Opinion
C. A. 8:22-cv-00782-JMC-JDA
05-03-2022
Randie Lee Grainger, Plaintiff, v. Director Rhodes, Unit Manager Smith, Unit Manager Cantright, Unit Manager Elliot, Major Johnson, Lt. Eden, Lt. Boyd, Sgt. Lauzon, Corporal Shouer, Falvo, Officer Browning, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jacquelyn D. Austin United States Magistrate Judge
Randie Lee Grainger (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee at the J. Reuben Long Detention Center (the “Detention Center”) in Conway, South Carolina, and he files this action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the undersigned finds that this action is subject to summary dismissal for the reasons below.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint on the standard court form, which was entered on March 10, 2022. [Doc. 1.] By Order dated April 1, 2022, the Court notified Plaintiff that this action was subject to summary dismissal for the reasons identified by the Court in that Order. [Doc. 12.] The Court noted, however, that Plaintiff may be able to cure the pleading deficiencies of his Complaint and granted Plaintiff twenty-one days to amend his Complaint. [Id. at 8.] Further, Plaintiff was specifically warned as follows:
If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint that corrects those deficiencies [identified in the Court's Order], this action will be recommended for summary dismissal.
[Id.] Nevertheless, Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint, and he has failed to cure the deficiencies identified by the Court in its Order.
Because Plaintiff did not respond to the Court's Order, and the time for response has lapsed, he has failed to prosecute this case and has failed to comply with an Order of this Court. Because Plaintiff has already ignored this Court's Order and deadlines, sanctions less drastic than dismissal would not be effective. Accordingly, as an additional basis for dismissal, the case should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his Complaint. [Doc. 1.] Plaintiff contends that his constitutional rights have been violated because he has been subjected to “secretive, ” “cruel, unusual, indefinite forms of punishment.” [Id. at 4.] Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that on February 20, 2022, he was placed in a lockup/detention unit as punishment for an infraction. [Id. at 5.] Corporal Shouer threatened Plaintiff by saying he would put him in the “darkest, most hopeless part of [the] jail.” [Id.] Then, on February 21, 2022, Corporal Falvo held a hearing and gave Plaintiff 10 days of confinement in lockup. [Id.] Upon his release 10 days later, Plaintiff was immediately placed into another “punitive” detention unit, the C-4 Unit. [Id.] Plaintiff contends he is allowed only 1.5 hours of recreation time a day in contrast to the 4 hours of recreation time that inmates in general population are allowed. [Id.] Plaintiff also has restrictions on orders and commissary items. [Id.] Plaintiff was told this was a punitive program by Officer Browning. [Id.]
Plaintiff contends that Defendants Smith and Elliot call the C-4 Unit general population, even though it is not general population. [Id.]
For his injuries, Plaintiff contends he has suffered “indescribable” mental injuries. [Id. at 7.] For his relief, Plaintiff seeks money damages in the amount of $93,000 for actual damages and $207,000 in punitive damages. [Id.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, ” is “frivolous or malicious, ” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even under this less stringent standard, Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in the Complaint, the Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint for relief must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). “And, although the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) are very liberal, more detail often is required than the bald statement by plaintiff that he has a valid claim of some type against defendant.” Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 326 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotations omitted). This is particularly true in a § 1983 action where “liability is personal, based upon each defendant's own constitutional violations.” Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001). “In order for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights.... Consequently, [defendants] must have had personal knowledge of and involvement in the alleged deprivation of [plaintiff]'s rights in order to be liable.” Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to assert a plausible claim for relief as to any cause of action. Accordingly, the Complaint is subject to summary dismissal for the reasons explained below.
As an initial mater, the undersigned notes that certain Defendants are entitled to dismissal from this action because Plaintiff makes no allegations about their direct, personal involvement in the events underlying Plaintiff's claims. Instead, Plaintiff merely names the Defendants in the caption and makes only general, vague allegations about his classification status at the Detention Center. “However, such general allegations, absent any specific facts of personal involvement in the events giving rise to this case, are insufficient to state a cognizable § 1983 claim.” Tracey v. Nelson, No. 1:12-cv-1614-JMC-SVH, 2012 WL 4583107, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 31, 2012), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 4588205 (D.S.C. Oct. 1, 2012).
