Opinion
C.A. No.: 02M-03-002-FSS
July 26, 2002
ORDER
On March 1, 2002 Petitioner, a sentenced inmate appearing pro se, filed a handwritten petition for writ of mandamus. He protests that the Department of Correction took away his earned good time credit. Petitioner also complains that he is entitled to credit for the time he spent on parole, before his parole was revoked due to his criminal misconduct and other parole violations.
On April 12, 2002 the Attorney General filed a motion to dismiss. The Attorney General argues that "Delaware courts lack jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus to a non-judicial public official or to a private person." Substantively, the Attorney General argues that the Board of Parole has authority under 11 Del. C. § 4352 to revoke good time credits. Because Goodwyn's legal position is wrong, the court will not analyze its jurisdiction closely.
In passing, the court observes that the Attorney General relies on In Re Hitchens, and two unreported cases for the proposition that this court lacks jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus to the Board of Parole. The authorities on which the Attorney General relies do not concern the jurisdiction of, to use the Attorney General's exact phrase, "Delaware courts." Actually, they merely address the Supreme Court of Delaware's original jurisdiction under Article IV, Section 11( 6) of the Delaware Constitution. The Superior Court's jurisdiction, which is established in Section 7 of Article IV, is much broader than the Supreme Court's. The court now will assume without deciding that if the Board fails to perform a non-discretionary function, the Superior Court, by issuing a writ of mandamus to the Board, can order it to do its duty. In other words, the court assumes without deciding that it has jurisdiction to issue an extraordinary writ, including a writ of mandamus, to an administrative body such as the Board of Parole.
In Re Hitchens, 600 A.2d 37, 38 (Del. 1991).
Compare Moore v. State, 171 A.2d 215 (Del.Super. 1961). ("Superior Court is given no statutory jurisdiction to review findings of the Paro le Board.")
The cases attached to the Attorney General's Motion to Dismiss do not jibe with the Motion's text. The Respondents rely on Smith v. Williams in 2001 WL 819583 (Del.Supr.), but they attached an interim order, 2001 WL 292608 (Del.Supr.), to their motion.
The above notwithstanding, the court declines to issue a writ here because the Board of Parole is authorized to forfeit good time after a parolee commits a criminal offense, and so can the Department of Correction. Thus, it appears that the decision to revoke Petitioner's good time was lawful.
11 Del. C. § 4352 AND 4382. 11 Del. C. § 4382(a) provides: "Any person subject to the custody of the Department of Correction at Level IV or V shall, upon conviction of any crime during the term of the sentence, shall forfeit all good time accumulated to the date of the criminal act; their forfeiture is not subject to suspension." See also, Smith v. Williams, Del. Supr., No. 49 3, 20 00, Per Curium, (July 10, 2001) (ORDER). Compare State v. Clyne, Del. Super., C.A. No. 02M-02-087, Slights, J. (July 22, 2002).
Petitioner's reliance on Nardini v. Willin, and Murray v. Messick, is misplaced. Petitioner's problem is not that he is being "re-cycled," like he claims. Nor is Department of Correction miscalculating Petitioner's earned good time. The Board of Parole has forfeited Petitioner's good time, for cause. Even the prisoner in Nardini "[did] not contest the Department's right to forfeit previously allowed good time for parol violations . . . ."
245 A.2d 16 4 (Del.Super. 1968).
Del. Super., C.A. No. 94M-08-002, Graves, J. (Feb. 23, 19 95).
245 A.2d at 165.
Taking Nardini, Murray, and 11 Del. C. § 4352 and 4382 into account, Petitioner has a right to have his good time calculated properly. But Department of Correction has authority to forfeit earned good time for established parole violations.
For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for Writ of Mandamus, on its face, fails to state a claim justifying relief and Respondents' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. The Petition is DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.