Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Humboldt County Super. Ct. Nos. JV070150, JV070154
Reardon, Acting P.J.
In October 2008, the juvenile court found that returning minors A.P. and J.P.I to the home of their mother—petitioner G.P. (mother)—would be detrimental to them. It terminated mother’s reunification services and set a March 2, 2009 date for a permanency planning hearing. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) Mother petitions for review of the order terminating reunification services and setting a permanency planning hearing. (See § 387.) She challenges the termination of reunification services, asserting that the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable services were provided to the family was not supported by substantial evidence. She also contends that the juvenile court erred by failing to offer her continued reunification services because there was a substantial probability that the minors would be returned to her custody within 18 months of their initial removal. Finally, mother seeks a stay of the scheduled permanency planning hearing. Real party in interest Humboldt County Department of Health and Human Services (department) opposes her petition and her request for a stay. We deny the petition on the merits.
All subsequent calendar dates refer to the 2008 calendar year unless otherwise indicated.
All subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
I. FACTS
In February 1999, mother gave birth to a daughter, A.P. D.F.I was one of the alleged fathers of this child. A son, J.P.I, was born to mother in January 2005. D.F.I was alleged to be his father. Mother and D.F.I divorced in August 2005, although they remained together after that time.
Mother had been diagnosed with psychotic paranoia with depression and took medication to help her deal with these mental health issues. When she became pregnant again, mother stopped taking her medication, but her doctor later put her back on them. On February 1, 2007, mother gave birth to another daughter, J.P.II. D.F.I and D.F.II were her alleged fathers. At birth, both J.P.II and mother tested positive for amphetamine. The minors lived with mother.
No alleged father is a petitioner in this matter. A petition filed by another of A.P.’s alleged fathers, J.W., was dismissed in December 2008 for failure to file a timely petition for an extraordinary writ. We include information about the alleged fathers to the extent that it is relevant to our determination of the issues that mother raises in her petition.
On the night of July 1, 2007, mother left the minors in the care of D.F.I and—unbeknownst to him—spent the night with D.F.II. The next morning, the godmother of infant J.P.II went to visit the child at D.F.I’s home. She found the baby to be cold and limp. D.F.I seemed unconcerned about the child, so the godmother brought J.P.II to a Eureka hospital. Child abuse was suspected. D.F.II appeared at the hospital, threatening to kill people including D.F.I. D.F.II may have been under the influence of methamphetamine. Mother came to the hospital, too, telling hospital officials that she was homeless.
Soon after arriving at the Eureka hospital, the baby was transferred to Children’s Hospital in Oakland, but there was little that could be done for her. J.P.II was diagnosed as suffering from a severe fatal head trauma resulting from violent shaking.
On July 3, 2007, A.P. and J.P.I were detained and placed with relatives. Mother and D.F.I appeared at the placement home and demanded to see the minors. Mother and D.F.I first arrived at the Oakland hospital to see J.P.II on July 4, 2007. By this time, J.P.II had been declared brain dead. She was kept alive on a ventilator until her organs were donated.
On July 6, 2007, the department filed juvenile dependency petitions on behalf of A.P. and J.P., alleging that mother, D.F.I and D.F.II had failed to protect the minors’ sibling, J.P.II, from harm. (See § 300, subd. (j).) On July 9, 2007, the juvenile court approved the detention of A.P. and J.P.I. Counsel was appointed for mother. On July 12, 2007, it formally ordered the department to offer services to mother—parenting classes, drug testing, substance abuse assessment and treatment, and a mental health evaluation.
A.F.—apparently, the child of mother and D.F.I and thus a sibling of A.P. and J.P.I—gave a statement to officials consistent with the conclusion that D.F.I had shaken the baby repeatedly, that the baby had difficulty breathing, and that she had overheard mother and D.F.I discussing whether to take the baby to a hospital. A.P. told officials that D.F.I was angry because mother stayed out all night. When she woke early on the morning on July 2, 2007, A.P. saw that J.P.II was not breathing. By late July 2007, Eureka police were conducting a criminal investigation into the child’s death. The only adults thought to have had an opportunity to injure J.P.II were mother, D.F.I and D.F.II.
