Opinion
Case No. 2:19-cv-2469-BHH-MGB
10-29-2019
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff Darrell Goss is a state prisoner representing himself and proceeding in forma pauperis. Under Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review the amended complaint and to submit a recommendation to the United States District Judge. For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends the amended complaint be summarily dismissed, in part.
ALLEGATIONS IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
Goss alleges that in May 2018, he entered into a common-law marriage with another state prisoner, Sasha Gaskins. (Dkt. No. 12 at 8.) According to Goss, the South Carolina Department of Corrections has a policy permitting inmates who are common-law married to communicate once they prove their relationship to the Department and get its permission to correspond. (Id.) However, Defendant Morley, a mailroom coordinator, has not allowed Goss and Gaskins to correspond because Gaskins is not on the list of relatives with whom Goss has been approved to communicate. (Id. 8-9.) Morley has not given Goss an opportunity to prove his relationship and has thus violated both Department policy and Plaintiff's First Amendment freedoms of speech, association, and religion. (Id. at 10.) Goss further alleges Morley has denied him the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees of due process and equal protection. (Id. at 10-11.)
Goss makes similar claims against Defendants Doe 1 and Doe 2, classification officials for the Department. He alleges they have ignored and denied his requests to have Gaskins added to his list of people with whom he is permitted to communicate. (Dkt. No. 8 at 11-13.) In so doing, they violated not only Department policy but also the First and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id.)
Next, Goss makes claims against Defendant Doe 3, a Department inmate grievance coordinator. He alleges he grieved the denials of his correspondence-related requests but Doe 3 "wrongfully rejected" his grievances. (Dkt. No. 8 at 13.) Goss asserts the denials violated Department policy as well as the First and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. at 13-15.)
Finally, Goss sues Defendant Britt-Pooser, who works in the Department's "inmate clearing house." (Dkt. No. 8 at 15.) Goss alleges he submitted a request to the Department's chief grievance officer asking to have the grievances Doe 3 denied "re-open[ed] and/or heard." (Id.) Britt-Pooser, however, denied the request and prevented the officer from ever receiving it. (Id.) As with the other defendants, Goss alleges she violated Department policies and the First and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. at 15-17.)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Goss commenced this case in August 2019. (See generally Dkt. No. 1.) When he filed his complaint, he also applied to proceed in forma pauperis. (Dkt. No. 2.) The undersigned granted his application and then conducted an initial review of the complaint. (Dkt. No. 7.) Upon review, the undersigned determined the complaint failed to state any claims for which the Court could grant relief. The undersigned therefore issued an order notifying Goss of her determination, explaining the defects, and providing him an opportunity to cure the defects by submitting an amended complaint. (Id.) Goss then timely submitted the amended complaint now under review. (Dkt. No. 12.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The granting of in forma pauperis status in a case triggers a district court's duty to "sift out claims that Congress found not to warrant extended judicial treatment." Nagy v. FMC Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 256 (4th Cir. 2004). The Court must dismiss any cases that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Those same criteria are grounds for dismissing a case filed by a prisoner. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court "'must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The court need not, however, accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions. Id. When "it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations," Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Because Goss is pro se, the undersigned has screened the complaint liberally and considered whether it includes any potential grounds for relief. See, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). That does not mean, however, the Court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim. Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1088 (1986).
DISCUSSION
Some of Goss's claims against Morley, Doe 1, and Doe 2 should be summarily dismissed because they do not state plausible claims for relief. Additionally, Doe 3 and Britt-Pooser should be summarily dismissed from the case because the allegations Goss has made against them do not constitute valid claims for relief.
A. Morley
The undersigned first addresses Goss's claims against Morley. Goss alleges she improperly has refused to let him correspond with Gaskins and has not given him a chance to prove he and Gaskins are eligible to communicate. (Dkt. No. 12 at 8-11.)
