Opinion
CV 622-075
01-26-2023
THEAPPLIUS ANDRE GOODMAN, Plaintiff, v. MR. BRIAN KEMP; MR. TIMOTHY WARD; GEORGIA PARDON AND PAROLE BOARD; DODGE STATE PRISON; and CORDELE JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,[1]Defendants.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
BRIAN K. EPPS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at the Dodge State Prison in Chester, Georgia, filed this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Because he is proceeding IFP, Plaintiff's amended complaint must be screened to protect potential defendants. Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 785 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Al-Amin v. Donald, 165 Fed.Appx. 733, 736 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
I. SCREENING THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
A. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff names as Defendants in both his original and amended complaint: (1) Governor Brian Kemp, (2) GDC Commissioner Timothy Ward, (3) Georgia Pardon and Parole Board, (4) Dodge State Prison (“DSP”), and (5) the Cordele Judicial Circuit. (Doc. no. 1, p. 1; doc. no. 5, p. 1.) Taking all of Plaintiff's allegations as true, as the Court must for purposes of the present screening, the facts are as follows.
On February 17, 2022, at 7:15 P.M., six inmates in the B6 dorm at DSP entered Plaintiff's cell and hit him with a lock and metal pipes. (Id. at 6.) The inmates stole his belongings and continued torturing him all night. (Id.) The inmates would not allow him to sleep and would beat him to keep him awake. (Id.) The incident lasted until approximately 6:45 A.M., when Officer Rogers arrived and immediately allowed Plaintiff to go to medical, then drove him to the emergency room. (Id.) At the hospital, Plaintiff was treated by an eye specialist and underwent surgery to correct his nose. (Id.)
The attack on Plaintiff was due to overcrowding and understaffing at DSP, which both Defendants Kemp and Ward are aware of. (Id. at 5.) Furthermore, GDC inappropriately grouped him in a dorm with aggressive inmates. (Id.) Plaintiff has been incarcerated since 1993, when he was sentenced in the Cordele Judicial Circuit to life in prison with parole but has been incarcerated longer than necessary because he refused to drop a prior federal civil claim (CV 697-091) in 1997. (Id. at 5-6.) Cordele Judicial Circuit has also not followed an order issued by the Georgia Supreme Court “to amend [his] case.” (Id. at 6.)
Plaintiff requests compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 7.)
B. DISCUSSION
1. Legal Standard for Screening
The amended complaint or any portion thereof may be dismissed if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune to such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). “Failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard as dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).” Wilkerson v. H & S, Inc., 366 Fed.Appx. 49, 51 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997)).
To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the allegations in the amended complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). That is, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. While Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A complaint is insufficient if it “offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,'” or if it “tenders ‘naked assertions' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). In short, the amended complaint must provide a “‘plain statement' possessing] enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).
The court affords a liberal construction to a pro se litigant's pleadings, holding them to a more lenient standard than those drafted by an attorney. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, this liberal construction does not mean that the court has a duty to re-write the amended complaint. Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006).
2. The Case Should Be Dismissed Because Plaintiff Failed to Truthfully Disclose His Prior Filing History
A prisoner attempting to proceed IFP in a civil action in federal court must comply with the mandates of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) of the PLRA provides:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
“This provision of the PLRA, commonly known as the three strikes provision, requires frequent filer prisoners to prepay the entire filing fee before federal courts may consider their lawsuits and appeals.” Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 723 (11th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007); see also Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S.Ct. 1721, 1726 (U.S. 2020) (“The point of the PLRA, as its terms show, was to cabin not only abusive but also simply meritless prisoner suits.”). The Eleventh Circuit has upheld the constitutionality of § 1915(g) because it does not violate an inmate's right to access the courts, the doctrine of separation of powers, an inmate's right to due process of law, or an inmate's right to equal protection. Rivera, 144 F.3d at 721-27.
Here, Plaintiff only disclosed one prior federal case dealing with facts other than those involved here: Goodman v. Gaither, et al., 6:97-CV-091 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 19, 2001); (doc. no. 5, p. 2.) However, the Court is aware Plaintiff has two other previous cases in federal court: Goodman v. Davis, et al., 6:98-CV-125 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 15, 2000) and Goodman v. Commissioner of Georgia Dept. of Corrections, et al., 6:19-CV-010 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 19, 2020). Plaintiff commenced these two undisclosed cases before the filing of his original and amended complaint in the instant case, meaning he had every chance to fully disclose his prior filings history.
