Opinion
6:23-cv-01119 (DNH/TWD)
11-14-2023
WILLIE THOMAS GOSIER, Plaintiff, v. UTICA POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.
WILLIE THOMAS GOSIER Plaintiff, pro se Oneida County Correctional Facility
WILLIE THOMAS GOSIER Plaintiff, pro se Oneida County Correctional Facility
ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
THERESE WILEY DANCKS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The Clerk has sent to the Court for review a pro se civil rights complaint filed by Willie Thomas Gosier (“Plaintiff”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff, who is presently confined at Oneida County Correctional Facility, seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (Dkt. No. 4.)
On September 5, 2023, Plaintiff's first IFP application was denied and this action was administratively closed. (Dkt. Nos. 2, 3.) The case was reopened on September 18, 2023, upon receipt of the required filing. (Dkt. Nos. 4, 5, 6.)
“28 U.S.C. § 1915 permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in a federal court without prepayment of the filing fee that would ordinarily be charged.” Cash v. Bernstein, No.09-CV-1922, 2010 WL 5185047, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2010). “Although an indigent, incarcerated individual need not prepay the filing fee at the time of filing, he must subsequently pay the fee, to the extent he is able to do so, through periodic withdrawals from his inmate accounts.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) and Harris v. City of New York, 607 F.3d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 2010)).
Section 1915(g) prohibits a prisoner from proceeding IFP where, absent a showing of “imminent danger of serious physical injury,” a prisoner has filed three or more actions that were subsequently dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The Court has reviewed Plaintiff's litigation history on the Federal Judiciary's Public Access to Court Electronic Records (“PACER”) Service. See http://pacer.uspci.uscourts.gov. It does not appear from that review Plaintiff had accumulated three strikes for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) as of the date this action was commenced.
Upon review of Plaintiff's IFP application, the Court finds he has demonstrated sufficient economic need. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). Plaintiff has also filed the inmate authorization form required in this District. (Dkt. No. 5.) Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff's IFP application. (Dkt. No. 4.)
II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE COMPLAINT
A. Standard Of Review
Having found Plaintiff meets the financial criteria for commencing this action IFP, and because Plaintiff seeks relief from an officer or employee of a governmental entity, the Court must consider the sufficiency of the allegations set forth in the complaint in light of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A. Section 1915(e) of Title 28 of the United States Code directs that, when a plaintiff seeks to proceed IFP, “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that - . . . (B) the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Similarly, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a court must review any “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity” and must “identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint . . . is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or . . . seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also Carr v. Dvorin, 171 F.3d 115, 116 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (noting Section 1915A applies to all actions brought by prisoners against government officials even when plaintiff paid the filing fee).
A claim is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (holding that “a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible”); Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[A]n action is ‘frivolous' when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless . . . or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.”).
To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement of the claim must be “plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The statement of the claim must do more than present “an unadorned, the-defendant-harmed-me accusation.” Id. It must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
In determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, “the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994). “[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
Moreover, a court should not dismiss a pro se complaint “without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, an opportunity to amend is not required where “the problem with [the plaintiff's] causes of action is substantive” such that “better pleading will not cure it.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).
B. Summary of the Complaint
The following allegations are taken from the complaint. On June 11, 2023, defendant Officer Janiel Rodriguez, of the Utica Police Department (“UPD”), “pulled over [Plaintiff's] car without probable cause and proceeded to illegally search [his] vehicle.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 9.) Plaintiff claims “all three defendants”-UPD Officer Rodriguez, UPD Officer James Amuso, and UPD Investigator Peter Paladino-“initiated and continued proceeding against me without probable cause.” Id. “Because of this malicious prosecution,” Plaintiff “was arrested and charged with Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance 7th and Aggravated Unlicensed Operation of Motor Vehicle 3rd.” Id. However, “no probable cause supported the traffic stop, [Plaintiff's] arrest, continued confinement, or continued prosecution.” Id.
