Assuming that plaintiff were aware of defendant's approach, did "it reasonably [appear] that a prompt crossing could be safely effected if approaching automobiles were lawfully managed and controlled"? Sturtevant v. Ouellette, 126 Me. 558, 562, 140 A. 368, 370. This was a jury question and the jury had to find that plaintiff did effect a safe crossing of that portion of the way which defendant could lawfully occupy. While Sturtevant dealt with a pedestrian upon a "crosswalk" the court in Gosselin v. Collins, 147 Me. 432, 434, 87 A.2d 883, and Lange v. Goulet, 144 Me. 16, 19, 63 A.2d 859, also "crosswalk" cases, make it clear that the Shaw rule of jury judgment applied. On the other hand if negligence be assumed in plaintiff's failure to observe northerly as he crossed the westerly half of Turner Road, the jury may well have concluded that this negligence was not causally connected with his injury. Such conclusion finds support by analogy to Wiles, supra, 143 Me. at p. 259, 60 A.2d 786, and Feely v. Norton, 149 Me. 119, 126, (Feely v. Morton) 99 A.2d 285. The jury could well have determined that the defendant was the sole proximate cause of the collision.
" See also McMann v. Reliable Furniture Co., 153 Me. 383, 140 A.2d 736; Gosselin v. Collins, 147 Me. 432, 87 A.2d 883; Lange v. Goulet, 144 Me. 16, 63 A.2d 859; Dyer v. Ayoob, 134 Me. 502, 187 A. 757; Sturtevant v. Ouellette, 126 Me. 558, 140 A. 368. There are certain other principles useful in determining negligence to be considered in the instant case.
Daughraty v. Tebbets, 122 Me. 397, 120 A. 354, and general rule is that when the testimony is conflicting the verdict will stand. Moulton v. Railway Co., 99 Me. 508, 509, 59 A. 1023; Spany v. Cote, 144 Me. 338, 343; Gosselin v. Collins, 147 Me. 432. Where no exceptions are taken to the charge of the presiding justice, it is presumed that the charge correctly presented to the jury the applicable propositions of law.
The question presented to us is whether the conduct of the plaintiff as disclosed by the record amounted to contributory negligence as a matter of law, or whether the question of the plaintiff's contributory negligence was one of fact for the jury. A majority of the court, upon the authority of Gosselin v. Collins, 147 Me. 432; Day v. Cunningham, 125 Me. 328; Sturtevant v. Ouellette, 126 Me. 558; Wetzler v. Gould, 119 Me. 276; Shaw v. Bolton, 122 Me. 232; Lange v. Goulet, 144 Me. 16; Dyer v. Ayoob, 134 Me. 502; and Wiles v. Connor Coal Wood Co., 143 Me. 250, are of the opinion that on the facts disclosed in the record this was a question of fact for the jury. The requested instructions, as set forth in the bill of exceptions (where not already covered in the charge), are based upon the premise that a pedestrian must, as a matter of law, not only look before starting to cross the street at a crosswalk but "continue his observations while crossing the street."
We are not, of course, a second jury. The principle has been stated and applied recently in Bernstein v. Carmichael, 146 Me. 446, 82 A.2d 786; Gamache v. Cosco, 147 Me. 333, 87 A.2d 509; Gosselin v. Collins, 147 Me. 432, 87 A.2d 883; Crockett v. Staples, 148 Me. 55, 89 A.2d 737. From our examination of the record with the plan and photographs, we are of the view, without going into detail, that the jury could have found substantially the situation herein described.