The Eleventh Circuit has approved of dismissing a case based on dishonesty in a complaint. In Rivera, the Court of Appeals reviewed a prisoner plaintiff's filing history for the purpose of determining whether prior cases counted as “strikes” under the PLRA and stated:
The district court's dismissal without prejudice in Parker is equally, if not more, strike-worthy. In that case, the court found that Rivera had lied under penalty of perjury about the existence of a prior lawsuit, Arocho. As a sanction, the court dismissed the action without prejudice, finding that Rivera “abuse[d] the judicial process[.]”Rivera, 144 F.3d at 731; see also Sears v. Haas, 509 Fed.Appx. 935, 936 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of complaint where prisoner plaintiff failed to accurately disclose previous litigation); Redmon v. Lake Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 414 Fed.Appx. 221, 223, 226 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal, after directing service of process, of amended complaint raising claims that included denial of proper medical care and cruel and unusual punishment for placement in a “restraint chair” and thirty-seven days of solitary confinement upon discovering prisoner plaintiff failed to disclose one prior federal lawsuit); Young v. Sec'y Fla. for Dep't of Corr., 380 Fed.Appx. 939, 940-41 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of third amended complaint based on a plaintiff's failure to disclose prior cases on the court's complaint form); Alexander v. Salvador, No. 5:12cv15, 2012 WL 1538368 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 21, 2012) (dismissing case alleging deliberate indifference to serious medical needs where plaintiff failed to disclose new case commenced in interim between filing original complaint and second amended complaint), adopted by, Alexander v. Salvador, No. 5:12cv15, 2012 WL 1538336 (N.D. Fla. May 2, 2012).
Indeed, “pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court must dismiss an IFP action if the court determines that the action is ‘frivolous or malicious.'” Burrell v. Warden I, 857 Fed.Appx. 624, 625 (11th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)). “An action is malicious when a prisoner misrepresents his prior litigation history on a complaint form requiring disclosure of such history and signs the complaint under penalty of perjury, as such a complaint is an abuse of the judicial process.” Id. The practice of dismissing a case as a sanction for providing false information about prior filing history is also well established in the Southern District of Georgia. See, e.g., Brown v. Wright, CV 111-044 (S.D. Ga. June 17, 2011); Hood v. Tompkins, CV 605-094 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 31, 2005), aff'd, 197 Fed.Appx. 818 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). Plaintiff's failure to disclose his prior cases discussed above was a blatantly dishonest representation of his prior litigation history, and this case is subject to dismissal without prejudice as a sanction for abusing the judicial process.
3. Plaintiff Fails to State a Supervisory Liability Claim against Defendants Kemp and Ward
“Supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Rosa v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 522 Fed.Appx. 710, 714 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). Likewise, supervisors and employers cannot be sued under § 1983 simply on a theory of respondeat superior. See Kruger v. Jenne, 164 F.Supp.2d 1330, 1333-34 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (citing Powell v. Shopco Laurel, Co., 678 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1982)) (explaining that an employer which provided medical care for state inmates could not be sued under § 1983 on respondeat superior theory).
“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to § 1983 actions, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Rosa, 522 Fed.Appx. at 714 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676) (internal quotations omitted). Therefore, to hold these Defendants liable, Plaintiff must demonstrate that they (1) actually participated in the alleged constitutional violation, or (2) there is a causal connection between the individual's actions and the alleged constitutional violation. See Hartley, 193 F.3d at 1269 (citing Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990)). Plaintiff has failed to allege facts that establish these Defendants were present for, or participated in, a constitutional violation. Therefore, Plaintiff must allege a causal connection between these Defendants and the properly asserted constitutional violations. See Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986) (requiring an affirmative causal connection between a defendant and an alleged constitutional violation).
Plaintiff appears to name both Defendants Kemp and Ward not because of any direct involvement in the events about which he complains, but by virtue of their supervisory positions over DSP. In his amended complaint, Plaintiff only alleges that his beating by the other inmates occurred because of overcrowding and understaffing. (Doc. no. 5, pp. 5-6.) However, nowhere does Plaintiff allege Defendants were present for, or participated in, any alleged constitutional violations.
