Gore v. Chapman

5 Citing cases

  1. State v. Bomar

    210 Tenn. 249 (Tenn. 1962)   Cited 11 times

    There the last sentence of paragraph 39 is that, — "Thus, it is not within the court's power to extend the age limit of the statute even under the rule of liberal construction." In the Florida case of Gore v. Chapman, 143 Fla. 438, 196 So. 840, 841 (a case not on all fours in every respect with the case at bar) the court in the closing section of its opinion makes this observation: Juvenile Courts "assume supervision of infants, but it would be absurd to argue that such power invoked in infancy would continue after majority had been reached."

  2. Cesaire v. State

    811 So. 2d 816 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 16 times
    Holding that "any action taken by the juvenile court after petitioner's nineteenth birthday was void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction"

    [4-6] Jurisdiction of the juvenile court is limited to that mandated by statute. See Gore v. Chapman, 143 Fla. 438, 196 So. 840, 841 (1940). The statute provides that "[t]he circuit court has exclusive original jurisdiction of proceedings in which a child is alleged to have committed a delinquent act or violation of law."

  3. L.Y. v. Dep. of Health Rehab. Serv

    696 So. 2d 430 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 4 times

    Nor do sections 39.41(2)(a)10 and 39.45, Florida Statutes, change our view. Section 39.01(10), Florida Statutes, defines children as individuals under the age of 18. See also Gore v. Chapman, 196 So. 840 (Fla. 1940); Simms v. State, Dep't of Health Rehabilitative Servs., 641 So.2d 957 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 649 So.2d 870 (Fla. 1994). Thus, we affirm, albeit without prejudice to L.Y.'s seeking appointment of a guardian pursuant to chapter 744, Florida Statutes, if there is some incapacity which could be shown.

  4. C.L.D. v. Beauchamp

    464 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 5 times
    Holding that juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to find a juvenile in contempt for failure to pay restitution once the juvenile turned nineteen

    [W]hen the jurisdiction of any child who is alleged to have committed a delinquent act is obtained, the court shall retain jurisdiction, unless relinquished by its order, until the child reaches 19 years of age. In Gore v. Chapman, 196 So. 840, 143 Fla. 438 (1940), the Florida Supreme Court held that, as the juvenile court was created by statute, its jurisdiction is limited to that mandated by the statute. Respondent argues that the court's jurisdiction to issue and determine the rule to show cause is not contingent on the court's ability to extend its jurisdiction.

  5. In Interest of J.N

    279 So. 2d 50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973)

    It appears that the authority of the juvenile court on the one hand and the Division of Youth Services on the other was solely derived from statutes. See Gore v. Chapman, Fla. 1940, 196 So. 840. The problem before this Court must, therefore, be resolved by reference to the pertinent statutes dealing with two agencies of government. Section 39.11(2)(b), F.S. 1971, F.S.A., was the source of the juvenile court's authority to deal with J.N. after he had been adjudicated to be a delinquent child.