Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BS110609
THE COURT:Plaintiff and appellant Jack Graham (Graham), in propria persona, appeals a judgment denying his petition for writ of mandate.
Graham’s superior court petition sought to overturn a decision by defendant and respondent Board of Trustees of the California State University (erroneously sued as The Administration of California State University Long Beach) (hereafter, University) refusing to remove an “F” grade in chemistry from Graham’s undergraduate transcript.
We perceive no error in the trial court’s ruling and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. University proceedings.
In the spring 2004 semester, Graham enrolled in Chemistry 377B at the University. On April 13, 2004, more than two weeks after classes began, Graham decided to withdraw from the class because he was failing due to an inability “to remember the formulas for the test.” However, Graham “forgot” to turn in the withdrawal form and thus failed to perfect his withdrawal from the class.
In June 2004, after the semester ended and Graham received an “F” in the course, he realized he had neglected to properly withdraw from the class and petitioned the University to withdraw retroactively.
On July 1, 2004, the University denied the request on the ground it was “not authorized to permit withdrawals after the end of the term.” The University advised Graham: “Chem 377B is being offered in Fall 2004 as you do have the ability to repeat the course, if you choose. Please note: withdrawals after the second week of instruction are normally only permitted for serious and compelling reasons. Fear of failing the course is not a serious and compelling reason.”
Graham did not reenroll in Chem 377B. In spring 2005, Graham took a different chemistry class, Chem 371B, in which he received a “B.”
In December 2006, Graham graduated from the University.
On May 17, 2007, nearly three years after the July 1, 2004 denial of Graham’s belated request to withdraw from Chem 377B, Graham filed another petition for exception to academic policy. In this petition, Graham sought to replace the “F” grade he received in Chem 377B with a “W.” In the alternative, Graham requested that his “F” grade in Chem 377B be replaced with the “B” grade he received in Chem 371B. In support, Graham submitted letters from professors stating Chem 371B is at least as rigorous as Chem 377B.
On May 24, 2007, the University’s Academic Appeals Committee denied the request, stating: “No changes can be made to the academic record after the degree has been granted. Although you have obtained letters to indicate that Chem 371B would be a suitable repeat for Chem 377B, this action would not have been automatic. You would have needed to submit a petition with supporting documents from the Chem Dept prior to your graduation.”
2. Superior court proceedings.
On August 22, 2007, Graham filed a petition for writ of mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085), seeking to set aside the University’s refusal to change his academic record on the ground he had already graduated, and to compel the University to consider his request for exception to academic policy “without denying it for the reason that [he] has already graduated from CSULB.” Graham contended: there is no rational basis for the policy banning changes to a student’s academic record after graduation; the application of said policy is repugnant to public policy; the University’s policy as applied to him is a “violation of his 14th Amendment property rights, and for no compelling state interest;” the University owed him a duty of care in regard to the keeping, fair calculation and fair reporting of his undergraduate GPA, “this being borne of a ‘special relationship’ these parties share;” and the University was not authorized to create or enforce the policy in question, at least not with regard to the way in which it was applied and enforced as to Graham.
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise specified.
In its opposition, the University argued: because Graham’s petition sounded in traditional or ordinary mandamus (§ 1085), the trial court’s role was limited to determining whether the University’s action was arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support; the trial court’s review should be framed in the context of judicial noninterference in a school’s academic affairs; the University’s policies were not applied in an arbitrary or capricious manner; there was no authority for the proposition that Graham had a property right to a better grade point average; and no “special relationship” existed which would require a different outcome.
3. Trial court’s ruling.
On April 22, 2008, the matter came on for hearing. The trial court denied Graham’s petition, setting forth its rationale as follows:
“ln the spring of 2004, petitioner, while an undergraduate at California State University at Long Beach, received an F grade in a course called CHEM 377B. In June, 2004, petitioner applied to change his grade from an F to a W, which would signify that petitioner had withdrawn from the course. Petitioner contended that he should be allowed to withdraw from the course because he completed an application to do so, but forgot to turn it in to the Office of Enrollment. Petitioner’s application was denied, and it was neither arbitrary nor bad faith for the University to do so. Petitioner did not show that, at the time that he completed the application that he failed to turn in, he was entitled to withdraw from the course and receive a W grade.
“Petitioner was advised by the University that he could repeat the course. Instead of doing so, petitioner, during the 2005 school year, took a different course which was similar to the course he failed, and petitioner passed that course. He then waited until 2007, after he had graduated, and then applied to have the later course substitute for the course that he failed in his academic record. The University denied his application because he had not sought or obtained prior approval to substitute one course for another, and that his application was not timely because he had not made it until after he graduated. It was neither arbitrary nor bad faith for the University to deny petitioner’s second application.
“Courts will not intervene into the academic affairs of schools unless the school acted arbitrarily or in bad faith. [(Paulsen v. Golden Gate University (1979) 25 Cal.3d 803, 808 (Paulsen).)] Petitioner has not made the required showing to be granted an exception to the widely accepted rule of judicial nonintervention into the academic affairs of schools.”
On June 27, 2008, Graham filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment denying his petition for writ of mandate.
CONTENTIONS
Graham contends: the petition for writ of mandate should have been granted as a matter of law; the denial of a hearing to the complaining party who is seeking to protect his constitutionally protected interests in liberty and property require a justification on the order of a compelling state interest; the rule of judicial noninterference is inapplicable because this case involves constitutional rights, rather than the University’s academic discretion or Graham’s academic performance; and he is entitled to raise new facts and new arguments on appeal because he is fighting for his constitutional rights and is being subjected to “cruel and unusual punishment” by the University.
DISCUSSION
1. Traditional or ordinary mandamus; standard of review.
This appeal is from a judgment denying a traditional writ of mandamus under section 1085, which is used to review adjudicatory decisions when the agency is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing. (American Board of Cosmetic Surgery v. Medical Board of California (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 534, 547.) Ordinary mandamus may be used to compel the performance of a duty that is purely ministerial in nature, or to correct an abuse of discretion. (Ibid.)
The “trial court’s role in a traditional mandamus proceeding is a limited one. It must determine whether the agency’s action was arbitrary, capricious, or without evidentiary support, and/or whether it failed to conform to the law. The trial court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency or force the agency to exercise its discretion in a certain way. [Citation.]” (Association of Irritated Residents v. San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control Dist. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 535, 542-543 (Irritated Residents).)
The “reviewing court exercises independent judgment in determining whether the agency action was ‘consistent with applicable law.’ [Citation.].... Since we apply the same standard as the trial court, its determination is not binding on us. [Citation.]” (Irritated Residents, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 543.)
2. General rule is judicial nonintervention into academic affairs; Graham failed to show the University acted arbitrarily or in bad faith so as to come within an exception to the general rule.
a. General rule of judicial nonintervention.
“There is a widely accepted rule of judicial nonintervention into the academic affairs of schools. [Citations.] However, some courts, including those of California on occasion, have carved out an exception to this rule by permitting limited intervention whenever it is alleged that a university or college has acted arbitrarily or in bad faith. [Citations.]” (Paulsen, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 808.) A school acts arbitrarily or in bad faith if, for example, it treats a student radically differently than others in a like situation, or if it imposes conditions extraneous to a student’s qualifications for a degree. (Id. at p. 809; see, e.g. Shuffer v. Board of Trustees (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 208, 218 (Shuffer) [plaintiff alleged he was “singled out for discriminatory and arbitrary treatment in connection with the completion of necessary requirements for receiving his graduate degree”].)
The rule of judicial nonintervention is exemplified by Paulsen. There, a law student was readmitted by a law school for a fourth year so that he could be certified as having studied law for four years; such persons could take the bar examination even if they did not receive a law degree. The law school advised the student that his readmission was a limited opportunity and that he would not be awarded a law degree even if he received straight A’s in his fourth year courses. This was the first time the law school had imposed a no-degree condition on a student. Guided by the rule of judicial nonintervention, our Supreme Court held the law school did not act arbitrarily or in bad faith by including the no-degree condition in readmitting, for the sole purpose of bar certification, an academically disqualified student. (Paulsen, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 806-811.)
b. No showing the University acted arbitrarily or in bad faith in refusing to relieve Graham of his “F” grade.
Irrespective of the various issues raised by Graham at oral argument on appeal, our review is confined to the issue he raised in his allegations in the petition and amended petition for writ of mandamus, wherein he challenged the University’s refusal to relieve him of his “F” grade in chemistry. (Clerk’s Transcript, pp. 5-15, 81-91.)
In the instant case, Graham has not shown the University’s refusal to relieve him of his “F” grade in Chem 377B was arbitrary, capricious, in bad faith or lacking in evidentiary support. Unlike Shuffer, supra, 67 Cal.App.3d at page 218, there is no allegation Graham was singled out for discriminatory and arbitrary treatment.
It is undisputed that Graham did not perfect his withdrawal from Chem 377B in the spring of 2004. Graham conceded that during the semester, he “forgot” to turn in the withdrawal form to enrollment services.
In July 2004, after Graham received an “F” grade in the class, the University rejected his request for a belated withdrawal but advised him that he could repeat Chem 377B in the fall of 2004. Graham did not avail himself of that opportunity.
In May 2007, five months after Graham graduated, he renewed his 2004 request, seeking a grade of “W” instead of “F” in Chem 377B. In the alternative, Graham requested the “F” grade in Chem 377B be replaced by his “B” grade in Chem 371B. The University denied said request on the ground no change can be made to an academic record after a degree has been granted.
It cannot be said the University’s refusal to entertain the request of Graham, an alumnus, to change his academic record was arbitrary or in bad faith. The University’s 2006/2007 Catalog states in relevant part at page 68: “Academic Appeals [¶] Students may petition for exception to academic policy. Typically, exception requests involve issues such as record errors, General Education substitutions or waivers, exceptions to the repeat/delete policy, and academic renewal.” (Italics added.)
Here, the request filed by Graham in May 2007 was just such an academic appeal. The document that Graham submitted was a “Petition for Exception to Academic Policy.” The petition invoked the “Repeat/Delete Exception.”
The problem for Graham is that in May 2007, he was no longer a student. To reiterate, the University’s academic appeal procedure provides “Students may petition for exception to academic policy.” (Italics added.) We cannot say the University acted arbitrarily, capriciously or in bad faith by refusing to entertain an academic appeal filed by Graham after he obtained his degree.
We note the declaration of Philip Garcia, filed in support of the University’s opposition to the petition for writ of mandate, indicates the California State University System consists of 23 campuses with more than 430,000 students, and the University has conferred more than 2 million baccalaureate degrees since 1935. Similarly, the declaration of Cecile Lindsay states that from the fall of 2004 to the time of Graham’s graduation, CSULB graduated more than 13,000 students and in the 2006-2007 academic year, it reviewed over 6,300 requests to graduate. Obviously, it would be an administrative nightmare for schools to have to revisit the GPAs of potentially millions of alumni years after they graduated. The University’s policy, confining academic appeals to current students, is not arbitrary or capricious.
In sum, this case does not fall within an exception to the general rule of judicial nonintervention in academic affairs.
It is unnecessary to address any remaining arguments.
DISPOSITION
The judgment denying the petition for writ of mandate is affirmed. The parties shall bear their respective costs on appeal.