Opinion
Cause No. 1:04-CV-291.
November 8, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Sheryl Grabner ("Grabner") alleges that her former employer, Defendant Adams County Memorial Hospital ("ACMH"), discriminated against her on the basis of her disability, thereby violating the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12111, et seq. ACMH, claiming that Grabner failed to file a timely charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), now moves to dismiss Grabner's suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Court DENIES ACMH's motion in part, CONVERTS the remainder to a motion for summary judgment, and ORDERS limited discovery and further briefing before resolving the motion.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
As this is a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, this Court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Grabner, the nonmovant. Bressner v. Ambroziak, 379 F.3d 478, 480 (7th Cir. 2004).
Grabner began employment with ACMH as a Staff Nurse in May 2000. (Compl. ¶ 8.) In January 2002, Grabner became "permanently impaired and disabled," and shortly thereafter, ACMH promoted her from Staff Nurse to Assistant Director of Nursing. ( Id. ¶ 9-10.) However, in October 2002, ACMH "forced [Grabner] to take leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act." ( Id. ¶ 13-14.) ACMH never returned Grabner to her position, and it terminated her employment on March 31, 2003.
Although the Complaint states that Grabner was terminated on March 31, 2004 (Compl. ¶ 15), the parties agree that this is incorrect, and that the true termination date was March 31, 2003 ( see Def.'s Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 4 n. 1; Pl.'s Br. in Opp'n at 8).
On January 15, 2004, which was 290 days after her termination, Grabner filed a charge of discrimination with the Fort Wayne Metropolitan Human Relations Commission ("Metro"). ( Id., Ex. A.) Metro forwarded her charge to the EEOC, and the charge was received by and filed with the EEOC on January 22, 2004, which was 297 days after Grabner's termination. ( See Def.'s Br. in Supp., Ex. A.) After receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, Grabner filed the instant suit. (Compl., Ex. B.)
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint and not to decide the merits. Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., 101 F.3d 519, 524 (7th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would support her claim for relief. Hickey v. O'Bannon, 287 F.3d 656, 657 (7th Cir. 2002). All well-pleaded facts must be accepted as true and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. Bressner, 379 F.3d at 480.
IV. DISCUSSION
The ADA expressly adopts the complex enforcement scheme of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). This means that a plaintiff must make a timely charge of discrimination to the EEOC before bringing suit under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), (f)(1). The central issue in this case is whether Grabner's EEOC charge was timely; if it was not, her suit is time-barred and must be dismissed. Stewart v. County of Brown, 86 F.3d 107, 110 (7th Cir. 1996).
Generally, the EEOC charge must be filed within 180 days after the allegedly discriminatory action took place. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). It is undisputed that Grabner did not meet this deadline, as her charge was filed 297 days after her termination. However, Grabner claims that she is entitled to a limited statutory exception which allows some plaintiffs 300 days to file an EEOC charge. See id. ACMH argues that (1) Grabner is not entitled to the 300-day limit; and (2) even if she is entitled to the 300-day limit, she still did not comply with it because the clock started ticking well before she was officially terminated. The Court will consider each argument in turn.
A. Further Discovery and Argument Is Necessary To Determine Whether Grabner Is Entitled to the 300-Day Limit
It is the policy of both the ADA and Title VII to "give States and localities an opportunity to combat discrimination free from premature federal intervention." EEOC v. Commercial Office Prod. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 110-11 (1988). Accordingly, there is an exception to the normal 180-day limit for filing an EEOC charge: if a plaintiff "initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief" for the alleged discrimination, she is granted 300 days to file with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). ACMH claims that Grabner did not institute such proceedings and thus is not entitled to the 300 day limit for her EEOC charge. Grabner's response is twofold.
