Opinion
Case No. 21-cv-07251-JSC
2022-04-06
Austin GOODWIN, Plaintiff, v. MARIN COUNTY TRANSIT DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.
Irene Karbelashvili, Irakli Karbelashvili, AllAccess Law Group, Santa Clara, CA, for Plaintiff. Jeffrey N. Brown, Thompson Coburn LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant Marin County Transit District. Kyle L. Schriner, Esq., Schriner Law Firm, PC, Berkeley, CA, for Defendant Marin Airporter.
Irene Karbelashvili, Irakli Karbelashvili, AllAccess Law Group, Santa Clara, CA, for Plaintiff. Jeffrey N. Brown, Thompson Coburn LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant Marin County Transit District. Kyle L. Schriner, Esq., Schriner Law Firm, PC, Berkeley, CA, for Defendant Marin Airporter.
ORDER RE: MARIN COUNTY TRANSIT DISTRICT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
Re: Dkt. No. 19 JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY, United States District Judge
Austin Goodwin brings this civil action under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), the California Disabled Persons Act, and the Unruh Civil Rights Act. Plaintiff alleges Marin County Transit District ("Marin Transit") and Marin Airporter bus operators violate the law by insisting that he provide documentation for his service dog before he is allowed to board the bus. (Dkt. No. 14.) Marin Transit's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's first amended complaint is pending before the Court. (Dkt. No. 19-1.) After considering the parties' briefs, and having had the benefit of oral argument on March 31, 2022, the Court DENIES Marin Transit's motion to dismiss.
Record citations are to material in the Electronic Case File ("ECF"); pinpoint citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of the documents.
BACKGROUND
A. First Amended Complaint Allegations
Plaintiff is an individual with post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD") who relies on his service dog, Kita, to access public accommodations and government facilities. (First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), Dkt. No. 14 ¶ 1.) Since October 15, 2020, Kita has been a qualified "service animal" trained to perform grounding techniques to help Plaintiff manage his PTSD. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 12.) Marin Transit is a special district of the state of California responsible for finance, planning, and management of public transit services operating within Marin County. (Id. ¶ 2.) Marin Transit provides a total of 29 fixed route transit services within Marin County. (Id.) Marin Airporter is a for-profit transportation company that Marin Transit contracts with to provide transportation services in Marin County. (Id. ¶ 3.)
Since April 2020, Plaintiff has taken buses operated by both Defendants about two to three times per week. (Id. ¶ 13.) Around 30 percent of the time that he rides these buses, the bus operators insist that Kita is a pet and request Plaintiff provide documentation that Kita is a service animal. (Id.) Plaintiff describes four examples where bus operators requested Plaintiff's service animal documentation. (Id. ¶¶ 14-17.)
First, on January 26, 2021, Plaintiff attempted to board Marin Transit 49 bus #508 with Kita when the bus operator refused to leave the bus stop unless Plaintiff produced documentation showing his dog was a qualified service animal. (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff informed the bus operator he was not required to produce documentation and the only questions the bus operator was allowed to ask were (1) whether the dog is a service animal required because of a disability, and (2) what work or task the dog has been trained to perform. (Id.) After a 10-minute delay, the bus operator proceeded to drive the bus to the next location. (Id.) On February 8, 2021, Plaintiff timely filed a tort claim with Marin Transit arising out of this incident. (Id. ¶ 8.) Marin Transit rejected this claim on March 22, 2021. (Id.)
Second, on March 17, 2021, Plaintiff attempted to board Marin Transit 49 bus #1510 with Kita when the bus operator told Plaintiff he was not allowed on the bus with his dog. (Id. ¶ 15.) When Plaintiff informed the bus operator his dog was a registered service animal, the bus operator demanded Plaintiff produce documentation establishing the dog as a service animal. (Id.) Plaintiff stated he did not have documentation, to which the bus operator responded, "how am I supposed to know that she is a real service dog[?]" (Id.) After Plaintiff explicitly told the bus operator his dog was trained to keep him calm and was required for his disability, the bus operator allowed Plaintiff to board the bus with Kita. (Id.) On March 17, 2021, Plaintiff filed a tort claim with Marin Transit arising from this incident. (Id. ¶ 9.) Marin Transit rejected this claim on March 23, 2021. (Id.)