At this juncture, the undersigned does not recommend summary dismissal of Goss's First Amendment claims against Morley, nor does she recommend summary dismissal of his Fourteenth Amendment due-process claim. However, the undersigned does recommend dismissing his equal-protection claim. To state an equal-protection claim, a prisoner must allege facts showing that he was treated differently from similarly situated inmates and that the discrimination was intentional or purposeful. E.g., Deleston v. Rivera, No. 6:11-cv-2968-DCN-KFM, 2011 WL 7040906, at *6 (D.S.C. Dec. 27, 2011) (citing Williams v. Hansen, 326 F.3d 569 (4th Cir. 2003)), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 135416 (D.S.C. Jan. 17, 2012), aff'd, 474 F. App'x 118 (4th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). Goss makes no such allegations. He does not identify any other inmates who were treated differently than him (let alone similarly situated ones), and he does not allege any facts showing deliberate discrimination. All he has alleged is the conclusory assertion that Morley denied him equal protection. That is not enough to state a claim. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (a complaint that offers only "naked assertion[s]" of a claim is not sufficient). Because Goss has failed to allege a facially valid equal-protection claim, the Court should dismiss it. Cf. Fredrickson v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., No. 1:16-cv-1667-BAM (PC), 2017 WL 2930848, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 10, 2017) (finding prisoner failed to state equal-protection claim involving denial of family visitation; among other things, he alleged no disparate treatment).
Goss's original complaint also contained no factual allegations supporting an equal-protection claim. In her prior order, the undersigned notified him that he had made only a conclusory equal-protection claim against Morley. (Dkt. No. 7 at 2.) Thus, Goss has had an opportunity to correct this pleading defect, to no avail.
In his allegations against Morley, Goss also asserts she violated Department policies. (Dkt. No. 12 at 8-11.) It is unclear whether Goss makes that assertion as part of his constitutional claim or instead is asserting it as an additional claim against Morley. To the extent he is asserting a separate claim based on the policy violation, that claim must fail; violations of Department policies cannot, by themselves, create § 1983 liability. E.g., Johnson v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 3:06-2062-CMC, 2007 WL 904826, at *12 (D.S.C. Mar. 21, 2007). Thus, if the Court views the amended complaint as including a separate policy-violation claim, the Court should summarily dismiss it.
B. Doe 1 and Doe 2
According to Goss, he has asked Doe 1 and Doe 2 multiple times to add Gaskins to his list of people with whom he may correspond. (Dkt. No. 12 at 11-13.) Goss alleges those defendants rejected some requests and ignored others. (Id.) As with Morley, the undersigned does not recommend summarily dismissing Goss's First Amendment and due-process claims against Doe 1 or Doe 2. However, she recommends dismissing his equal-protection claims against them because, as with Morley, Goss has not alleged any facts that support such claims. In addition, if the Court reads the amended complaint as making independent claims against Doe 1 and Doe 2 for violating Department policies, the undersigned would recommend dismissing those claims as well.
C. Doe 3 and Britt-Pooser
Finally, Goss asserts claims against Doe 3 and Britt-Pooser relating to their handling of his grievances. (Dkt. No. 12 at 13-17.)
Inmates do not have a constitutionally protected right to a grievance procedure or to access any grievance procedure that a state establishes. Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Consequently, Goss has no claim against Doe 3 for denying his grievances. See, e.g., Roberts v. Lewis, No. 2:17-cv-177-RMG-MGB, 2017 WL 1148594, at *6 (D.S.C. Mar. 3, 2017) ("'Ruling against a prisoner on an administrative complaint does not cause or contribute to [a constitutional] violation.'" (quoting George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007)), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 1134717 (D.S.C. Mar. 24, 2017). Likewise, Goss has no claim against Britt-Pooser for blocking his request for further grievance review. See Cf. Charles v. Nance, 186 F. App'x 494, 495 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (holding alleged failure to investigate a grievance "fails to assert a due process violation"); Roberts, 2017 WL 1148594, at *6 (finding prisoner had no constitutional claim for prison officials ignoring his grievances); Sweat v. Rennick, No. 9:11-cv-2908-JMC-BM, 2012 WL 1358721, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 7, 2012) (recommending dismissal of claim of failure to properly investigate a grievance), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 1358654 (D.S.C. Apr. 19, 2012). Because Goss cannot sue Doe 3 or Britt-Pooser for their handling of his grievances, the undersigned recommends dismissing all of Goss's constitutional claims against them.
In addition, the amended complaint again suggests Goss may be asserting claims against these two defendants for violating Department policies. If the Court agrees with that reading, it should dismiss those claims. See Johnson, 2007 WL 904826, at *12.
In sum, Goss has not stated any valid claims against Doe 3 or Britt-Pooser. Consequently, they should be dismissed from this case.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the undersigned recommends the Court (1) summarily dismiss Goss's equal-protection claims against Morley, Doe 1, and Doe 2; (2) summarily dismiss all claims Goss may be making solely for any defendant's violation of Department policies; and (3) summarily dismiss all claims against Doe 3 and Britt-Pooser and dismiss those defendants from the case.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED. October 29, 2019
Charleston, South Carolina
/s/_________
MARY GORDON BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).