Therefore, Plaintiff must allege a causal connection between Defendants and the asserted constitutional violations. See Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986) (requiring an affirmative causal connection between a defendant and an alleged constitutional violation). The “causal connection” can be established “when a history of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so,” Brown, 906 F.2d at 671, or when “the supervisor's improper ‘custom or policy . . . result[s] in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.'” Hartley, 193 F.3d at 1269 (quoting Rivas v. Freeman, 940 F.2d 1491, 1495 (11th Cir. 1991)). The standard for demonstrating “widespread abuse” is high. In the Eleventh Circuit, “deprivations that constitute widespread abuse sufficient to notify the supervising official must be obvious, flagrant, rampant and of continued duration, rather than isolated occurrences.” Brown, 906 F.2d at 671. A causal connection may also be shown when the facts support “an inference that the supervisor [or employer] directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003).
Here, Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to support the necessary causal connection. Plaintiff fails to allege a history of widespread abuse at DSP, an improper custom or policy put into place by Defendants, or an inference that Defendants directed others to act, or knew they would act, unlawfully. In sum, Plaintiff has not shown Defendants Kemp and Ward participated in the alleged constitutional violation, nor has he drawn the necessary causal connection to any alleged constitutional violation. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against Defendants Kemp and Ward.
4. Defendants Georgia Pardon and Parole Board and Dodge State Prison are Not Subject to Liability in a § 1983 Suit
“The Eleventh Amendment insulates a state from suit brought by individuals in federal court, unless the state either consents to suit or waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Stevens v. Gay, 864 F.2d 113, 114 (11th Cir. 1989) (footnote omitted) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-100 (1984)). Arms or agencies of the state are also immune from suit. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (“There can be no doubt, however, that suit against the State and its Board of Corrections is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, unless [the State] has consented to the filing of such a suit.”); Stevens, 864 F.2d at 115 (Eleventh Amendment bars suit against GDC); Bailey v. Silberman, 226 Fed.Appx. 922, 924 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (“Neither a State nor its agencies may be sued as a named defendant in federal court absent the State's consent.”). Because the State of Georgia has sovereign immunity against Plaintiff's § 1983 claims, and Defendant Georgia Pardon and Parole Board is an agency of the state, it should be dismissed from the case.
Likewise, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant Dodge State Prison because jails and prisons are not legal entities subject to liability in § 1983 claims. See Jamelson v. Unnamed Defendant, No. CV 617-103, 2017 WL 6503630, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 19, 2017) (holding “Georgia State Prison . . . is not a separate legal entity capable of being sued”), adopted by 2018 WL 616142 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 29, 2018); Parks v. Georgia, No. CV 517-047, 2017 WL 2930832, at *3 (S.D. Ga. July 10, 2017) (holding “penal institutions . . . are generally not considered legal entities subject to suit”); see also Brannon v. Thomas Cty. Jail, 280 F. App'x. 930, 934 n.1 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting Thomas County Jail is not entity capable of being sued under Georgia law). Appropriate parties for suit under § 1983 included “persons” who participated in the alleged violation. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (subjecting only “persons” to liability); Ga. Insurers Insolvency Pool v. Elbert Cty., 368 S.E.2d 500, 502 (Ga. 1988) (limiting § 1983 liability to “(1) natural persons; (2) an artificial person (a corporation); and (3) such quasiartificial persons as the law recognizes as being capable to sue”) (quotations omitted).
Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Georgia Pardon and Parole Board and Dodge State Prison should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
5. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Against Defendant Cordele Judicial Circuit
Plaintiff seeks to hold the Cordele Judicial Circuit liable for the sentence he is currently serving at DSP and its failure to follow an unidentified order issued by the Georgia Supreme Court. (Doc. no. 5, p. 6.) However, the Cordele Judicial Circuit is not a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Mumford v. Zieba, 4 F.3d 429, 435 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding state court is not person under § 1983); (Williams v. Ocmulgee Judicial Circuit, No. 5:15-CV-00139, 2015 WL 6755292 (M.D. Ga. 2015) (same). Plaintiff's claim against the Cordele Judicial Circuit thus fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
II. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court REPORTS and RECOMMENDS Plaintiff s amended complaint be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
SO REPORTED and RECOMMENDED.