Page references to documents identified by docket number are to the numbers assigned by the CM/ECF docketing system maintained by the Clerk's Office. Unless otherwise indicated, excerpts from the record are reproduced exactly as they appear in the original and errors in spelling, punctuation, and grammar have not been corrected.
Plaintiff avers he “sustained and suffered damages as a result of this malicious prosecution” including “a deprivation of liberty apart from the initial seizure.” Id. Plaintiff claims “[a]ll three defendants misrepresented material facts from the City of Utica criminal court and Corrections and Community Supervision, to facilitate a forced erroneous conviction against me.” Id. at 10. Plaintiff continues, “[t]his entire criminal proceeding would have been resolved in my favor if my motions and due process wasn't terminated because of the defendants concealed malicious and misconduct.” Id.
Plaintiff then states he has “met all five elements” for his malicious prosecution claim as follows:
(1) All three defendants Janiel Rodriguez, James Amuso, and Peter Paladino have caused me continued confinement and prosecution.
(2) The original action was terminated in favor of my criminal defense.
(3) No probable cause supported my original arrest, continued confinement, or prosecution.
(4) All three defendants acted with malice. A lack of probable cause created an inference of malice by Janiel Rodriguez and James Amuso both UPD officers. Falsifying evidence is sufficient to show malice in front of a jury in USDC, NDNY.
(5) I have sustained damages and Fourth Amendment violation because of the defendants unlawful actions of malicious prosecution without probable cause.Id. at 10. Plaintiff requests “[m]onetary relief from all three defendants in the amount of $450,000 and dismissal of Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance 7th and Aggravated Unlicensed Operation of Motor Vehicle 3rd.” Id. at 4, 11. Plaintiff also seeks “dismissal of charges pending in the City of Utica criminal court.” Id. at 4.
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which establishes a cause of action for “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (internal quotations and citations omitted). To state a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the challenged conduct: (1) was attributable to a person acting under color of state law; and (2) deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Whalen v. Cty. of Fulton, 126 F.3d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1997). To establish liability under the statute, a plaintiff must plead that each government official defendant violated the Constitution through that official's own individual actions. Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 618 (2d Cir. 2020). An official may not be held liable for constitutional violations simply because he held a high position of authority. Victory v. Pataki, 814 F.3d 47, 67 (2d Cir. 2016). “Section 1983 claims against municipal employees sued in their official capacity are treated as claims against the municipality itself.” Ortiz v. Wagstaff, 523 F.Supp.3d 347, 361 (W.D.N.Y. 2021) (internal quotations and citation omitted). A municipality cannot be held liable under Section 1983 unless the challenged action was undertaken pursuant to a municipal policy, custom, or practice. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
A. Malicious Prosecution
Plaintiff's complaint asserts a single cause of action against defendants Rodriguez, Amuso, and Paladino. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.) “To state a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show (1) that the defendant commenced or continued a criminal proceeding against him; (2) that the proceeding was terminated in the plaintiff's favor; (3) that there was no probable cause for the proceeding; and (4) that the proceeding was instituted with malice.” Ramos v. City of New York, No. 1:18-CV-04938 (ALC), 2020 WL 4041448, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2020); see also Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 39 (2022); Marshall v. Randall, 719 F.3d 113, 118-19 (2d Cir. 2013). Relevant here, “[t]o demonstrate a favorable termination of a criminal prosecution for purposes of the Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983 for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff [must] show that his prosecution ended without a conviction.” Thompson, 596 U.S. at 39; see also Spak v. Phillips, 857 F.3d 458, 462 (2d Cir. 2017) (“A ‘favorable termination' does not occur until the prosecution against the plaintiff has ‘conclusively' ended.”).
Construed liberally, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts in support of each element of a malicious prosecution claim, including that the criminal prosecution for “Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance 7th and Aggravated Unlicensed Operation of Motor Vehicle 3rd” “ended without a conviction.” (See Dkt. No. 1; Thompson, 596 U.S. at 39.)
