Opinion
01-21-00286-CV
02-16-2023
RUSSELL WAYNE GOODWIN, Appellant v. SCOTT ORMAN GOODWIN, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court Grimes County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 4511-B
Panel consists of Goodman, Countiss, and Farris Justices.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Gordon Goodman, Justice.
In this forcible-detainer suit, Scott Goodwin sued to evict Russell Goodwin from his property. Russell, proceeding pro se, appeals from the judgment awarding possession of the property to Scott. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
BACKGROUND
This dispute is between two brothers, Russell and Scott Goodwin. Russell was living on a property owned by Scott. In February of 2021, Scott sent Russell a notarized letter evicting Russell from the property. In the letter, Scott gave Russell until April to vacate the property. In April of that year, Scott filed a forcible-detainer suit in a justice of the peace court to evict Russell. After a bench trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of Scott and awarded him possession of the property. Russell appealed to the county court. The county court conducted a bench trial de novo, also rendered judgment in favor of Scott, awarded him possession of the property, and ordered Russell and "all other occupants" to vacate the property. Russell now appeals this judgment.
DISCUSSION
In four points of error, Russell argues the county court erred in rendering judgment for Scott because (1) Scott's petition was defective; (2) Scott failed to prove he provided proper notice of eviction; (3) the petition did not name any other defendants yet the court's judgment ordered "all other occupants" to vacate the property; and (4) the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the suit because Scott obtained title to the property through coercion. In response, Scott generally argues that Russell did not preserve these errors for appellate review. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Forcible Detainer
A forcible-detainer suit is a special proceeding, governed by particular statutes and rules, to determine the right to immediate possession of real property. Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 709 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.); see also TEX. PROP. CODE §§ 24.001-.011; TEX. R. CIV. P. 510. The forcible-detainer suit provides a "speedy, simple, and inexpensive means" to determine the right to possession of a property. Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709. The only issue a justice of the peace court, or a county court on appeal, can determine in a forcible-detainer suit is the right to immediate possession of a property. TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(e); Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709; see Salaymeh v. Plaza Centro, LLC, 264 S.W.3d 431, 435 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (on appeal, county court limited to jurisdiction of justice court). These courts cannot resolve title issues. TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(e); Salaymeh, 264 S.W.3d at 435; Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 708-09. To prevail in a forcible-detainer suit, a plaintiff does not need to prove title but only needs to show "sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate a superior right to immediate possession" of the property. Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709.
Error Preservation
For error to be preserved for appellate review, the record must show that a party made the request or complaint to the trial court in a timely manner, and that the trial court either ruled on the request or refused to do so. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). Even constitutional complaints, including allegations of due-process violations, must be raised below or they are not preserved for appellate review. Dreyer v. Greene, 871 S.W.2d 697, 698 (Tex. 1993); see also Robinson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 12-14-00212-CV, 2015 WL 5714546, at *3 (Tex. App.-Tyler Sept. 30, 2015, pet. dism'd) (mem. op.) (overruling appellant's constitutional complaints in appeal from forcible-detainer suit because complaints not presented to trial court).
When the error relates to a pleading defect, the complaining party must specially except to the pleading defect in writing and bring the defect to the attention of the trial court, or else the defect is waived and the party fails to preserve the issue for appellate review. TEX. R. CIV. P. 90; see Italian Cowboy Partners, Ltd. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 341 S.W.3d 323, 346 (Tex. 2011) (party waived objection to damages that were discussed at trial but not pleaded by failing to specially except to pleading defect in writing); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a) (to preserve error for appellate review, record must show complaint was timely made to trial court and trial court either ruled on complaint or refused to rule).
A party's pro se status does not relieve him from the preservation-of-error requirement. See Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam) ("[P]ro se litigants are not exempt from the rules of procedure."); Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184-85 (Tex. 1978) ("There cannot be two sets of procedural rules, one for litigants with counsel and the other for litigants representing themselves.").
A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
We first consider Russell's fourth point of error because subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to a court's power to decide a case. See Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 553-54 (Tex. 2000). Russell contends the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the forcible-detainer suit because Scott was not the rightful owner of the property. Russell claims the trial court erred by not verifying the correct ownership of the property or allowing him to present evidence to show Scott allegedly used coercion to add his name to the title.
