Thus, plaintiff does not share the same legitimate claim of entitlement in its Measure 37 claim. Plaintiff's reliance on Grabhorn, Inc. v. Metropolitan Service District, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1284 (D. Or. 2009) is similarly misplaced. In Grabhorn, the owner and operator of a solid waste facility had an agreement and specially designated status to receive dry waste from the metropolitan district.

Grabhorn, Inc. v.Metro. Serv. Dist. , 624 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1286–88 (D. Or. 2009). And in David Hill , the district court recognized a constitutionally protected property interest in a binding preliminary plat approval that the plaintiff received from a city.

Likewise, Plaintiff has demonstrated a protected property interest in its contracts with the City at this stage, and that right was clearly established in 2016. See David Hill Dev., Ltd. Liab. Co. v. City of Forest Grove, 688 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1217-19 (D. Or. 2010) (finding that a real estate developer sufficiently alleged a property interest where Oregon law provided that a plat was binding and the city had a pattern of interference with the plaintiff's ability to develop the property due to city preference for other developers); see also Grabhorn, Inc. v. Metro. Serv. Dist., 624 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1288 (D. Or. 2009) (holding that a metropolitan code controlling variance application was "sufficiently mandatory" to create a constitutionally protected property interest). Mr. Miller argues that the statutory language is not mandatory and that the library's security needs, Plaintiff's interpretation of its indemnification duties under the parking garage contract, and Plaintiff's bankruptcy raised questions as to whether Plaintiff could provide needed services when required.

Id. at *1217-*1219. See Grabhorn, Inc. v. Metropolitan Service Dist., 624 F. Supp. 2d 1280 1284, 1288 (D. Or. 2009) (King J.) (holding that metropolitan code controlling variance application was "sufficiently mandatory" to create a constitutionally protected property interest). Here, the Amended Complaint does assert a protected property interest on a theory that the QRF statute obligates the City to contract with a QRF qualified to perform the required services.

Doyle v. City of Medford, 606 F.3d 667, 674 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Wedges/Ledges of Cal., Inc. v. City of Phx., Ariz., 24 F.3d 56, 63 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Although the Code directs the City Treasurer to consider all 'relevant information' when making its determination, it does not allow the City Treasurer to rest its decision on anything other than the 'game of skill' determination; the Code does not provide any open-ended discretionary factors."); Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646, 657 (9th Cir. 1983) ("The first two conditions are factual, involving no discretion. We believe that a determination as to whether the public interest will be prejudiced, while obviously giving a certain amount of play in the decisional process, defines an articulable standard."); Grabhorn v. Metro. Serv. Dist., 624 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1288 (D. Or. 2009) ("The Metro Code does provide specific criteria that the Council shall consider, but some of the criteria are quite subjective and require predicting future events, such as the 'expected impact on the region's recycling and waste reduction efforts.' . . . I conclude that the Metro Code sections at issue are sufficiently mandatory to create a constitutionally protected property interest.") (emphasis in original). Defendants argue that the Oregon law at issue does not mandate an outcome for two reasons: first, the statute leads with the term "may," and second, the statute contains subjective criteria.

With regard to Plaintiff's equal protection claim, it is likewise clearly established that governmental entities should not used their regulatory power to single out individuals for different treatment without a rational basis. See Grabhorn, Inc. v. Metro. Serv. Dist., 624 F.Supp.2d 1280, 1290–91 (D.Or.2009). Therefore, on the basis of the facts alleged in the First Amended Complaint, I conclude that Defendants had “fair warning” that their conduct was unconstitutional.