Although the complaint states, “the original action was terminated in favor of my criminal defense,” Plaintiff also claims, “[t]his entire criminal proceeding would [have] been resolved in [his] favor if [his] motions and due process wasn't terminated because of the defendants concealed malicious and misconduct.” (Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff claims “[a]ll three defendants misrepresented material facts from the City of Utica criminal court and Corrections and Community Supervision, to facilitate a forced erroneous conviction against [him],” but Plaintiff has not alleged what material facts were mispresented. Id. at 10. Moreover, Plaintiff seeks “dismissal” of “charges filed against him” (i.e., Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance 7th and Aggravated Unlicensed Operation of Motor Vehicle 3rd). Id. at 11. In short, Plaintiff's malicious prosecution is plead in a wholly conclusory fashion. See Joseph v. JRF Income Tax Bus. Servs., No. 21-CV-3869, 2021 WL 3516421, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2021) (“A complaint that offers nothing more than ‘an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation' or that ‘tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement' is insufficient.”) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
Therefore, the Court recommends dismissal of this claim.
B. False Arrest
To the extent Plaintiff's complaint could be construed as asserting a false arrest claim against defendants Rodriguez, Amuso, and Paladino, the claim does not survive initial review.
“To establish a false arrest or imprisonment claim under either New York State law or section 1983, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff was conscious of his confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.” Albergottie v. New York City, No. 08 CIV. 8331 (SHS), 2011 WL 519296, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2011); see also Arrington v. City of New York, No. 14-CV-3023 (ARR) (VMS), 2014 WL 11350821, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2014). “The existence of probable cause is a complete defense to a Section 1983 claim for false arrest, and constitutes justification for the arrest.” Williams v. Suffolk Cty., 284 F.Supp.3d 275, 284-85 (E.D.N.Y. 2018). Moreover, “[i]f, following the arrest, the plaintiff was convicted of the charges against him, that conviction normally would be conclusive evidence of probable cause.” Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Cameron v. Fogarty, 806 F.2d 380, 387 (2d Cir. 1986).
Here, Plaintiff alleges he “was arrested and charged with” Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance 7th and Aggravated Unlicensed Operation of Motor Vehicle 3rd and “no probable cause supported the traffic stop, [Plaintiff's] arrest, continued confinement, or continued prosecution.” Id. However, as noted above, Plaintiff also alleges an “erroneous conviction” and seeks dismissal of those charges.
Thus, the complaint fails to state a claim for false arrest.
C. Heck v. Humphrey
As a separate matter, Plaintiff's claims may be barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Civil lawsuits may not be used to collaterally attack criminal convictions. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a section 1983 action seeking damages is not cognizable if a decision in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily invalidate a criminal conviction unless the conviction or sentence had been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by a federal habeas court. Id. at 486-87. See Perry v. City of Albany, No. 8:20-CV-165 (GTS/DJS), 2020 WL 3405636, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. May 6, 2020) (“[c]laims of false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and fabrication of evidence are generally viewed as barred by the rule in Heck.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 3403080 (N.D.N.Y. June 19, 2020); see also Duamutef v. Morris, 956 F.Supp. 1112, 1115-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (dismissing § 1983 claims of malicious prosecution, false arrest, perjury, retaliation, and civil rights conspiracy under Heck where the plaintiff's underlying conviction had not been overturned); Rivera v. City of Yonkers, 470 F.Supp.2d 402, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (dismissing plaintiff's false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims as barred under Heck).
Additionally, insofar as Plaintiff seeks to have this Court intervene in a state court criminal proceeding, this Court must abstain. See, e.g., Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 70, 73 (2013).
