Neither is the requirement that those who wish to solicit such contributions obtain an information card (which is in essence a permit) an unreasonable exercise of the police power of the city. ( Gospel Army v. City of Los Angeles (1945) 27 Cal.2d 232 [ 163 P.2d 704].) (1a) With respect to the issue first raised by the People we note that the petition for the writ was not properly verified.
" (Id., at p. 56 (conc. opn. of Shaw, J., speaking for maj. of court).) We quoted with approval this passage of Dart, in Gospel Army v. City of Los Angeles (1945) 27 Cal.2d 232 [163 P.2d 704] (Gospel Army), a case in which we upheld, under the federal and state Constitutions, a local ordinance regulating charitable solicitors. In Gospel Army, we contrasted the regulation at issue in that case with a legislative measure regulating persons who solicit union membership that had been invalidated in Thomas v. Collins (1945) 323 U.S. 516 [65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430], noting that the court in Thomas "was careful ... to distinguish cases in which the speaker solicits funds from the public: 'Once the speaker goes further, however, and engages in conduct which amounts to more than the right of free discussion comprehends, as when he undertakes the collection of funds or securing subscriptions, he enters a realm where a reasonable registration or identification requirement may be imposed.... . [This would constitute] free speech plus conduct akin to the activities [tha
It sustained the regulations in both instances, filing separate opinions in each case. 27 Cal.2d 232; 28 Cal.2d 460. But the attack upon the city ordinances in the Gospel Army case covered a much wider range than here, and the court's principal opinion was rendered in that cause.
[10] As heretofore pointed out, petitioner Murdock has been subjected to two trials and has successfully prosecuted two appeals from judgments of conviction. We granted a hearing in this matter after petitioners' application for a writ to restrain a third trial was denied by the district court of appeal, and, in order to secure uniformity of decision of related problems, transferred to this court the appeal in Gospel Army v. City ofLos Angeles, 27 Cal.2d 232 [ 163 P.2d 704], in which plaintiff sought to enjoin the enforcement of the same ordinance. We should not under these circumstances, in fairness to petitioner or respondent court, refuse to decide in this proceeding the jurisdictional question involved in the criminal charges, on the ground that there is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy by trial and appeal.
In the aftermath of Schaumberg, supra, 444 U.S. 620, however, it cannot reasonably be argued that any different standard or result would apply to an analysis of the portions of the Cantwell statute dealing with charitable or philanthropic purposes. The proper role of the state in preventing fraudulent solicitations is recognized in Gospel Army v. City of Los Angeles (1945) 27 Cal.2d 232 [ 163 P.2d 704]. The ordinance under review in Gospel Army required prospective solicitors to file with the department of social service a notice of intention which described the nature, purpose, method and estimated expenses of the proposed solicitation, and set forth in detail the solicitor's receipts, expenses and charitable distributions for the previous year.
Under an ever expanding police power, factual situations which at one time or in one locality fall logically within the first group, may just as logically at a later time or in a different locality fall within the second or third classification. (Compare: In re Dart (1916), 172 Cal. 47 [ 155 P. 63] and Gospel Army v. City of Los Angeles (1952), 27 Cal.2d 232 [ 163 P.2d 704]; Los Angeles v. Hollywood Cemetery Assn. (1899), 124 Cal. 344 [57 P. 153] and Odd Fellows' Cemetery Assn. v. San Francisco (1903), 140 Cal. 226 [ 73 P. 987].) Likewise, a business which at one time may have been subject to discretionary regulation may ultimately take on the complexion of an activity which comes within the protective cloak of the First Amendment.
304 [84 L.Ed. at p. 1218]; see also Cox v. New Hampshire (1941) 312 U.S. 569 [85 L.Ed. 1049, 61 S.Ct. 762, 133 A.L.R. 1396].) The state may also reasonably and narrowly regulate solicitations in order to prevent fraud (see, e.g., Gospel Army v. City of Los Angeles (1945) 27 Cal.2d 232 [ 163 P.2d 704]) or to prevent undue harassment of passersby or interference with the business operations being conducted on the property (see, e.g., In re Hoffman (1967) 67 Cal.2d 845, 851-852 [ 64 Cal.Rptr. 97, 434 P.2d 353]).
) See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, supra (1943) 319 U.S. 105, 110; Gospel Army v. City of Los Angeles (1945) 27 Cal.2d 232 [ 163 P.2d 704], appeal dism. 331 U.S. 543 [67 S.Ct. 1428, 91 L.Ed. 1662]; City of Corona v. Corona etc. Independent (1953) 115 Cal.App.2d 382, 390 [ 252 P.2d 56], cert. den. 346 U.S. 833 [74 S.Ct. 2, 98 L.Ed. 356]. Cf. Saia v. New York, supra (1948) 334 U.S. 558, striking down as overbroad an ordinance prohibiting the use of sound amplifiers in public places without permission from the chief of police, where no standards were prescribed for the exercise of that official's discretion.
(4) In this state the following rule applies: "That reasonable regulation of charitable organizations is within a government's police power has long been established; such regulation does not intrude upon the right of free speech. ( Gospel Army v. City of Los Angeles, 27 Cal.2d 232, 245-246 . . ., Matter of Application of Dart, 172 Cal. 47 . . .) `The occupation of soliciting contributions to charitable purposes is clearly so far subject to the police power, that it may be regulated by laws or ordinances providing for a reasonable supervision over the persons engaged therein, and for the application and use of the contributions received to the purposes intended, in order to prevent unscrupulous persons from obtaining money, or other things, under the pretense that they were to be applied to charity, and to prevent the wrongful diversion of such funds to other uses, . . .' ( Matter of Application of Dart, supra, p. 56.)" ( Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 549-550 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 21, 432 P.2d 717]. See also Amer. Mission Army v. City of Lynwood (1956) 138 Cal.App.2d 817, 819-820 [ 292 P.2d 533].
Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board, 329 U.S. 69, distinguished upon the special circumstances appearing in that case as rendering the California Supreme Court's judgment "final" within the meaning of § 237 of the Judicial Code. Pp. 547-548. 3. Although the modern rule is that, in determining whether a state court's remand is for a new trial, this Court will examine both the judgment and the opinion as well as other circumstances that may be pertinent, this does not mean that in the ordinary case this Court will disregard the effect of the judgment under local law. P. 548. 27 Cal.2d 232, 163 P.2d 704, appeal dismissed. An appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court of California, 27 Cal.2d 232, 163 P.2d 704, reversing a judgment of a trial court without direction dismissed for want of jurisdiction under § 237 of the Judicial Code. P. 548.