; see, e.g., Rahman v. Fischer, No. 9:10-CV-1496 (LEK/TWD), 2012 WL 4492010, at *13 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2012); Cole-Hoover v. N.Y. Dep't of Corr. Servs., 02-CV-00826(M), 2010 WL 2510953, at *3-4 (W.D.N.Y. June 17, 2010); Borrello v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Servs., No. 00-CV-177A, 2004 WL 2191565, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2004); Nassau Cnty. Emp. “L” v. Cnty. of Nassau, 345 F.Supp.2d 293, 304-05 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). “The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine ‘bars conspiracy claims against employees of entities such as [DOCCS] (when those employees are alleged to have conspired solely with each other) unless, pursuant to the doctrine's ‘scope of employment' exception, the employees were pursuing personal interests wholly separate and apart from the entity by whom they were employed.'” Richard, 38 F.Supp.3d at 353 (quoting Graham v. Peters, No. 13-CV-705JTC, 2013 WL 5924727, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2013)).

F.Supp.3d 340, 353 (W.D.N.Y. 2014) (second alteration in original) (quoting Graham v. Peters, No. 13-CV-705JTC, 2013 WL 5924727, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2013)). The Court concludes that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's § 1985(2) claims for four reasons.

Mr. Powell's request for discovery does not cure this defect in the pleading. See Graham v. Peters, No. 13-CV-705JTC, 2013 WL 5924727, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2013) (granting motion to dismiss conspiracy claim despite plaintiff's request for discovery).

"While exact specifics are not required, 'the pleadings must present facts tending to show agreement and concerted action.'" Graham v. Peters,No. 13-CV-705JTC, 2013 WL 5924727, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2013) (quoting Anilao v. Spota, 774 F. Supp. 2d 457, 512-13 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)). Plaintiff is required to "'make an effort to provide some details of time and place and the alleged effects of the conspiracy.'

The procedural safeguards to which a prison inmate is entitled before being deprived of a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest are well established, the contours of the requisite protections having been articulated in Wolff v. McDonnell , 418 U.S. 539, 564-69, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974)." Graham v. Peters , 2013 WL 5924727, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. 2013). The constitutionally mandated due process requirements include: "(1) written notice of the charges to the inmate; (2) the opportunity to appear at a disciplinary hearing and present witnesses and evidence in support of his defense, subject to a prison facility's legitimate safety and penological concerns; (3) a written statement by the hearing officer explaining his decision and the reasons for the action being taken; and (4) in some circumstances, the right to assistance in preparing a defense."

Courts in this circuit have generally held that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine does not apply to instances where the plaintiff has claimed retaliation or discrimination based only on a personal bias against the plaintiff. See id. (dismissing conspiracy claim where the plaintiff stated only a conclusory allegation that "the defendants were . . . pursuing a 'personal' agenda"); Graham v. Peters, No. 13-CV-705JTC, 2013 WL 5924727, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2013) (dismissing complaint where the defendants provoked plaintiff, assaulted him, and filed disciplinary charges against him that were ultimately reversed, all in retaliation for the plaintiff's criticism of the facility's staff and programs); Rahman v. Fischer, No. 9:10-CV-1496 (LEK/TWD), 2012 WL 4492010, at *1, 13 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2012) (dismissing conspiracy claim where the plaintiff alleged that the defendants conspired against him to deny him access to class and a locker in retaliation for his exercising his First Amendment religious rights as a Shiite Muslim); Vega, 610 F. Supp. 2d at 205-06 (dismissing conspiracy claim where the plaintiff alleged that the defendants were motivated by their personal bias against the plaintiff's homosexuality).

However, Defendants adequately briefed dismissal based on the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine in their motion to dismiss (Dkt. 15 at 6), and this district, as well as others within the Second Circuit, have applied the doctrine to claims against Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”) employees. See Graham v. Peters, No. 13–CV705JTC, 2013 WL 5924727, at *5–6, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156509, at *15–16 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2013); see also Vega v. Artus, 610 F.Supp.2d 185, 205–06 (N.D.N.Y.2009) (dismissing Plaintiffs conspiracy claims pursuant to the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine where all of the defendants were DOCCS employees, and all were acting within the scope of their employment); Liner v. Fischer, No. 11 Civ. 6711(PAC)(JLC), 2013 WL 3168660, at *11 n. 12, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88147, at *36 n. 12 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2013) (dismissing § 1983 conspiracy claim where all defendants were DOCCS employees acting within the scope of employment), adopted, 2013 WL 4405539, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11369 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2013); Cole–Hoover v. N.Y. Dep't of Corr. Servs., No. 02–CV–00826(M), 2010 WL 2510953, at *3–4, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60002, at *12 (W.D.N.Y. June 17, 2010) (declining to reinstate plaintiff's conspiracy claim, which was dismissed as a matter of law based on the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine); Borrello v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Servs., No. 00–CV–177A, 2004 WL 2191565, at *2, 2004 U.S. Di

“While exact specifics are not required, ‘the pleadings must present facts tending to show agreement and concerted action.’ ” Graham v. Peters, No. 13–CV–705JTC, 2013 WL 5924727, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2013) (quoting Anilao v. Spota, 774 F.Supp.2d 457, 512–13 (E.D.N.Y.2011) ). Plaintiff is required to “make an effort to provide some details of time and place and the alleged effects of the conspiracy ... [including] facts to demonstrate that the defendants entered into an agreement, express or tacit, to achieve the unlawful end.”

The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine “bars conspiracy claims against employees of entities such as [DOCCS] (when those employees are alleged to have conspired solely with each other) unless, pursuant to the doctrine's ‘scope of employment’ exception, the employees were pursuing personal interests wholly separate and apart from the entity by whom they were employed.” Graham v. Peters, No. 13–CV–705JTC, 2013 WL 5924727, at *5, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156509, at *15–16 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2013); see also Liner v. Fischer, No. 11 Civ. 6711(PAC)(JLC), 2013 WL 3168660, at *11 n. 12, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88147, at *36 n. 12 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2013) (dismissing § 1983 conspiracy claim where all defendants were DOCCS employees acting within the scope of employment); Vega v. Artus, 610 F.Supp.2d 185, 205–06 (N.D.N.Y.2009) (dismissing Plaintiff's conspiracy claims pursuant to the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine where all of the defendants were DOCCS employees, and all were acting within the scope of their employment); Little v. City of New York, 487 F.Supp.2d 426, 441–42 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (dismissing § 1983 conspiracy claim against two police officers who worked for the City of New York pursuant to the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine).