Opinion
Case No. 2:03-CV-758.
April 27, 2006
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is currently before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's Opinion and Order Filed December 5, 2005 (" Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration"). Doc. No. 157. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff's motion is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
This is an employment action in which plaintiff Frederick Graessle ("plaintiff") alleges that his employment was terminated by defendants, Nationwide Credit, Inc., NCI Resource Management, Inc. and Nationwide Credit, Inc. dba NCI Resource Management, Inc. (collectively "defendants" or "NCI"), because of his age and his religion.
Earlier in the litigation, the Court authorized plaintiff to pursue discovery related to employees throughout the company who occupied positions similar to that occupied by plaintiff, based on plaintiff's representation, made at a conference with the Court, as to the testimony of defendants' corporate designee:
Because [the corporate deponent] apparently testified on deposition that plaintiff's alleged failure to meet "his" goals was a factor in his termination, plaintiff may seek discovery regarding similarly situated personnel ( i.e., sales personnel and sales supervisory personnel) on a company-wide basis for the years 2000-2002.
Doc. No. 111.
Defendants thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of that Order, arguing that plaintiff's counsel had misrepresented the testimony of their corporate deponent. Defendants' Motion to Reconsider Court's Discovery Ruling Permitting Discovery of Individual Performance Goals; Doc. No. 114. The actual deposition transcript, which was not available at the conference, indicates that the corporate designee testified that plaintiff was terminated because the company failed to meet its goals and was forced to reorganize, a process that included the elimination of plaintiff's position. On December 5, 2005, the Court granted defendants' motion to reconsider:
Read in its entire context, [defendants' corporate deponent] did not testify that it was plaintiff's failure to meet "his" goals that was a precipitating factor in his termination. Instead, [defendants' corporate deponent] testified that the company did not meet its goal, thereby necessitating a reorganization that eliminated plaintiff's position. . . . . Because plaintiff's failure to meet his individual performance goals was not a factor in his termination, discovery related to the individual performance goals of other personnel are not relevant to plaintiff's claims. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration.
Doc. No. 155, at 5-6.
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, asking this Court to reconsider its December 5, 2005, Opinion and Order, Doc. No. 157, is now ripe for resolution.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"District courts possess the authority and discretion to reconsider and modify interlocutory judgments any time before final judgment." Rodriguez v. Tenn. Laborers Health Welfare Fund, 89 Fed. Appx. 949, 952 (6th Cir. 2004). See also Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 12 (1983) ("every order short of a final decree is subject to reopening at the discretion of the district judge"); Mallory v. Eyrich, 922 F.2d 1273, 1282 (6th Cir. 1991) ("District courts have inherent power to reconsider interlocutory orders and reopen any part of a case before entry of a final judgment.").
Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not explicitly address motions for reconsideration of interlocutory orders, the authority for a district court to hear such motions is found in both the common law and in Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rodriguez, 89 Fed. Appx. at 959. A district court's authority to reconsider its previous orders has been recognized to afford such relief as justice requires. Id.
Traditionally, courts will find justification for reconsidering interlocutory orders when there is (1) an intervening change of controlling law; (2) new evidence available; or, (3) a need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Id. (citing Reich v. Hall Holding Co., 990 F. Supp. 955, 965 (N.D. Ohio 1998)).
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff requests that this Court reconsider its December 5, 2005, Opinion and Order, in which it, inter alia, concluded that plaintiff was not entitled to company-wide discovery of individual performance goals. Plaintiff contends that recent deposition testimony, unavailable at the time that the Court issued its Opinion and Order, confirms that consideration of individual performance goals was a factor in plaintiff's termination. Plaintiff relies on the deposition testimony of NCI's Regional Human Resources Manager, Bruce Wright, and of NCI's Senior Vice President of Human Resources, Roger Bruce.