A petition was also filed on behalf of A.F., but her case is not before us on appeal. We note the facts about her case that bear on the matters involving A.P. and J.P.I.
By the end of July 2007, the department had prepared its initial case plan. The plan identified abusive behavior, drug abuse, neglect regarding basic necessities and poor parenting skills as mother’s problems requiring intervention. The case plan called for mother to provide a stable and suitable residence for the minors, to comply with medical or psychological treatment, and to remain free from illegal drugs. Specifically, she was to complete both a mental health and a substance abuse assessment, and then to follow any recommendations that were made by those assessments. Mother was also required to complete a parenting class and to visit with her children. That month, mother underwent a mental health evaluation and was diagnosed with depression and amphetamine abuse.
Counsel for mother was relieved in October 2007 and new counsel was appointed for her. The jurisdiction hearing was continued many times—once, at the request of an alleged father; twice, because the department did not file its report in time; and three times, at the instigation of mother’s new counsel, who hoped for a settlement of the jurisdictional issues. Mother completed her parenting class in December 2007. That month, she also underwent a second mental health assessment, which resulted in a diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder and amphetamine abuse (in remission). Mother appeared anxious and depressed, having experienced insomnia and nightmares.
In January, the department filed first amended petitions on behalf of A.P. and J.P.I. These petitions noted the death of J.P.II and provided more information about who might be the fathers of these two minors. The key allegation of sibling abuse was also reworded, after negotiations between the department and mother’s new counsel. Mother submitted the jurisdictional issues in the petition on the basis of the department reports. The juvenile court sustained the allegations of the first amended petitions and found A.P. and J.P.I to be dependent children. The department sent mother a letter later that month, with a copy of the updated case plan. The social worker suggested that mother complete some drug screenings and have a mental health assessment before the time for the six-month review hearing.
By February, A.P. was living with the parents of her alleged father, B.M. J.P.I had been placed in a local foster home, where he seemed happy. Mother lived with D.F.I and members of her extended family. She continued to believe that no adult was responsible for J.P. II’s injuries. She had not participated in an alcohol and drug assessment. By the end of February, the department had obtained the results of mother’s completed mental health assessment, which recommended that mother complete a medication assessment and participate in counseling. Mother completed the medication assessment that month and the social worker referred her to a specific counseling program. In March, mother tested positive for amphetamine use. The social worker again encouraged mother to begin counseling.
An initial mental health assessment was conducted in July 2007 and a second occurred in December 2007.
In April, the juvenile court conducted a dispositional hearing. It found that the continued removal of A.P. and J.P.I from mother was required, based on the finding of sibling abuse. It concluded that mother had made adequate progress with the elements of her case plan and that the department had made reasonable efforts to assist her. The department was ordered to provide continued reunification services to mother. She and the department were ordered to comply with the case plan. As the date for a six-month review had passed, a 12-month review hearing was set for September. In April, mother still had not obtained housing and failed to complete drug testing.
In May, the department gave mother a new referral for counseling, because the original referral was no longer accepting new clients. Mother failed to attend her May medication appointment. In June, the social worker made a follow-up request for mother to obtain counseling, having arranged for the mental health provider to contact her about scheduling an initial counseling assessment. Mother completed this counseling assessment on July 30.
In September and October, a contested 12-month review hearing was conducted. The department noted that mother had completed a parenting program, a mental health assessment and a medication assessment. However, she had not begun a regular program of counseling to address her mental health issues and had taken only one of 10 required drug tests by early September. In that one test, mother tested positive for amphetamine. She took a second test in mid-September but the results were still pending. Despite several requests, mother had also failed to provide a release form needed so that the social worker could gauge whether she was attending her drug treatment program and if so, what progress she was making and what the results of her drug tests were. She reported that she regularly attended mental health counseling, but the mental health worker could confirm that she had met only once with mother.
Mother was living with extended family in Eureka and had not obtained her own residence. She told the social worker that she and D.F.I intended to reside together, but D.F.I denied this was true. Mother reported that she had purchased a travel trailer, but the social worker learned from the owner of the trailer that the sale had not been made. The department noted its repeated attempts to engage mother in her case plan, on which it concluded that she had made only limited progress. It recommended termination of mother’s reunification services and setting a date for a permanency planning hearing.