Third, on March 27, 2021, Plaintiff attempted to board a Marin Transit 245 southbound bus with Kita when the bus operator insisted Plaintiff provide documentation for his service dog. (Id. ¶ 16.) After Plaintiff advised the bus operator he was not required to produce paperwork for his service dog, the bus operator allowed Plaintiff to board the bus. (Id.) On April 7, 2021, Plaintiff filed a tort claim with Marin Transit arising from this incident. (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff filed an amended tort claim with Marin Transit on April 14, 2021, and Marin Transit rejected the amended claim on May 3, 2021. (Id.)
Lastly, on September 28, 2021, Plaintiff attempted to board a Marin Transit 49 northbound bus with Kita when the bus operator asked whether Kita was a service dog, whether the Plaintiff had papers, and whether Plaintiff was going to board the bus without papers. (Id. ¶ 17.) When Plaintiff informed the bus operator he did not have papers but still planned to board the bus, the bus operator allowed him to board. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a tort claim with Marin Transit arising from this incident on October 20, 2021. (Id. ¶ 11.) Marin Transit rejected the claim on December 3, 2021. (Id.)
Plaintiff complained to Marin Transit regarding the bus operators' requests for Kita's documentation as a service animal, however, his complaints have not stopped these requests. (Id. ¶ 18.) Marin Transit has failed to implement and enforce policies and procedures as required by the ADA and California law related to service animals. (Id. ¶ 19.)
B. Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on September 17, 2021. (Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff alleged three claims: (1) violation of Title II of the ADA; (2) violation of California Civil Code Sections 54, 54.1, and 54.3, et seq. (The California Disabled Persons Act, ("CDPA")), and (3) violation of California Civil Code Section 51, et seq. (The Unruh Civil Rights Act). (Id. at 4, 6, 8.)
On December 15, 2021, Marin Transit filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 12.) Plaintiff subsequently filed the now operative First Amended Complaint ("FAC"). (Dkt. No. 14.) In his FAC, Plaintiff elaborates on his factual allegations and adds a Title III ADA claim against Marin Airporter, a for-profit transportation company that provides transportation services in Marin County. (Id. ¶ 3.)
LEGAL STANDARD
A complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Plausibility is not equivalent to probability, however, it requires "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 687, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Therefore, a complaint must provide a defendant with fair notice of the claims against it and the grounds for relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). When reviewing a motion to dismiss, courts accept factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). However, "the tenet that a court must accept a complaint's allegations as true is inapplicable to threadbare recitals of a cause of action's elements, supported by mere conclusory statements." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
DISCUSSION
Marin Transit moves to dismiss Plaintiff's FAC pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). First, Marin Transit argues Plaintiff's allegations do not constitute discrimination under the ADA because (1) asking for documentation for a service animal does not violate the ADA, and (2) even if the ADA prohibited asking for documentation, Plaintiff only alleges a few "isolated instances" and perfection is not required to avoid ADA liability. Second, Marin Transit argues Plaintiff fails to allege intentional discrimination by Marin Transit's officials because bus operators do not qualify as officials for purposes of establishing deliberate indifference under the ADA. Third, because Plaintiff's ADA claim fails, Marin Transit contends Plaintiff's CDPA and Unruh Act claims must fail as well. Finally, Marin Transit insists that any state law claims for damages are limited to the four specific tort claims Plaintiff filed and any other claims are barred by the California Tort Claims Act ("CTCA").
I. Title II of the ADA
Plaintiff alleges Marin Transit violates Title II of the ADA by failing to implement policies and procedures that would prevent discrimination against passengers with disabilities. (FAC ¶ 24.) To prove that a public service violated Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show: (1) he is a "qualified individual with a disability"; (2) he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity's services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability. Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135 (9th Cir. 2001).
There is no dispute Plaintiff pleads sufficient facts to establish that he has PTSD and is therefore a "qualified individual with a disability." Instead, Marin Transit argues that Plaintiff was not "excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity's services" because (1) he was able to board the bus with his service dog, and (2) he was only asked for Kita's documentation on four occasions.