A. NCI's Regional Human Resources Manager, Bruce Wright
Bruce Wright did not participate in the decision to terminate plaintiff's employment with NCI. Doc. No. 159; Deposition of Bruce Wright, at 17. However, he was the individual who drafted defendants' response to plaintiff's EEOC charge ["EEOC Response"], which required him to investigate the charges made by plaintiff. Id., at 27-29.
Plaintiff contends that the "EEOC Response unequivocally states that Plaintiff's, and his staff's, failure to procure sufficient sales was a primary indicator in making the decision to terminate him." Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, at 3. After careful review of the EEOC Response and Wright's deposition testimony related to it, the Court disagrees.
Plaintiff relies on the following language in the EEOC Response for the proposition that plaintiff was terminated for failure to meet his individual performance goals:
As explained to Mr. Graessle at the time of discharge, stagnated sales and the inability to secure new business were the primary indicators that led to this decision.
Doc. No. 159; Exhibit 17 attached to Deposition of Bruce Wright. Mr. Wright elaborated on the terms used by him:
Q. When you say stagnated sales and the inability to secure new business were the primary indicators that led to this decision, did you mean stagnated sales and inability to get new business in healthcare [the division in which plaintiff was employed]?
A. Yeah, it would have been related to healthcare and the organization, yes.
Q. Okay.
A. Throughout the organization. But that may be particularly with healthcare as I recall.
Q. So is it fair to say based on the information you obtained from Roger Bruce, your understanding was that part and parcel to Mr. Graessle's termination was that — an inability to generate sales. Is that fair?
A. No. That is not fair.
Q. Well, how would you — how do you interpret the sentence that you wrote there, stagnated sales?
A. Stagnated sales was a part of the business decision which is what I referred to several times in the statement, the business decision to restructure the department, stagnated sales in — throughout the organization.Id., at 43-44.
The Court concludes that neither Mr. Wright's testimony nor the EEOC Response justifies reconsideration of this Court's previous order which prohibited discovery by plaintiff of individual performance goals of other personnel.
B. NCI's Senior Vice President of Human Resources, Roger Bruce
Plaintiff also argues that, in his deposition testimony, the Senior Vice President of Human Resources for NCI, Roger Bruce, "conceded that Defendants' EEOC Response indicates that Plaintiff's termination was based, at least in part, on Plaintiff's sales performance." Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, at 3. After careful review of Mr. Bruce's testimony, the Court again disagrees.
Mr. Bruce did not participate in the decision to terminate plaintiff nor did he participate in the investigation of plaintiff EEOC charge or the drafting of the EEOC Response. Id., at 80. His only involvement in plaintiff's termination was to explain the severance package to plaintiff. Id., at 80-82. The testimony upon which plaintiff relies was made in response to a question asking Mr. Bruce to speculate about the meaning of Bruce Wright's terms, made in the EEOC Response, "stagnated sales and the inability to secure new business."
Q. So you would expect [Mr. Wright] to only include [in the EEOC Response] information that he obtained during his review process; correct? I'm not asking you to think about why he put that there. I'm asking, as his supervisor, would you expect him to only put information that he obtained from supervisors during his review process.
A. Well, whatever his — whatever process he went through to respond to this EEO charge, I'm sure it was based on conversation with somebody else.
Q. Okay. He wouldn't just —
A. Or — no, he wouldn't make it up is the point.
Q. Right. And in reading that, would it be your impression in reading that that Mr. Graessle may have been selected as part of that overall directive to reduce salary because of his performance?
A. That could very well have been the case, yes.
Doc. No. 159; Deposition of Roger Bruce, at 39-40. Any ambiguity reflected in this speculation, however, is definitively laid to rest by other portions of this deponent's testimony:
Q. Okay. How long — as you're probably aware, during 2002 it's been represented to my client among other things that one of the reasons for his termination was based on a company-wide reorganization.
A. My memory serves me that that was the only reason. You said that was one reason. To my knowledge, that was that only reason.Id., at 29. The full context of this deposition testimony, too, does not militate in favor of reconsideration of this Court's December 5, 2005, order.
WHEREUPON, in light of the foregoing, Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, Doc. No. 157, is DENIED.