D. Utica Police Department
Plaintiff lists the Utica Police Department as a defendant in the caption of the complaint. It is well established that “[a] police department is an administrative arm of [a] municipal corporation,” and “cannot sue or be sued because it does not exist separate and apart from the municipality and does not have its own legal identity.” Baker v. Willett, 42 F.Supp.2d 192, 198 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (citations omitted); see Hester-Bey v. Police Dep't, No. 12-CV-3320, 2012 WL 4447383, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2012) (explaining that “Section 1983 provides that an action may only be maintained against a ‘person' who has deprived another of rights under the ‘Constitution and Laws,' and holding that, because “[t]he New York City Police Department is not a ‘person' within the meaning of section 1983 [it] is therefore[ ] not a suable entity.” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983)). Thus, the Utica Police Department is not a proper defendant for Plaintiff's section 1983 claims.
Further, to the extent plaintiff intended to bring his claims against the City of Utica, of which the Utica Police Department “is an administrative arm,” he has failed to plead such a claim. To prevail on a § 1983 claim against a municipal entity, a plaintiff must show: “(1) actions taken under color of law; (2) deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; (3) causation; (4) damages; and (5) that an official policy of the municipality caused the constitutional injury.” Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 2008). Thus, “a municipality can be held liable under Section 1983 if the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights under federal law is caused by a governmental custom, policy, or usage of the municipality.” Jones v. Town of E. Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012). “The Supreme Court has made clear that ‘a municipality cannot be made liable' under § 1983 for acts of its employees ‘by application of the doctrine of respondeat superior.'” Roe, 542 F.3d at 36 (citing Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478 (1986)).
As set forth above, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right. Additionally, Plaintiff does not allege, and nothing in his complaint suggests, that any of the allegedly wrongful acts or omissions on the part of any City employee are attributable to a municipal policy or custom. See, e.g., Cotto v. City of New York, 803 Fed.Appx. 500, 504 (2d Cir. 2020) (“Cotto's allegations do not support a Monell claim because they focus on the individual officers and isolated events leading to Cotto's stop, detention, and prosecution without plausibly alleging a custom or policy pursuant to which those violations occurred.”) Thus, Plaintiff has not made a showing, in his pleadings, sufficient to impose Monell liability on the City of Utica. See Hayward v. City of New York, No. 12-CV-3220 ENV, 2012 WL 3580286, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2012).
E. Leave to Amend
In this case, it is not clear whether better pleading would permit Plaintiff to cure the deficiencies identified above. In light of his pro se status, the Court recommends granting Plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended complaint if he desires to proceed with this action. Any such amended complaint, which shall supersede and replace in its entirety the previous complaint filed by Plaintiff, must contain a caption that clearly identifies, by name, each individual Plaintiff is suing in the present lawsuit and must bear the case number assigned to this action. The body of Plaintiff's amended complaint must contain sequentially numbered paragraphs containing only one act of misconduct per paragraph. Thus, if Plaintiff claims that his civil and/or constitutional rights were violated by more than one defendant, or on more than one occasion, he should include a corresponding number of paragraphs in his amended complaint for each such allegation, with each paragraph specifying (i) the alleged act of misconduct; (ii) the date on which such misconduct occurred; (iii) the names of each and every individual who participated in such misconduct; (iv) where appropriate, the location where the alleged misconduct occurred; and, (v) the nexus between such misconduct and Plaintiff's civil and/or constitutional rights. In addition, Plaintiff should include facts regarding the status or ultimate disposition of his criminal case.
IV. CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, for these reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff's IFP application (Dkt. No. 4) is GRANTED, and it is further RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; and it is further
Plaintiff is advised that although he has been granted IFP status, he will still be required to pay the $350 filing fee for this action, overtime, along with any other costs he may incur, including copying and/or witness fees.
RECOMMENDED that Utica Police Department be TERMINATED as a defendant; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk serve a copy of this Order and Report-Recommendation on Plaintiff, along with a copy of the unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with the Second Circuit's decision in Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW . Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, 6(a).
If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order and Report-Recommendation by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the Order and Report-Recommendation was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a)(1)(C).
IT IS SO ORDERED.