A. Asking for Documentation as an ADA Violation
Marin Transit argues as a threshold matter that a bus driver does not violate the ADA by asking a passenger if he has documentation showing that his dog is a service animal. The Court is not persuaded.
The ADA's prohibition against discrimination "is universally understood as a requirement to provide 'meaningful access.' " Lonberg v. City of Riverside, 571 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir. 2009). A plaintiff may establish a denial of "meaningful access" by showing there was a violation of a relevant implementing regulation if such violation denied the plaintiff meaningful access to a public benefit. A.G. v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 69, 815 F.3d 1195, 1204 (9th Cir. 2016); see also K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088, 1102 (9th Cir. 2013) ("[I]n considering Title II's "meaningful access" requirement, we are guided by the relevant regulations interpreting Title II.").
Congress gave the Secretary of Transportation authority to promulgate regulations to enforce Title II of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12149(b). The regulations include a rule that public and private entities on fixed route systems shall permit service animals to accompany individuals with disabilities in vehicles and facilities. 49 C.F.R. § 37.167(d); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12143(a) (deeming it discriminatory under the ADA for a public entity operating a fixed-route system to provide disabled individuals with services which are inferior to those provided to the nondisabled). Service animals include "any guide dog, signal dog, or other animal individually trained to work or perform tasks for an individual with a disability." 49 C.F.R. § 37.3.
While the regulations permitting service animals in vehicles and facilities do not themselves address documentation, Federal Transit Administration Circular 4710.1 ("the Circular") provides guidance on various ADA provisions and the United States Department of Transportation's ("DOT") implementing regulations at 49 C.F.R. Parts 27, 37, 38, and 39. (Dkt. No. 23 at 2; Dkt. No. 23-1 at 2.) Section 2.6 of the Circular, which interprets the service animal regulations at 49 C.F.R. Section 37.167(d), provides:
Transit agencies cannot have a policy requiring riders to provide documentation for their service animal before boarding a bus or train or entering a facility, but personnel may ask riders two questions: (1) is the animal a service animal required because of a disability? and (2) what work or task has the animal been trained to perform?(Dkt. No. 23-1 at 12.) Thus, the Circular specifically prohibits a policy that requires asking for service animal documentation.
The Court GRANTS Plaintiff's request to take judicial notice of the Circular. See, e.g., Lowthorp v. Mesa Air Grp. Inc., No. CV-20-00648-PHX-MTL, 2021 WL 3089118, at *5 (D. Ariz. July 22, 2021) (taking judicial notice of a DOT bulletin); Veliz v. Cintas Corp., No. C 03-1180 RS, 2009 WL 1107702, at *3 n.2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2009) (taking judicial notice of various DOT publications and notices).
Because the DOT created the Circular to interpret the DOT's own regulations, it is controlling unless "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461, 117 S.Ct. 905, 137 L.Ed.2d 79 (1997); see also Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565-66, 100 S.Ct. 790, 63 L.Ed.2d 22 (1980) (holding that an agency's construction of its own regulations should be dispositive "[u]nless demonstrably irrational"); Kohler v. Presidio Int'l, Inc., 782 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that the Department of Justice's interpretation of the ADA Accessibility Guidelines was "entitled to substantial deference" and "will be disregarded only if plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation."). Marin Transit's insistence in a footnote that deference should not be granted to the Circular because it states in Section 2.1 that it "does not alter, amend, supersede, or otherwise affect the DOT ADA regulations themselves", FTA Circular 4710.1, Ch. 2.1 (2015), is unpersuasive. The case upon which Marin Transit relies, Boose v. Tri-County Metropolitan District of Oregon, 587 F.3d 997, 1005 (9th Cir. 2009), held that the agency letter was not entitled to deference because its interpretation of the regulation at issue was "plainly erroneous." Here, in contrast, Marin Transit has not established that the Circular conflicts with the DOT ADA regulations and is therefore "plainly erroneous"; instead, the Circular gives specificity to the statutory scheme the Secretary of Transportation was charged with enforcing. See Fortyune v. City of Lomita, 766 F.3d 1098, 1104 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding the Department of Justice's Technical Assistance Manual and its interpretation of a Title II implementing regulation was entitled to Auer deference because it was not "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.").