Here, Plaintiff makes no allegations at all in the body of his Complaint against Defendants Director Rhodes, Unit Manager Cantright, Major Johnson, Lt. Eden, Lt. Boyd, and Sgt. Lauzon. Because Plaintiff makes no factual allegations in the Complaint of personal involvement against these Defendants, they are entitled to summary dismissal. See Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974) (“Where a complaint alleges no specific act or conduct on the part of the defendant and the complaint is silent as to the defendant except for his name appearing in the caption, the complaint is properly dismissed.”); Newkirk v. Circuit Court of City of Hampton, No. 3:14-cv-372-HEH, 2014 WL 4072212, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 14, 2014) (finding the complaint was subject to summary dismissal where plaintiff made no factual allegations against the named defendants within the body of the pleading). In the absence of specific allegations against the named Defendants to support a claim for relief, the Complaint is subject to dismissal on this basis as to these Defendants. See Weller, 901 F.2d at 391 (finding dismissal was proper where complaint contained no allegations against defendants).
Further, to the extent Plaintiff's claims against these Defendants are based on supervisory liability, the undersigned notes that the doctrine of respondeat superior is generally not applicable in § 1983 actions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 221 (4th Cir. 1999). For a supervisory official to be held liable for constitutional injuries inflicted by his subordinates, certain criteria must be established. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994). Specifically, a plaintiff must show that the supervisory official was (1) actually or constructively aware of a risk of constitutional injury, (2) and deliberately indifferent to that risk, and (3) that an affirmative causal link exists between the supervisor's inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. Carter, 164 F.3d at 221. Here, the Complaint contains no plausible allegations against these Defendants to demonstrate that they were aware of, or deliberately indifferent to, any risk of constitutional injury to Plaintiff.
Likewise, Plaintiff makes only cursory allegations against Defendants Unit Manager Smith, Unit Manager Elliot, Corporal Shouer, Falvo, and Officer Browning. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Shouer threatened to put him “in the darkest, most hopeless part of [the] jail, ” that Defendant Falvo held a hearing and gave Plaintiff 10 days of confinement in lockup, that Defendant Browning said Plaintiff was placed in a punitive program, and that Defendants Smith and Elliot referred to the C-4 Unit as general population. [Doc. 1 at 5.] These allegations, however, fail to provide a basis to support any claim for relief against these Defendants, and they are therefore entitled to dismissal from this action. Although Plaintiff has not identified any specific cause of action, he may be asserting a due process claim. In any case, as explained below, his allegations fail to state a claim for relief that is plausible.
As a pretrial detainee, Plaintiff has a due process right against restrictions that amount to punishment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). To establish that a condition or restriction of confinement is constitutionally impermissible “punishment, ” a pretrial detainee must show “either that it was (1) imposed with an expressed intent to punish or (2) not reasonably related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective, in which case an intent to punish may be inferred.” Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988). Moreover, courts have held that “[a] pretrial detainee cannot be placed in segregation as a punishment for a disciplinary infraction without notice and an opportunity to be heard; due process requires no less.” Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 438 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Mitchell v. Dupnils, 75 F.3d 517, 524 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that a pretrial detainee who is placed in disciplinary segregation as punishment has a right to a due process hearing); King-Fields v. Leggett, No. ELH-11-1491, 2014 WL 694969, at *19 (D.Md. Feb. 19, 2014) (finding that a pretrial detainee had a liberty interest in avoiding disciplinary segregation).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was placed in lockup after he was found guilty of an infraction at a hearing. He also alleges that, after his 10-day lockup, he was placed in another unit as punishment. These allegations fail to show, however, that Plaintiff was denied his due process rights. Plaintiff concedes that he received a hearing at which he was convicted of an infraction and sentenced to lockup. And, Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing the second unit to which he was moved constituted disciplinary segregation that would trigger due process protections. As such, Plaintiff's Complaint, as alleged, fails to state a claim for relief.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
In light of the foregoing, it is recommended that the District Court DISMISS this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A without further leave to amend and without issuance and service of process.
As noted, Plaintiff was directed to file an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies noted by the Court in its Order dated April 1, 2022. [Doc. 12.] Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint or attempted to cure the deficiencies in his original filings. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends dismissal without further leave to amend. See Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, No. 17-7621, 2018 WL 2472069, at *1 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018) (explaining that, where the district court has already afforded a plaintiff with the opportunity to amend, the district court, in its discretion, can either afford plaintiff an additional opportunity to file an amended complaint or dismiss the complaint with prejudice).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.