1. Applicable law
A justice of the peace court and county court can only decide who is entitled to possession of a property in a forcible-detainer suit; these courts do not have subject-matter jurisdiction to decide who holds title to a property. TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(e); Salaymeh, 264 S.W.3d at 435; Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 708-09. The existence of a title dispute does not deprive the justice court of jurisdiction, but when there is a "genuine issue of title so intertwined with the issue of possession" that the justice court cannot decide the issue of possession without first deciding the title issue, then the justice court lacks jurisdiction over the suit. Yarbrough v. Household Fin. Corp. III, 455 S.W.3d 277, 280 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.). Whether a court has subject-matter is a question of law that we review de novo. Chinyere v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 440 S.W.3d 80, 83 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.). "Subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal." Id.
2. Analysis
Russell claims the lower courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because Scott did not have rightful title to the property. However, Scott was not required to prove title to the property, but only "sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate a superior right to immediate possession." Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709. The record includes a general warranty deed signed by Richard Goodwin and Jennye Goodwin selling the property to Scott Goodwin. This is sufficient evidence of ownership to show Scott has a superior right of immediate possession. Russell claims this deed is invalid and Scott does not have rightful title because Scott obtained the deed by coercion and illegal tactics, but that is not an issue for a justice court or county court to decide. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(e) (only issue justice court may adjudicate in forcible-detainer suit is right to possession, not title). "Deeds obtained by fraud are voidable . . . and remain effective until set aside." Ford v. Exxon Mobil Chem. Co., 235 S.W.3d 615, 618 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam). If the deed was obtained by fraud as Russell claims, then he can file a different lawsuit in a "court of proper jurisdiction" to set aside the deed on the basis of fraud because forcible-detainer suits are cumulative of any other remedy a party may have. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(e); Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709. Although Russell has raised a question about the validity of Scott's title, he has not demonstrated that the issue of title and possession are "so intertwined" that the lower courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Cf. Yarbrough, 455 S.W.3d at 283 (where deed was allegedly void, rather than just voidable, issues of title and possession were intertwined, depriving lower courts of jurisdiction). Therefore, Russell's fourth point of error is overruled.
B. Defects in Petition
Russell claims the trial court erred in entering judgment based on Scott's petition that was defective, incomplete, and improperly sworn. Scott argues, in response, that Russell has waived these complaints because the record does not show that he preserved them.
1. Applicable law
Texas follows a fair-notice pleading standard. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887, 896 (Tex. 2000); see TEX. R. CIV. P. 47 (requiring pleadings to contain "a short statement of the cause of action sufficient to give fair notice of the claim involved"). Under this standard, fair notice of a claim is given if the opposing party can understand from the pleading the nature and basic issues of the claim and the type of evidence that might be relevant. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 34 S.W.3d at 896. We construe pleadings liberally in the pleader's favor unless the opposing party raises a special exception to the pleading. Id. at 897. "An opposing party should use special exceptions to identify defects in a pleading so that they may be cured, if possible, by amendment." Id. If a party fails to specially except to a pleading defect, the defect is waived and the error is not preserved. TEX. R. CIV. P. 90; see Italian Cowboy Partners, 341 S.W.3d at 346 (party waived objection by failing to specially except in writing); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a) (to preserve error for appellate review, record must show complaint was timely made to trial court and trial court either ruled on complaint or refused to rule).
2. Analysis
Russell argues the trial court erred in entering a judgment for Scott based on a defective petition. He argues the petition did not state the grounds for eviction or contain copies of the eviction notice, making it incomplete. He also argues the petition was improperly sworn because Scott did not state the asserted facts are true and within his personal knowledge. However, the record does not show that Russell made these objections by special exception in writing to the trial court. Therefore, any pleading defects are waived. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 90; TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Italian Cowboy Partners, 341 S.W.3d at 346. Russell's first point of error is overruled.
Russell also argues that the petition was defective because Scott did not provide a proper notice to vacate, but we discuss that issue more fully below.
Further, even if the pleading defects had not been waived, we do not think they would rise to the level of depriving Russell of due process, as he contends. Russell argues the petition does not state a reason explaining why it was proper to file a suit for eviction, which deprived him of due process to prepare a defense. However, the rules of civil procedure only require that a pleading give "fair notice" of the claim asserted. TEX. R. CIV. P. 47. "[A] plaintiff need not marshal all his evidence in order to satisfy due[-]process requirements; it is enough that the petition state a cause of action, give fair notice of the claim, and not affirmatively disclose facts that defeat relief." Onwukwe v. Ike, 137 S.W.3d 159, 166 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.). The petition in this case states that the plaintiff, Scott, was seeking to evict Russell. Although the petition does not state the grounds for eviction, it states that Scott had already given Russell a written notice to vacate and demand for possession. The petition provided enough notice of Scott's claim to enable Russell to prepare a defense and to satisfy due-process requirements.