Mother asked to be given another six months of reunification services, asserting that she had substantially complied with her case plan and that there was a substantial probability that she would reunify with the minors within the next six months. An advocate for A.P. and J.P.I recommended termination of mother’s reunification services. She opined that because of mother’s lack of participation in the case plan, an additional six months of reunification services would not be sufficient to allow the juvenile court to safely return the children to her.
At the hearing, county counsel and counsel for the minors asserted that the maximum time for reunification services had expired, noting that J.P.I—the youngest member of the sibling group—was under three years of age at the time of detention. The minors’ attorney argued that mother may have begun some, but had not completed, any of the components of her case plan. Visitation was consistent, but chaotic, and drug testing was almost nonexistent. Counsel for mother argued that while detention occurred in July 2007, the disposition hearing was not completed until April 2008. Thus, she reasoned, mother had only been participating in reunification services for about six months. She noted that the social worker had been offering reasonable services, but only since April. She also argued that mother had made significant progress on every component of the case plan and had demonstrated the capacity to complete her treatment plan objectives.
In fact, mother’s record of visitation was nearly perfect.
The social worker testified at the hearing that mother had completed a substance abuse assessment, but that the treatment program was not able to offer services to her because of her mental health issues. Mother had not complied with the mental health component of her case plan. She completed a mental health and medication assessment, but had not participated in counseling. Mother had also failed to participate in regular drug testing. Visitation remained supervised because mother’s interactions with the minors were not adequate to support a shift to unsupervised visitation. Participation in counseling could also facilitate this shift. Mother had not obtained stable housing. The social worker acknowledged that mother completed a parenting class.
The social worker testified that the family was offered reunification services from the time that the minors were detained in July 2007. By January 2008, mother had completed her parenting classes, but had not engaged in any other services that had been offered to her. Mother had attended regular visitation with the minors.
The social worker failed to credit mother for undergoing the two mental health evaluations that were conducted in 2007. (See fn. 5, ante.)
Mother also testified at the hearing. She worked full time as a hotel housekeeper. She completed a substance abuse assessment, but was never told the results of the test until she read them in the department report. She did not sign a release form because she wanted to talk with her attorney first. Mother testified that she had completed a mental health assessment. She had not been able to participate in counseling because she was working and visiting with the children. She wanted to set up counseling appointments on her days off. Usually, she had not participated in drug testing because she had no transportation and could not miss work. Mother admitted that visits were sometimes chaotic. She believed that she was entitled to more hours of visitation than the department provided. She admitted that she had only rarely attended her substance abuse program three times in the past eight months. She described the prescription medication that she had been taking for her mental health issues. Mother told the juvenile court that she did not think she had a current drug problem, although she did have one long ago.
County counsel argued that mother needed to do much more than she already had to address the issues that brought her children into juvenile court. Mother’s attorney argued that she was entitled to further reunification services because she had only received eight months of reunification services since January 2008. She reasoned that mother had made significant progress on each component of her case plan. She asked for another six months of reunification services for mother.
The juvenile court concluded that the department made reasonable efforts to assist her in complying with the case plan. It stated that reunification services were provided from the time of removal and that at the disposition hearing, it found that the department had provided reasonable services up to that time. It found that mother had consistently visited with the minors, but that she made minimal progress toward alleviating the causes requiring removal. Even after more than a year, mother was still at the beginning stages of compliance with her case plan. Her failure to make substantial progress was prima facie evidence of detriment. It found that return of A.P. and J.P.I to mother’s custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to them. It found that there was no substantial probability that the minors would be returned to mother’s custody by the March 2009 18-month date. As such, on October 8, the juvenile court terminated mother’s reunification services and set a March 2, 2009 date for a permanency planning hearing. (See § 366.26.)
Mother filed a timely notice of intent to file a writ petition challenging these rulings. On December 4, mother filed a petition for extraordinary writ relief. She challenges the juvenile court’s finding that the department offered her reasonable services and contends that the juvenile court failed to acknowledge the substantial probability that A.P. and J.P.I could be safely returned to her custody within 18 months of their initial removal. She asks us to order the juvenile court to vacate its order setting a permanency planning hearing, order reunification services to be continued, order visitation with the minors, and return custody of A.P. and J.P.I to her. She also asks us to stay the March 2, 2009 permanency planning hearing if this matter is not resolved by that date. We issued an order to show cause. The department opposes the petition and the request for a stay.
