Opinion
Case No. 20050905-CA.
Filed December 22, 2005. (Not For Official Publication).
Appeal from the Third District, Salt Lake Department, 010909861, The Honorable Tyrone E. Medley.
Cari Allen, Bountiful, Appellant Pro Se.
Steven T. Waterman and Steven C. Strong, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges Greenwood, McHugh, and Orme.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Cari Allen appeals the denial of her Motion to Reconsider the Ruling/Order Dated the 9th Day of June 2005, Denying Cari Allen's Motion to Obtain Relief from Incorrect Judgment. This case is before the court on Granite Stone's motion for summary disposition.
In October 2004, Allen filed a motion under rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure seeking modification of the "Order on Judgment Creditor's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside and/or Amend Replacement Order," which was entered on August 4, 2004. The district court denied that motion in an order entered on June 9, 2005. On June 20, 2005, Allen filed a motion to reconsider the June 9, 2005 order. That motion reiterated the same arguments for revision of the August 4, 2004 order. The district court denied the motion to reconsider in an order entered on September 1, 2005, and Allen filed this appeal.
To the extent that Granite Stone claims we lack jurisdiction over this appeal, we construe the claim as an argument that the appeal is a substitute for a direct appeal of the August 4, 2004 order. Having failed to directly appeal from the August 4, 2004 order, Allen's initial rule 60(b) motion sought an amendment of that order to clarify that the district court had not resolved whether she owned stock in Log Furniture, Inc. She previously sought the same clarification in a letter dated August 6, 2004; however, she did not file a direct appeal or a timely motion to alter or amend the August 4, 2004 order. Allen also did not file a direct appeal of the June 9, 2005 order denying her initial rule 60(b) motion. Instead, she filed a motion to reconsider, which repeated the same arguments and sought the same amendment of the August 4, 2004 order. The motion was successive in seeking the same relief as the initial rule 60(b) motion.
Allen's remedies were to file either a timely motion to alter or amend the August 4, 2004 order, or a timely notice of appeal. When she was unsuccessful in her initial rule 60(b) motion, she filed a motion to reconsider. The motion to reconsider did not assign any error to the handling of the initial rule 60(b) motion and, instead, reasserted the same issues. After failing to file a direct appeal from the August 4, 2004 order, Allen "has attempted to use [r]ule 60(b) as a `back door' to a direct appeal" by appealing the denial of her successive rule 60(b) motions.Franklin Covey Client Sales v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110, ¶ 23, 2 P.3d 451.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the successive post-judgment motions. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the motion to reconsider the June 9, 2005 order.
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge, Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge, and Gregory K. Orme, Judge.