Additionally, the record shows the petition was properly sworn, contrary to Russell's claim. Russell asserts that the petition is defective because it "must be sworn to by the plaintiff," TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(a), but it contains no statement that the allegations within are true and correct to the best of Scott's knowledge. However, Scott signed the petition, and the petition states it was "sworn to and subscribed before" the clerk of the justice court. Rule 500.2 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure states that "sworn" means "signed in front of someone authorized to take oaths, such as a notary, or signed under penalty of perjury." TEX. R. CIV. P. 500.2(y). A justice court clerk is a person authorized to take oaths under Section 602.002(3) of the Government Code. TEX. GOV'T CODE § 602.002(3) ("An oath made in this state may be administered and a certificate of the fact given by . . . a justice of the peace or a clerk of a justice court ...."); see also Flores v. State, No. 01-12-01008-CR, 2014 WL 60697, at *6 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 7, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting clerk of justice court was officer empowered to administer oaths under Government Code). Therefore, the petition is properly sworn within the meaning of the rules of civil procedure.
Russell did not preserve his objections to Scott's pleading defects by special exception, so the defects are waived, and we overrule his second point of error.
C. Proper Notice to Vacate
Russell next argues that Scott's petition was defective because it does not show that Scott provided Russell the eviction notice required by statute. But we again conclude that Russell did not preserve this error for review.
1. Applicable law
The Texas Property Code describes "forcible detainer" as the refusal to surrender real property on demand. TEX. PROP. CODE § 24.002(a). A demand for possession of property "must be made in writing" and "must comply with the requirements for a notice to vacate under Section 24.005." TEX. PROP. CODE § 24.002(b). The notice-to-vacate requirements under Section 24.005 require a landlord to give a tenant "at least three days' written notice to vacate" before the landlord files a forcible-detainer suit. TEX. PROP. CODE § 24.005(a), (b). The landlord must give the notice "in person or by mail at the premises in question." TEX. PROP. CODE § 24.005(f). Additionally, "[i]f the lease or applicable law requires the landlord to give a tenant an opportunity to respond to a notice of proposed eviction, a notice to vacate may not be given until the period provided for the tenant to respond to the eviction notice has expired." TEX. PROP. CODE § 24.005(e). The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure require a petition in an eviction case to contain a "description of when and how notice to vacate was delivered." TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(a)(3).
Again, to preserve error for appellate review, the record must show that the party made the request or complaint to the trial court in a timely manner, and that the trial court either ruled on the request or refused to do so. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). To complain about a pleading defect, a party must specially except to the pleading defect in writing and bring the defect to the attention of the trial court; otherwise, the defect is waived, and the party fails to preserve the issue for appellate review. TEX. R. CIV. P. 90; TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Italian Cowboy Partners, 341 S.W.3d at 346.
2. Analysis
Russell claims Scott's petition is defective because it does not contain a copy of the three days' notice to vacate required by the Property Code or a notarized notice of eviction. However, Russell has waived his objections to what he characterizes as pleading defects-the lack of a copy of the notice to vacate and a notarized notice of eviction-because the record does not show that he raised these complaints in the trial court. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 90; TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Italian Cowboy Partners, 341 S.W.3d at 346. Even if Russell had preserved his complaints for review, we would conclude they lack merit. Russell claims Scott's petition is defective because it does not contain a copy of the three days' notice to vacate or a notarized notice of eviction, but he has not identified any authority requiring a petition in a forcible-detainer suit to include these documents. The petition includes a description of when and how the notice to vacate was delivered, as required by the rules of civil procedure. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(a)(3). The petition states, "Plaintiff has given Defendant(s) a written notice to vacate .... Such notice was delivered on the 21[st] day of Feb[.], 2021 by this method: Notarized notice of eviction[.]"
Russell also argues the notice to vacate does not comply with the Property Code because it does not unequivocally demand possession or contain language demanding possession, which makes the notice ambiguous. Russell characterizes this as a pleading defect because the petition did not show proper notice had been served. But again, Russell has waived his objections to what he characterizes as a pleading defect because the record does not show that he raised these complaints in the trial court. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 90; TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Italian Cowboy Partners, 341 S.W.3d at 346. And even if he had preserved his complaints for review, we would conclude they lack merit. Russell has not identified any authority stating a notice to vacate must unequivocally demand possession. See TEX. PROP. CODE § 24.002(b) (requiring demand for possession to be in writing and meet requirements for notice to vacate but not requiring any particular language be used); TEX. PROP. CODE § 24.005(a) (requiring notice to vacate to be in writing and be given at least three days before filing suit but not requiring any particular language be used). The notice to vacate in the record states, "You are here by [sic] evicted .... [W]e have decided to give you till April 1, 2021 to remove your possessions and vacate the premises." While not using the exact phrase "demand for possession," the notice clearly asks Russell to vacate the property. Russell has not identified any valid reason why this notice to vacate fails to comply with the Property Code requirements-it is in writing and was given more than three days before suit was filed.