Further, far from being "plainly erroneous," the DOT's guidance is consistent with the Department of Justice's implementing regulations for Title III which prohibit certain "inquiries" regarding service animals. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(c)(6) ("A public accommodation . . . may make two inquiries to determine whether an animal qualifies as a service animal. A public accommodation may ask if the animal is required because of a disability and what work or task the animal has been trained to perform."); see also Hurley v. Loma Linda Univ. Med. Ctr., No. CV12-5688 DSF OPX, 2014 WL 580202, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2014) (noting hospital employee's request for plaintiff's service animal documentation two to three times violated Title III of the ADA even though plaintiff was removed from the hospital for unrelated reasons).
Marin Transit's reliance on Bottila v. City of Madison, No. 08-0433-SLC, 2008 WL 4163180, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 3, 2008) is misplaced. Bottila is not persuasive because it fails to consider any DOT regulations in its analysis and precedes the Circular, which was published on November 4, 2015.
Finally, Marin Transit argues that the Circular prohibits a transit agency from adopting a policy requiring documentation for service animals and that because Plaintiff does not allege the existence of such a policy, he cannot state an ADA claim based on the Circular. Drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor, he has sufficiently alleged such a policy. DOT regulations provide that public or private entities operating a fixed route system shall ensure that personnel are trained so they operate vehicles safely and properly assist and treat individuals with disabilities who use the service in a respectful and courteous way, with appropriate attention to the difference among individuals with disabilities. 49 C.F.R. § 37.173 (emphasis added). Plaintiff's allegation that bus drivers ask him for documentation 30 percent of the time he rides Marin Transit buses (FAC ¶ 13), coupled with Marin Transit's obligation to train its drivers to properly assist disabled riders, support a plausible inference that Marin Transit failed to train its bus operators not to ask for documentation and therefore had a policy that allowed operators to improperly demand documentation.
B. Denial of Meaningful Access
Next, Marin Transit argues that even if the bus operators should not have asked for documentation, Plaintiff was not denied meaningful access to Marin Transit buses because perfection is not required to avoid ADA liability. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 304, 105 S.Ct. 712, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985) ("Meaningful access" does not guarantee "equal results" for the disabled); see also Segal v. Metro. Council, 29 F.4th 399, 404-05 (8th Cir. 2022) (rejecting the plaintiff's argument that a violation of DOT regulations amounts to a per se ADA violation). Indeed, the DOT has noted that rather than prosecuting every violation of its regulations, it prioritizes administrative enforcement based on "failures to comply with basic requirements and 'pattern or practice' kinds of problems, rather than on isolated operational errors." 49 C.F.R. Pt. 37, App. D.
Citing Midgett v. Tri-County Metropolitan District of Oregon, 254 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2001), Marin Transit argues that Plaintiff's allegations of only four instances of a bus operator asking for documentation are insufficient as a matter of law to constitute a denial of meaningful access. In Midgett, the Ninth Circuit held the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the plaintiff's request for a permanent injunction where the plaintiff's evidence merely established several frustrating, but isolated, instances of malfunctioning lift service when taking the bus. Id. The court noted that, under the regulations, occasional problems do not establish a violation of the ADA and at most, the evidence showed past violations of the ADA. Id.
Marin Transit's reliance on Midgett is misplaced. First, it was decided on summary judgment in the context of a request for a permanent injunction and not on a 12(b)(6) motion when all reasonable inferences from the allegations must be drawn in the plaintiff's favor. Second, Marin Transit's argument assumes that bus operators asked Plaintiff for documentation on only four occasions. The FAC alleges, however, that Plaintiff takes a Marin Transit bus around two to three times a week and that the operators ask him for documentation 30 percent of the time. (FAC ¶ 13.) Drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that being asked for documentation 30 percent of the time is isolated and nonactionable. See Askins v. Metro. Transit Auth., No. 1:19-cv-4927-GHW, 2020 WL 1082423, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2020) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss where the allegations went "far beyond conclusory allegations" and plaintiff alleged eight instances with dates, times, and locations where bus drivers impaired plaintiff's ability to board); see also Reidy v. Cent. Puget Sound Transit Reg'l Auth., No. C13-536 RSL, 2014 WL 7340373, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 22, 2014) (distinguishing case from Midgett and rejecting defendant's argument that plaintiff still has "meaningful access" when they successfully board another bus because the occasional harms in Midgett were in the process of being remedied and repetition of the harms to the plaintiff in that case were inevitable).
