Opinion
2013-02588
08-05-2015
Sahn Ward Coschignano & Baker, PLLC, Uniondale, N.Y. (Christian Browne and Jonathan D. Gottlieb of counsel), for appellants. Bee Ready Fishbein Hatter & Donovan, LLP, Mineola, N.Y. (Thomas V. Pantelis of counsel), for respondents Board of Appeals of the Incorporated Village of Lawrence, Lloyd Keilson, Mark Schreck, Edward Gottlieb, Esther Williams, and Lester Henner. Schneider Mitola LLP, Garden City, N.Y. (Marc H. Schneider and Ryan D. Mitola of counsel), for respondent 284–285 Central Owners Corp.
Sahn Ward Coschignano & Baker, PLLC, Uniondale, N.Y. (Christian Browne and Jonathan D. Gottlieb of counsel), for appellants.
Bee Ready Fishbein Hatter & Donovan, LLP, Mineola, N.Y. (Thomas V. Pantelis of counsel), for respondents Board of Appeals of the Incorporated Village of Lawrence, Lloyd Keilson, Mark Schreck, Edward Gottlieb, Esther Williams, and Lester Henner.
Schneider Mitola LLP, Garden City, N.Y. (Marc H. Schneider and Ryan D. Mitola of counsel), for respondent 284–285 Central Owners Corp.
Opinion
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Board of Appeals of the Incorporated Village of Lawrence dated March 20, 2012, which, after a rehearing, reversed its prior determination dated November 29, 2011, and granted, with stated conditions, an application by the respondent 284–285 Central Owners Corp. for certain area variances, the petitioners appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Brown, J.), dated January 30, 2013, as denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs payable to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
Contrary to the petitioners' contention, the determination of the respondent Board of Appeals of the Incorporated Village of Lawrence (hereinafter the Board) to reverse its first determination denying the subject application for certain area variances and thereupon grant that application, with stated conditions, was rational and not arbitrary and capricious (see Matter of Tersigni v. Village of Lynbrook Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 33 A.D.3d 713, 713, 821 N.Y.S.2d 919 ; Matter of Madonia v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Inc. Vil. of Lindenhurst, 300 A.D.2d 588, 589, 755 N.Y.S.2d 84 ; Matter of Quatraro v. Village of Kenmore Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 277 A.D.2d 1001, 1002, 716 N.Y.S.2d 508 ; Matter of Ireland v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Queensbury, 195 A.D.2d 155, 159, 606 N.Y.S.2d 843 ; see also Matter of Friedman v. Board of Appeals of Vil. of Quogue, 84 A.D.3d 1083, 1084–1085, 923 N.Y.S.2d 651 ). The Board properly engaged in the required balancing test and considered the relevant statutory factors (see Village Law § 7–712–b[3][b] ; Matter of Khan v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Vil. of Irvington, 87 N.Y.2d 344, 351–352, 639 N.Y.S.2d 302, 662 N.E.2d 782 ). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding (see Matter of Levine v. Village of Is. Park Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 95 A.D.3d 1125, 1128, 944 N.Y.S.2d 270 ; see also Matter of Beyond Bldrs., Inc. v. Pigott, 20 A.D.3d 474, 475, 799 N.Y.S.2d 241 ).
CHAMBERS, J.P., HALL, COHEN and MALTESE, JJ., concur.