Finally, Russell argues that a landlord must strictly comply with the statutory requirements in a forcible-detainer suit, citing Kennedy v. Andover Place Apartments, 203 S.W.3d 495, 497 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.). He argues Scott did not strictly comply with the statutory requirements here because he did not give Russell an opportunity to respond to the notice of proposed eviction, nor did he provide Russell with a later notice to vacate. Again, Russell characterizes this as a pleading defect because the petition did not show proper notice had been served. But Russell has waived his objections because the record does not show that he raised these complaints in the trial court. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 90; TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Italian Cowboy Partners, 341 S.W.3d at 346. And even if he had preserved his complaints for review, we would conclude they lack merit. Section 24.005(e) of the Property Code only requires a landlord to give a tenant an opportunity to respond to a notice of proposed eviction "[i]f the lease or applicable law requires" it. TEX. PROP. CODE § 24.005(e). Russell has not identified a lease provision or applicable law requiring Scott to give him an opportunity to respond, so there is no indication that Section 24.005(e)'s response requirement applied here.
Russell has raised several objections to Scott's petition that ultimately question whether Scott satisfied the statutory requirements to prevail on his forcible- detainer suit, but Russell did not preserve these errors for our review. Even if he had preserved these errors, he has not shown a violation of any of the eviction statutes or rules. Russell's second point of error is overruled.
D. Judgment Against All Other Occupants
Finally, Russell contends there is error in the trial court's written judgment because the judgment ordered Russell and "all other occupants" to vacate the property, but this order was not based on the pleadings because Scott's petition only named Russell and was only served on Russell, not any other occupants. Russell claims that Scott knew that Russell's wife was also living on the property when he filed suit and that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over her because she was not named in the petition or served.
1. Applicable law
A trial court's judgment must conform to the pleadings. TEX. R. CIV. P. 301; Moran v. Williamson, 498 S.W.3d 85, 93 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). A trial court has no authority to render judgment against a person who is not named or served as a defendant. TEX. R. CIV. P. 124; Werner v. Colwell, 909 S.W.2d 866, 869 (Tex. 1995). Only after a person is properly served with a citation and petition does a trial court acquire personal jurisdiction over that person. See In re Guardianship of Fairley, 650 S.W.3d 372, 380 (Tex. 2022) (stating personal jurisdiction requires "valid service of process on the defendant").
However, a party may not challenge a trial court's personal jurisdiction over another person. See In re Guardianship of Castanon, No. 10-06-00058-CV, 2007 WL 700987, at *1-2 (Tex. App.-Waco Mar. 7, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.). "[A]n appealing party may not complain of errors that do not injuriously affect it or that merely affect the rights of others." Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829, 843 (Tex. 2000); see also McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Cortez, 66 S.W.3d 227, 234 (Tex. 2001) (controversy must adversely affect party seeking appellate review). If we were to rule on the merits of an issue affecting a person who is not a party to this appeal, we would be issuing an advisory opinion, which we have no authority to do. See Valley Baptist Med. Ctr. v. Gonzalez, 33 S.W.3d 821, 822 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam) ("[C]ourts have no jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions."); see also Humeniuk v. Tex. Health Res., No. 05-08-00912-CV, 2010 WL 1136499, at *2 (Tex. App.- Dallas Mar. 26, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (opinion would be advisory where remedy sought on appeal would only affect nonparty).
2. Analysis
The record does not show that any other occupants besides Russell were named in the petition or served with process. But Russell cannot challenge the trial court's judgment against other people. See Castanon, 2007 WL 700987, at *1-2; Torrington Co., 46 S.W.3d at 843. We cannot reverse part of the trial court's judgment based on Russell's complaint of harm to another person, even if that other person is his wife. Thus, we must overrule Russell's third issue. See Niera v. Frost Nat'l Bank, No. 04-09-00224-CV, 2010 WL 816191, at *2 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Mar. 10, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (overruling appellant's point of error complaining only of injury to nonparty).
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.