Marin Transit's insistence that Plaintiff's specific allegations of only four instances of being asked for documentation should control over the unsupported allegation of a 30 percent rate of documentation requests is unsupported by relevant law. The case upon which Marin Transit relies, United States v. Parada-Banos, No. CR-12-0635-EMC, 2013 WL 3187404, at *15 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2013), held that an allegation that a "significant percentage" of police were in collusion with gangs was vague and conclusory because there was no indication what a "significant percentage" would constitute nor were any direct observations provided. Here, in contrast, Plaintiff alleges four specific examples with dates, times, and route numbers where bus operators asked for Plaintiff's service animal documentation and specifically alleges this type of conduct occurred "30 percent of the time." (FAC ¶¶ 13-17.)
The other cases cited by Marin Transit are distinguishable as each involved an allegation of a single, isolated incident. See, e.g., Barich v. City of Cotati, No. 21-cv-00034-EMC, 2021 WL 1197089, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2021) (dismissing ADA claim predicated on an isolated failure of hearing-assistance devices during a single City Council meeting); Hartman v. Costa Verde Ctr., No. 16cv0956 JM, 2016 WL 7178964, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2016) (dismissing claim of a single alleged malfunction of a bus lift); Lee v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Auth., No. 5:15-cv-05338-HRL, 2016 WL 6427880, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2016) (dismissing claim of an isolated instance where a bus operator improperly deployed a wheelchair ramp). Here, Plaintiff alleges bus operators ask for documentation 30 percent of the time and he alleges specifics for four of those instances. Given Plaintiff's allegations of repeated violations, Midgett's rationale does not apply at this stage of the litigation.
II. Damages under Title II of the ADA
Plaintiff also seeks damages pursuant to Title II of the ADA with regard to his denial of access. (FAC ¶ 29.) In an action for monetary relief under Title II, a plaintiff must additionally allege intentional discrimination by the defendant. Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1138. Intentional discrimination under the ADA means "that the deliberate indifference standard applies." Id. "Deliberate indifference requires both knowledge that a harm to a federally protected right is substantially likely, and a failure to act upon that [ ] likelihood." Id. at 1139. "When the plaintiff has alerted the public entity to his need for accommodation, the public entity is on notice that an accommodation is required, and the plaintiff has satisfied the first element of the deliberate indifference test." Id. Regarding the second element of the test, "a failure to act must be a result of conduct that is more than negligent and involves an element of deliberateness." Id.
Here, Plaintiff alleges that he complained to Marin Transit regarding the bus operators' inquiries, and he also filed tort claims with Marin Transit following each of the alleged instances, which Marin Transit rejected. (FAC ¶¶ 8-11, 18.) Plaintiff further alleges that despite his complaints, he continues to receive inquiries from bus operators regarding Kita's service animal status. (Id. ¶ 18.) Marin Transit insists that these allegations are insufficient as a matter of law because (1) bus drivers are not qualifying officials for purposes of establishing deliberate indifference under the ADA, and (2) prior complaints to Marin Transit are likewise insufficient. The Court is unpersuaded.
First, while bus drivers are not qualifying officials for purposes of establishing deliberate indifference under the ADA, Plaintiff alleges he filed complaints directly with Marin Transit regarding the actions of the bus operators in addition to complaining to the individual bus drivers. Marin Transit's reliance on cases involving complaints to bus drivers only is therefore misplaced. See, e.g., Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123, 1135 (11th Cir. 2019) (holding bus drivers were not officials because they did not play a "key decision point in the administrative process"); Romero v. Los Angeles Cnty. Metro. Transit Auth., No. CV 14-3456 DSF (AGRx), 2015 WL 13917099, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 2015) ("It is likely that Plaintiffs' wheelchair-bound status placed the individual bus operators on notice for their need for specific accommodations, but this is far from sufficient to establish that . . . a municipal entity, knowingly failed to provide Plaintiffs with a required accommodation."). Here, in contrast, Plaintiff alleges that despite complaining to Marin Transit and filing tort claims after four instances where bus operators requested his service animal documentation, the bus operators are continuing to discriminate against Plaintiff. (FAC ¶ 18.)
