Opinion
C. A. 8:22-cv-00306-JMC-JDA
02-22-2022
Randy Lee Grainger, Plaintiff, v. JRL Detention Center, Mediko, Corporal Cribb Corporal Vermeer, Officer Childers, Office Oliver, Officer Linnen, Nurse Rachel, Menta Health Couns Jennifer, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
JACQUELYN D. AUSTIN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Randie Lee Grainger (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Defendants violated his constitutional rights. [Docs. 1; 1-2.] Plaintiff filed this action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. [Doc. 8.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. For the reasons explained below, the J Reuben Long Detention Center and Mediko are both subject to summary dismissal as Defendants from this action. The action remains pending against the remaining Defendants.
An Order authorizing service of the Complaint on Defendants Corporal Cribb, Corporal Vermeer, Officer Childers, Officer Oliver, Officer Linnen, Nurse Rachel, and Mental Health Counselor Jennifer is entered concurrently with this Report and Recommendation.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee and is currently incarcerated at the J. Reuben Long Detention Center in Conway, South Carolina (the “Detention Center”). [Doc. 1 at 1.] Plaintiff commenced this civil rights action alleging Defendants violated her constitutional rights by filing a handwritten complaint on January 27, 2022. The undersigned conducted a review of the handwritten complaint and, by Order dated February 2, 2022, directed Plaintiff to complete and return a complaint on the standard court form. [Doc. 6.] Plaintiff then filed a complaint on the standard court form, which was entered as an attachment to the original filing. [Doc. 1-2.] The Court construes both the original handwritten filing [Doc. 1] and the standard court form [Doc. 1-2] together as the Complaint in this matter. Having reviewed the Complaint, the undersigned concludes that service of process should be authorized as to all Defendants but the Detention Center and Mediko, which are both subject to dismissal for the reasons below.
A prisoner's pleading is considered filed at the moment it is delivered to prison authorities for forwarding to the court. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988). Although Plaintiff's initial pleadings were not dated by the prison mailroom when they were received for forwarding to this Court, Plaintiff's handwritten complaint is dated January 27, 2022. [Doc. 1 at 13.] Accordingly, the Court finds that this action was filed on January 27, 2022.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute, which authorizes the district court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if Plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court would still be charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se pleadings remain subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411,417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
This action is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
It is well settled that only “persons” may act under color of state law, and, therefore, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a “person.” See Harden v. Green, 27 Fed.Appx. 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001). The Detention Center is a facility or building and, as such, is not subject to suit because it cannot be sued as a “person” in a § 1983 lawsuit. See e.g., Brooks v. Pembroke City Jail, 722 F.Supp. 1294, 1301 (E.D. N.C. 1989) (“Claims under § 1983 are directed at ‘persons' and the jail is not a person amenable to suit.”); Morrison v. Greenville Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 4:17-cv-2657-JMC-TER, 2017 WL 7732598, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 10, 2017), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 936383 (D.S.C. Feb. 16, 2018). Police departments, buildings, and correctional institutions usually are not considered legal entities subject to suit. See Harden, 27 Fed.Appx. at 178 (finding that the medical department of a prison is not a person pursuant to § 1983); Nelson v. Lexington Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 8:10-cv-2988-JMC, 2011 WL 2066551, at *1 (D.S.C. May 26, 2011) (finding that a building-the detention center-is not amenable to suit under § 1983 and that Food Service Supervisors was a group of people not subject to suit); see also Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 750 F.Supp. 1131, 1132 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (dismissing city police department as improper defendant in § 1983 action because it was not a “person” under the statute); Shelby v. City of Atlanta, 578 F.Supp. 1368, 1370 (N.D.Ga. 1984) (dismissing police department as party defendant because it was merely a vehicle through which city government fulfills policing functions).
Mediko is also subject to summary dismissal. “Mediko appears to be a private corporation.” Fullwood v. Long, No. 4:18-cv-883-BHH-TER, 2018 WL 2209230, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 11, 2018), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 2196091 (D.S.C. May 14, 2018). “Usually, a private company that provides medical services to a publicly-run prison or jail is a state actor under § 1983.” Perritt v. J. Reuben Long Det. Ctr., No. 0:19-cv-1881-JFA-PJG, 2019 WL 3322871, at *2 (D.S.C. July 24, 2019). “But, to hold a private company (rather than an individual who works for that company) liable under § 1983, a Plaintiff must plead and show that an official policy or custom of the company caused the alleged deprivation of a federal right.” Id. Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts against Mediko in the body of his Complaint, and his allegations as to the other Defendants fail to plausibly show that the injuries he allegedly suffered resulted from the purported lack of adequate medical treatment caused by an official policy or custom of Mediko. See Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974) (“Where a complaint alleges no specific act or conduct on the part of the defendant and the complaint is silent as to the defendant except for his name appearing in the caption, the complaint is properly dismissed.”); Newkirk v. Circuit Court of City of Hampton, No. 3:14-cv-372-HEH, 2014 WL 4072212, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 14, 2014) (finding the complaint was subject to summary dismissal where plaintiff made no factual allegations against the named defendants within the body of the pleading). Indeed, “Plaintiff has not alleged how Mediko is a person acting under color of state law or any policies enacted by Medico that caused Plaintiff harm. Mediko is not amenable to suit under § 1983 solely based on Mediko being the employer of others.” Fullwood, 2018 WL 2209230, at *3. Mediko is therefore entitled to dismissal.
Accordingly, the Detention Center and Mediko are both entitled to summary dismissal as a Defendants from this § 1983 action. Plaintiff's allegations against Defendants Corporal Cribb, Corporal Vermeer, Officer Childers, Officer Oliver, Officer Linnen, Nurse Rachel, and Mental Health Counselor Jennifer are sufficient to survive initial review and the Complaint will be served as to those Defendants only.
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that the District Court dismiss the Detention Center and Mediko from this action. This action remains pending against the remaining Defendants.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Suite 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).