First, Grabner asserts that she is entitled to the 300-day limit by virtue of filing a charge with Metro. But this argument fails because Metro lacks "authority to grant or seek relief" for the discrimination Grabner alleges. Id. Metro "derives its power and jurisdiction from the statutes and ordinances" that authorized and created it, United Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Metro. Human Relations Comm'n, 859 F.Supp. 323, 326 (N.D. Ind. 1993), aff'd, 24 F.3d 1008 (7th Cir. 1994), primarily the City Code of Fort Wayne, Indiana ("Code"). A cursory review of the Code reveals that Metro's jurisdiction is limited to the territorial boundaries of Fort Wayne, see, e.g., Code §§ 10.01, 93.001, 93.002, 93.050, 93.054(13), but Grabner does not live in Fort Wayne, none of the allegedly discriminatory acts described in Grabner's charge occurred in Fort Wayne, and ACMH's principal place of business is outside of Fort Wayne. ( See Compl.) In short, Metro had no "authority to grant or seek relief" for ACMH's alleged discrimination, and thus Grabner's charge with Metro did not entitle her to a 300-day limit for filing her EEOC charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); see Vitug v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 860 F.Supp. 546, 550-51 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (denying 300-day limit to claimant who filed charge with state agency lacking jurisdiction over her charge), aff'd on other grounds, 88 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1996).
The Court takes judicial notice of the Code. Fed.R.Evid. 201; see also Demos v. City of Indianapolis, 302 F.3d 698, 706 (7th Cir. 2002). Relevant sections are found in Exhibit B to ACMH's dismissal brief.
Grabner's second argument may gain more traction, however. Grabner notes that there is a state agency, the Indiana Civil Rights Commission ("ICRC"), which clearly has "authority to grant or seek relief" in her case. See Ind. Code §§ 22-9-1-1 et seq., 22-9-5-1 et seq. She also notes that the EEOC has "worksharing" agreements with many state and local agencies, in which the state and local agencies sometimes waive the opportunity to process charges before the EEOC does. The Seventh Circuit has at least contemplated the possibility that under such an agreement, the filing of an EEOC charge alone might be sufficient to "institute proceedings with a State or local agency" and thus entitle the plaintiff to the 300-day limit. Russell v. Delco Remy Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 51 F.3d 746, 750-51 (7th Cir. 1995); Sofferin v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 923 F.2d 552, 558-60 (7th Cir. 1991). In other words, it is possible that by filing a charge with the EEOC on the 297th day, Grabner also instituted proceedings with the ICRC, thus entitling her to the 300-day limit in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) and making her EEOC charge timely.
There is another wrinkle, however. Once a claimant has instituted proceedings with a State or local agency such as the ICRC, she must wait either (1) sixty days; or (2) until the agency terminates its proceedings, whichever is earlier, before filing her charge with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c). Accordingly, even if Grabner's EEOC filing on the 297th day instituted proceedings with the ICRC, thus entitling her to the 300-day limit, her EEOC charge is still not timely unless the ICRC also terminated its proceedings before the 300 days ran. But again, the Seventh Circuit has held that such a result is possible if a worksharing agreement is in place. Russell, 51 F.3d at 750-51; Sofferin, 923 F.2d at 559.
In short, Grabner's EEOC charge might have been timely, but only if the EEOC and the ICRC are parties to a worksharing agreement which "provide[s] that a filing with the EEOC simultaneously initiates and terminates [ICRC] proceedings." Russell, 51 F.3d at 751; Sofferin, 923 F.2d at 559. Resolution of that question requires the Court to consider facts extrinsic to the pleadings and ACMH's motion to dismiss. Therefore, the Court will convert this portion of ACMH's motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b), and will reserve ruling until the parties complete additional discovery and briefing on this narrow issue (on the schedule outlined below).