In November 2008, mother filed a second petition for extraordinary writ in this matter. The petition was dismissed in December 2008, as it was found to be untimely filed and duplicative of the issues raised in the petition that is now before us.
II. REASONABLE SERVICES
A. Tailored Services
Mother challenges the juvenile court’s order terminating reunification services, asserting that its finding that reasonable services were provided to the family was not supported by substantial evidence, for several reasons. When a child is removed from his or her parent’s custody, the juvenile court must order reunification services to be provided to the family, except in unusual circumstances. The purpose of these services is to assist in reunifying the family. (§ 361.5, subd. (a); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.695(f)(1).) At the 12-month hearing, if the juvenile court does not return the minor to the parent, it must find whether or not reasonable services designed to overcome the problems that led to the initial removal have been offered or provided to the family. (§ 366.21, subd. (f); rule 5.715(c)(4)(A).)
We were not assisted by mother’s repeated references to an outdated version of the Rules of Court, which was renumbered in January 2007.
First, she reasons that the case plan was not designed to overcome the sole problem leading to the removal of the minors—the death of A.P. and J.P.I’s sibling. This claim confuses the cause of the removal—the death of J.P.II—with the reasons that it became necessary. As indicated at the detention stage, mother had parenting, substance abuse and mental health issues that made removal of J.P.II’s siblings necessary in order to protect them.
Mother also claims that the case plan was not narrowly tailored to meet the specific needs of the family. She reasons that if it had been properly tailored to meet these needs, then what she characterizes as her “significant compliance with the case-plan” would have resulted in the reunification of the family. We disagree with her underlying assumption that she substantially complied with the case plan.
The updated case plan was prepared with the participation of mother’s new counsel, raising the specter of induced error of which she may not now complain. (See, e.g., USLIFE Savings & Loan Assn. v. National Surety Corp. (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 336, 347; Abbott v. Cavalli (1931) 114 Cal.App. 379, 382; see 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, § 390, pp. 448-449.) Any claim that she was required to comply with the terms of the case plan is now waived, because mother did not appeal from the disposition order which required her compliance, nor has she filed any petition to modify that order. The current writ petition does not entitle mother to challenge prior orders which have not been challenged in a timely manner. (See John F. v. Superior Court (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 400, 404-405; see also In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 46-47.)
Mother contends that she cannot be faulted for failing to follow the counseling recommendation of the mental health assessment because she did not receive them. The record shows that in mid-February 2008, the department had not yet received that recommendation. As soon as the recommendation for counseling was received, the social worker advised mother of this requirement and gave her a counseling referral. Mother took little action to obtain counseling during the next seven months, despite repeated counseling referrals from the social worker. In light of her failure to act once the recommendation for counseling was received, mother cannot demonstrate any prejudice resulting from a delay in obtaining that recommendation from the mental health assessment.
Mother complains that she met the requirements of the mental health assessment by beginning counseling. To the contrary, the record shows that she attended an initial meeting at the counseling center, but that she had not actually attended any counseling sessions, belying her claims that she was regularly attending them. A single intake meeting does not constitute substantial compliance with a counseling component of a case plan.
Mother also argues that her case plan did not actually inform her that counseling would be considered a pivotal element of her case plan. The case plan required mother to obtain a mental health assessment and to follow its recommendations, under a heading “Counseling/Mental Health Services.” Counseling was one of the recommendations of that assessment and the social worker repeatedly advised mother to participate in counseling. She also claims that the department failed to emphasize the importance of counseling before the 12-month review hearing in September and October. The record supports the conclusion that counseling was regularly recommended and supported from the time that the department obtained the results of mother’s mental health assessment fleshing out this requirement, apparently in February.
Mother also contends that the department failed to make a good faith effort to implement the case plan because the counseling referral was not given to her orally, but was given in writing. This different form of information does not constitute a failure on the part of the department to provide reasonable substantive services to mother. Repeatedly, mother overstates her own efforts and fails to give due credit to those efforts undertaken by the department on her behalf. The fault was not with the case plan, but her own failure to recognize her parental shortcomings and to comply with the terms of the plan designed to address those ongoing issues.