Second, Marin Transit's reliance on Ferguson v. City of Phoenix for its argument that prior complaints, standing alone, do not establish "deliberate indifference" is likewise misplaced. 157 F.3d 668, 675 (9th Cir. 1998). Ferguson was decided on summary judgment and addressed the sufficiency of the evidence. Based on the evidentiary record, the Ninth Circuit noted that complaints about the defendant's 9-1-1 problems were only sporadic and little different from what other municipalities experience when improvements are made to an emergency system benefiting the public. Id. The court further indicated that there was nothing to suggest that the defendant received numerous and repeated complaints to which it did not respond and, indeed, there was evidence that a follow-up was always done following a complaint to defendant such that there was nothing to suggest deliberate indifference on the part of the defendant. Id. Again, here, in contrast, Plaintiff alleges he made multiple complaints to Marin Transit and he filed four tort claims that were each rejected. (FAC ¶¶ 8-11.) There are no allegations that Marin Transit followed-up with Plaintiff and Plaintiff alleges that bus operators continue to request service animal documentation.
Henning v. County of Santa Clara, No. 15-cv-05171 NC, 2017 WL 1036729, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2017), is more analogous to this case. There the court found that because the plaintiff specifically complained about his difficulty with his phone, and because the defendant was therefore on notice of plaintiff's issue and opted to close the case, the plaintiff met both elements of the deliberate indifference test. Id. The court noted that based on the language defendant used to close the plaintiff's complaint, the court could not guess whether the defendant simply opted not to do anything about the plaintiff's complaint or accommodate his needs and summary judgment on this issue was therefore precluded. Id. Here, as in Henning, Plaintiff made complaints to Marin Transit and filed tort claims regarding the bus operators' requests for his service animal documentation. Marin Transit was therefore on notice of Plaintiff's issue and, drawing reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor, was deliberately indifferent to the bus drivers' alleged errors.
III. The California Disabled Persons Act and the Unruh Act
Plaintiff also brings claims against Marin Transit under the CDPA and the California Unruh Civil Rights Act. (FAC at 9-11.) The CDPA provides "[a]ny person or persons, firm or corporation who denies or interferes with admittance to or enjoyment of [ ] public facilities . . . or otherwise interferes with the rights of an individual under Sections 54, 54.1, and 54.2 is liable for . . . damages." Cal. Civ. Code § 54.3. A violation of the ADA also constitutes a violation of the CDPA. Cal. Civ. Code § 54(c). Therefore, because Plaintiff has sufficiently pled his ADA claim, he has sufficiently pled a claim under the CDPA.
California's Unruh Civil Rights Act operates identically to the ADA. Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 731 (9th Cir. 2007). Any violation of the ADA necessarily constitutes a violation of the Unruh Act. Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f). Because the Unruh Act adopted the full expanse of the ADA, it follows that the same standards for liability apply under both Acts. Lentini v. Cal. Ctr. for the Arts, Escondido, 370 F.3d 837, 847 (9th Cir. 2004). Thus, because Plaintiff's Unruh Act claim is premised on his ADA claim, he has sufficiently pled a claim under the Unruh Act.
IV. The Claim Presentation Requirement of the California Tort Claims Act
Marin Transit argues that under the CTCA, Plaintiff's claims should be limited to only the four specific tort claims that were presented to Marin Transit. This argument is moot because Plaintiff is not seeking damages for specific incidents that are not alleged in the claims.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Marin Transit's motion to dismiss. As discussed at oral argument, Defendants are to inform the Court in writing by April 13, 2022 whether they would like to be referred to early mediation pursuant to the Court's ADR program.
This Order disposes of Docket No. 19.
IT IS SO ORDERED.