous courts have determined that§ 9501 does not create a private right of action. See, e.g., N.A.M.I. v. Essex Cty. Bd. of Freeholders, 91 F.Supp.2d 781, 786 (D.N.J. 2000) (“the Restatement of Bill of Rights for Mental Health Patients does not create any judicially enforceable rights or duties”);Benge v. Pounds, 2008 WL 384567 at *3 (D. Colo., Feb. 7, 2008) (“Nothing in the language of the statute indicates an intent by Congress that the ‘Restatement of Bill of Rights for Mental Health Patients' should create a private cause of action.”); see also Merryfield v. Schearrer, 2008 WL 4427656, at *6 (D. Kan. Sept. 25, 2008); Semler v. Finch, 2008 WL 4151825, at *9 (D. Minn. Sept. 3, 2008), aff'd, 333 Fed.Appx. 156 (8th Cir. 2009); Green v. Lichtcsien, 2001 WL 78915, *3 (N.D. III. Jan. 26, 2001); Jones v. Kent Cty. Superior Ct., Delaware, No. CV 17-394-RGA, 2018 WL 4771904, at *4 (D. Del. Oct. 3, 2018). Accordingly, dismissal is appropriate as to this claim as well.
D. State Law Claims
Plaintiff mentions several state statutes in his amended complaint, including S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-430 and S.C. Code Ann. § 1-13-20. To the extent he is attempting to allege any claims for relief under state law, the undersigned recommends that the court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any such state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir.1995) (holding district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to retain jurisdiction over the state law claims); see also, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966); Revene v. Charles County Comm'rs, 882 F.2d 870, 875 (4th Cir.1989).
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, it is recommended that Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, or in the Alternative, Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 48) be granted, Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 69) be denied, and this case be dismissed.
Florence, South Carolina
The parties are directed to the important information on the attached page.