Mother also makes an unsupported claim that A.P.’s wishes should have encouraged the department to take a more active role in mother’s progress. Apparently, this claim is based on A.P.’s complaints that mother was not doing what she needed to do to be able to return the minors to mother’s care. This claim of error is unsupported by any factual or legal argument. An appellant’s failure to articulate any legal argument in an opening brief may be deemed an abandonment of that aspect of the appeal. (See Berger v. Godden (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1119; see also 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Appeal, § 701, pp. 769-771.) Assuming arguendo that mother has standing to raise issues related to A.P.’s interest, we deem this claim of error to be abandoned.
B. Length of Service Period
Alternatively, mother contends that the termination of reunification services was premature. With regard to this contention, she complains that her change of counsel and repeated continuances before the January 2008 jurisdiction hearing effectively required her to sacrifice a part of her reunification period in order to be represented effectively at that hearing. She asserts that she was arguably unable to seek advice from her newly appointed counsel until counsel became familiar with her case. She appears to contend that the case plan was not provided to her until February 2008, when the department issued a predisposition report including a copy of the initial case plan. She raised a claim of a shortened period of reunification services before the juvenile court, which rejected it.
This claim is somewhat disingenuous, as the newly appointed counsel in the juvenile court represents mother in this petition and presumably knows whether mother could have obtained any advice during the initial days after she took over representation of mother. Also, it takes little effort on the part of new counsel to determine the components of the case plan and to advise a client of the next steps to be taken to achieve them. There was no evidence in the juvenile court or on appeal suggesting that mother lacked the effective assistance of counsel during this or any other period of this matter.
In the juvenile court, mother’s counsel argued that the case plan did not actually begin until the April 2008 disposition.
In essence, mother challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable services were provided to her. When faced with such a challenge to a juvenile court finding, our standard of review is well settled. We must view the entire record in the light most favorable to the finding, indulging in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold it. If substantial evidence supports the finding, we cannot disturb the juvenile court’s judgment. (In re Precious J. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1472; In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545.) When two or more reasonable inferences can be drawn from the facts, we have no authority to substitute our deduction for that made by the juvenile court. (In re Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 545; In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 412, 420.) We have no power to reweigh the evidence—only to determine if there is sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding. (In re Jacqueline G. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 582, 585; see In re Heather P. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1214, 1226-1227, disapproved on another point in In re Richard S. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 857, 866 fn. 5.) We must uphold the juvenile court’s findings unless no rational fact finder could reach the same conclusion. (In re Athena P. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 617, 629.)
Mother was entitled to 12 months of reunification services. That 12-month period began to run 60 days after the minors were removed from her custody. (See §§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(A), (C), 366.21, subd. (f); rule 5.695(f)(1).) Her claim of error hinges on her underlying contention that she was not given a full 12 months of reunification services. We disagree with this underlying factual claim. A review of the entire record shows that at the July 2007 detention hearing, the juvenile court ordered that specific reunification services—including those related to mother’s underlying parenting, substance abuse and mental health issues—be offered. The social worker testified that the family was offered reunification services from the time of detention. A copy of the initial case plan detailing those reunification services was filed on August 28, 2007—less than 60 days after the July 3, 2007 removal. Mother actually participated in that plan by completing her parenting classes ahead of schedule in December 2007. A January 24, 2008 updated version of the case plan was mailed to mother after a meeting about these issues conducted in November 2007 with mother’s newly appointed counsel. A copy of the initial case plan first appears in the record as an attachment to the department’s February 2008 report issued in advance of the upcoming disposition hearing, but the evidence in the record satisfies us that it had been issued long before then. Mother’s claim that the period for her reunification services did not begin to run until the beginning of 2008 is not supported by the record, which instead supports the juvenile court’s finding that those services had been offered at least 12 months before being terminated in October 2008.