In its reply brief, ACMH makes a final attempt to avoid this result. It argues that even if Grabner initiated ICRC proceedings when she filed her EEOC charge, the ICRC still lacked "authority to grant or seek relief" because her ICRC charge was untimely. See Ind. Code § 22-9-1-3(p) (requiring ICRC charges to be made within 180 days of discriminatory act). However, this argument has been squarely rejected by the Supreme Court, which held in Commercial Office Products that even an untimely charge with a state agency entitles the claimant to the 300-day limit for filing her EEOC charge. 486 U.S. at 122-24. The Court reasoned that "the importation of state limitations periods" into 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) would both "confuse lay complainants" and "embroil the EEOC in complicated issues of state law":
In order for the EEOC to determine the timeliness of a charge filed with it between 180 and 300 days, it first would have to determine whether the charge had been timely filed under state law, because the answer to the latter question would establish which of the two federal limitations periods should apply. This state-law determination is not a simple matter. The EEOC first would have to determine whether a state limitations period was jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional. And if the limitations period was nonjurisdictional . . . the EEOC would have to decide whether it was waived or equitably tolled. The EEOC has neither the time nor the expertise to make such determinations.Id. at 124.
In a similar vein, ACMH points to Ind. Code § 22-9-1-12.1(d), which provides that "[a]ny person who files a complaint with any local agency may not also file a complaint with the [ICRC]." ACMH argues that since Grabner filed with Metro first, any proceedings she initiated with ICRC were invalid under this section, divesting ICRC of "authority to grant or seek relief" and preventing Grabner from enjoying the 300-day limit for her EEOC charge. However, the reasoning of Commercial Office Products defeats this argument also. Quite simply, the EEOC should not have to immerse itself in the minutiae of state law just to figure out whether a charge before it is timely. 486 U.S. at 124. Accordingly, a claimant who files a charge with a state or local agency having jurisdiction over her claim is entitled to the 300-day limit for her EEOC charge, even if her state or local charge runs afoul of state procedural requirements. See id. at 122-24.
B. If Grabner Is Entitled to the 300-Day Limit, Her Complaint Cannot Be Dismissed for Failure to State a Claim
ACMH argues in the alternative that even if Grabner is entitled to the 300-day limit for filing her EEOC claim, she still did not file it on time. Although Grabner admittedly filed her EEOC charge 297 days after she was officially terminated, ACMH contends that the allegedly discriminatory act actually occurred before her termination was final. Specifcally, it points to a letter that it sent Grabner on March 19, 2003, which requested certain information from her and warned that she would be terminated on March 31 if she did not provide the information. ( See Def.'s Br. in Supp., Ex. D.) ACMH, which construes Grabner's claim in this case as one of discriminatory termination, believes that the clock began to tick on the day this letter was sent, which was more than 300 days before she filed her EEOC charge. Grabner responds that her claim is properly conceived as a failure-to-accommodate claim, and that it did not accrue until she was finally terminated on March 31, 297 days before she filed her EEOC charge.Whichever party may have the better of this argument, it cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss. "When [a] discriminatory act occurs, no less than whether a given act was discriminatory, is a question of fact," Lever v. Northwestern Univ., 979 F.2d 552, 553 (7th Cir. 1992), and thus it requires full-fledged discovery to resolve. On this extremely limited record, the Court cannot say that it "appears beyond doubt" that Grabner failed to file her EEOC charge within 300 days of the discriminatory act. Accordingly, ACMH's motion to dismiss is denied on this point. Hickey, 287 F.3d at 657.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons given above, ACMH's motion to dismiss is DENIED as to its argument that Grabner failed to file her EEOC charge within 300 days of the discriminatory act.
The remainder of ACMH's motion is CONVERTED to a motion for summary judgment, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). The parties are granted until January 5, 2005, to conduct discovery on the following issue: are the EEOC and the ICRC parties to a worksharing agreement, the terms of which provide that an EEOC filing simultaneously initiates and terminates ICRC proceedings? See Russell, 51 F.3d at 750-51; Sofferin, 923 F.2d at 559. The parties will then each file a brief no later than January 20, 2005, supplementing their arguments in light of the new discovery, after which the Court will rule.
At that time, the Court will also consider ACMH's Motion to Strike (Docket # 10).