C. Reasonableness of Visitation
Mother’s third claim is that she was not offered or provided reasonable visitation with A.P. Reasonable visitation is an essential element of reasonable reunification services. (In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 972; In re Luke L. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 670, 679; rule 5.695(f)(4).) She contends that the case plan required five hours of visitation each week, but that—while she had five hours with J.P.I—she had only four hours with A.P. The juvenile court ordered mother to be given five hours of visitation per week with each child. Mother visited her children faithfully. She reasons that because she was not given an additional hour of visitation with A.P. each week, the juvenile court was deprived of the opportunity to know whether reunification services—if implemented as ordered—would have resulted in mother’s reunification with A.P. Mother also complains that the department arranged for visitation with the minors’ grandmother and among the siblings during her own visits, suggesting that these practices diminished her own opportunity for visitation. Finally, she challenges the department’s failure to transition her from supervised visitation to unsupervised visits, or to explain how she might facilitate this transition.
Reunification services need not be perfect to be reasonable. (In re Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 972.) Even if the department could have provided more services, this fact does not necessarily render the services that it did offer unreasonable. (See id. at p. 973.) Nothing about the overlap in visitation among mother, grandmother and siblings tainted the visitation that was provided. The department demonstrated its willingness to accommodate the family when it shifted the visitation schedule to adjust to mother’s changing work schedule. (See, e.g., id. at pp. 972-973.) During supervised visitation, observers found mother’s conversation and conduct sometimes inappropriate, even after the issues were discussed with her. Mother’s failure to acknowledge her substance abuse problem, her failure to obtain counseling and the sometimes chaotic nature of the supervised visits gave the juvenile court sufficient evidence to conclude that the department properly declined to offer mother unsupervised visitation with A.P. and J.P.I. Considering all the circumstances of this case, we find sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that the department offered or provided reasonable visitation to mother and her family. Thus, her claim of insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that the department provided her with reasonable services fails.
III. PROBABILITY OF SAFE RETURN
Mother also contends that the juvenile court erred by failing to offer her continued reunification services because there was a substantial probability that the minors would be returned to her custody within 18 months of their removal. A juvenile court must conduct a permanency hearing at the 12-month hearing. At that time, it must return the child to the parent’s custody unless such a return would create a substantial risk of detriment to the child. A parent’s failure to participate regularly and make substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs is prima facie evidence that return would be detrimental. (§ 366.21, subd. (f).)
At the 12-month hearing, the juvenile court may extend reunification services for a period not to exceed 18 months after the child’s removal if it can be shown that the minor may be may be returned to the parent within the remainder of the 18-month period. In order to extend the reunification period beyond the 12-month period, the juvenile court must find that there is a substantial probability that the child will be returned to the custody of the parent within the extended period. (§§ 361.5, subd. (a)(2), 366.21, subds. (f), (g)(1).) In this matter, mother specifically asked for an additional six months of services. Instead, the juvenile court terminated services, finding that she had made only minimal progress toward meeting the goals of her case plan. It specifically rejected her claim that there was a substantial probability that the minors would be returned to her within an extended reunification period.
In her petition, mother contends that her compliance with the case plan warranted an additional six months of reunification services. In order to find a substantial probability of return within the 18-month period, the juvenile court must make all of three findings. (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1); rule 5.715(c)(3).) We need only consider one of those required findings—that the juvenile court must find that the parent has made significant progress in resolving the problems that led to removal. (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1)(B); rule 5.715(c)(3)(B).) In our case, the juvenile court could not make this finding. Instead, it found that mother had made only minimal—that is, less than significant—progress in this regard. It concluded that mother was only at the early phase of her compliance. At the 12-month hearing, mother had obtained no suitable housing, had engaged in no regular mental health counseling, had failed to acknowledge—much less, address—her substance abuse issues, and had not completed a satisfactory drug test. (See pt. II.A., ante.) The record before us satisfies us that the juvenile court’s finding that there was no substantial probability of return was supported by substantial evidence. As mother cannot establish that she made significant progress in resolving the issues that led to the removal of A.P. and J.P.I from her custody, she has not shown that she is entitled to an additional six months of reunification services. (See § 366.21, subd. (g)(1); rule 5.715(c)(3).)
The petition for writ of mandate is denied on the merits. (§ 366.26, subd. (l); rule 8.452(i); In re Julie S. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 988, 990-991.) The request for a stay of the March 2, 2009 hearing is denied. Our decision is final immediately. (Rule 8.264(b)(3).)
We concur: Sepulveda, J., Rivera, J.
All subsequent references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.