Opinion
CV-21-6
11-15-2021
JAMES GOODE, Plaintiff v. MARSTON ROAD SLIPS, LLC, Defendant
Plaintiff: Marshall J. Tinkle, Esq. Defendant: Andrew Sparks, Esq. & William J. Kennedy, Esq.
Plaintiff: Marshall J. Tinkle, Esq.
Defendant: Andrew Sparks, Esq. & William J. Kennedy, Esq.
ORDER ON MOTION TO AMEND AND MOTION TO DISMISS
MaryGay Kennedy, Justice, Superior Court.
Before the court is Defendant, Marston Road Slips LLC's, ("defendant") Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and Plaintiff, James Goode's, ("plaintiff') opposed motion to amend his complaint to add Sebago Basin Slips Condominium Association as a party.
I. Factual Background
Plaintiff is the owner of real property located at 50 Hackett Road, Windham, Maine. (Compl. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff acquired this property from his parents, who acquired it by deed recorded in the Cumberland County Registry of Deeds in Book 2770, Page 182 on August 21, 1963. (Id.) Prior to this conveyance, the property had been part of a large tract of land owned by Lawrence V. Manchester. (Id. ¶ 4.) This tract of land contained a number of private roads. (Id. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff's deed contains language granting him the "right to use Basin Landing Road in common with others." (Id. ¶ 5.) Basin Landing Road was one of the private roads on the Manchester tract at the time of the conveyance, running from Route 35 in Windham to "Basin Landing" on Sebago Lake. (Id. ¶ 7.) Basin Landing has a boat ramp secured by a locked gate. (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff alleges that he, his parents and other family members have continually used this road for recreational boating purposes. (Id. ¶ 9.) For most of the time that plaintiff or his parents have owned their property, the Basin Landing gate was secured by a combination lock which they were given the combination to. (Id. ¶ 14.)
Basin Road has undergone several modifications over the years. Part of Basin Road has been renamed "Hackett Road." (Id. ¶ 10.) The part of Basin Road that connects to Basin Landing is now called "Upper Basin Road." (Id.) Together, these two roads form the northeasterly boundary of plaintiff's property. (Id.) In the 1970s, Manchester rerouted the lower portion of Basin Landing Road to a gravel road intersecting Marston Road. (Id. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff alleges that he has used this rerouted section since approximately 1978. (Id.)
In 2017, a portion of the Manchester tract which extends to Basin Landing was conveyed to defendant. (Id. ¶ 12.) After acquiring the parcel, defendant destroyed the detour connecting Upper Basin Road to Marston Road. (Id. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff still had access to Marston Road and Basin Landing via Hackett Road. (Id.) In the fall of 2019, when plaintiff went to remove his boat from Basin Landing for the season, he found that the combination lock securing the gate had been replaced by a padlock. (Id. ¶ 16.) When plaintiff asked defendant for a key to the padlock, defendant refused. (Id. ¶ 17.)
Plaintiff brought this action alleging 3 counts: Count I, declaratory judgment declaring that plaintiff has an express easement to access the boat landing at the end of Marston Road; Count II, declaratory judgment declaring that plaintiff has an easement by implication to access the boat landing at the end of Marston Road; and Count III, declaratory judgment declaring that plaintiff has acquired an easement by prescription to access the boat landing at the end of Marston Road.
II. Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on January 5, 2021. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on January 19, 2021, arguing that it was not the proper party because it had transferred its interest in the property to Sebago Basin Slips Condominium Association ("Association"). Plaintiff filed a motion to amend his complaint to add the Association as a defendant on January 29, 2021. Plaintiff filed his opposition to the motion to dismiss on February 1, 2021, Defendant filed its reply on February 9, 2021. On the same day, defendant filed an opposition to the motion to amend on the basis that plaintiff should not be allowed to amend his complaint to add the Association as a defendant if Marston Road Slips, LLC is not removed as a defendant.
III. Standard of Review
Leave to amend a pleading is to be "freely given where justice so requires." M.R. Civ. P. 15(a). "A motion to amend may be denied based on one or more of the following grounds: undue delay, bad faith, undue prejudice, or futility of amendment." Montgomery v. Eaton Peabody, LLP, 2016 ME 44, 5 13, 135 A.3d 106. Action on a motion to amend should occur before the court entertains a dispositive motion. Sherbert v. Remmel, 2006 ME 116, 5 8, 908 A.2d 622.
When ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court views the "facts alleged in the complaint as if they were admitted." Nadeau v. Frydrych, 2014 ME 154, 55, 108 A.3d 1254 (per curiam) (quotation marks omitted). A complaint must set forth the "elements of a cause of action or allege[ ] facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief pursuant to some legal theory." Id. Facts are read in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. "Dismissal is warranted only when it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any set of facts that might be proved in support of the claim." Halco v. Davey, 2007 ME 48, 5 6, 919 A.2d 626 (quotation marks omitted).
IV. Discussion
A. Motion to Amend
Leave to amend should be freely granted where justice so requires. M.R. Civ. P. 15(a). Defendant only opposes the motion to amend on the basis that it should be dismissed from the case for the reasons it raises in its motion to dismiss. (See Opp. Mot. Amend.) Defendant does not argue that the motion should be denied for "undue delay, bad faith, undue prejudice, or futility of amendment." Montgomery, 2016 ME 44, ¶ 13, 135 A.3d 106. This amend mentis clearly not futile, as defendant's basis for the motion to dismiss is that the Association is the property owner and therefore proper defendant in this case. Defendant's concerns about its status as a proper defendant can be addressed in reference to its motion to dismiss. Leave to amend will be granted.
B. Motion to Dismiss
Defendant moves to dismiss the claims against it because it is no longer the owner of the property over which plaintiff claims an easement. Defendant argues that any suit regarding plaintiff's alleged easement must be brought against the Association pursuant to 33 M.R.S. § 1603- 111, which provides:
The court may consider the Declaration without converting the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment because it is an official public document. See Moody v. State Liquor & Lottery Comm 'n, 2004 ME 20, ¶ 11, 843 A.2d 43; see also Estate of Robbins v. Chebeague & Cumberland Land Trust, 2017 ME 17, ¶2, l54A.3d 1185.
Neither the association nor any unit owner except the declarant is liable for that declarant's torts in connection with any part of the condominium which that declarant has the responsibility to maintain. Otherwise, an action alleging a wrong done by the association shall be brought against the association and not against any unit owner.
Plaintiff's amended complaint alleges wrongs done by both the Association and the defendant. Contrary to defendant's assertion, it has retained an interest in the common elements in the form of various easements allowing it to perform, among other things, "construction, reconstruction, maintenance, repair, renovation, replacement or correction of the of the Units or Common Elements." (Mot. Dismiss Ex. B at 7.) This easement could certainly cover replacing the lock to Basin Landing or destroying the gravel detour connecting Upper Basin Road and Marston Road. Therefore, it is by no means certain that the Association was the only entity that could have engaged in this conduct.
Based on the facts alleged in the complaint, either the Association or defendant could have denied plaintiff access to Basin Landing. Defendant may have done so while exercising rights under the easements it retamed as Declarant or the Association may have done so while exercising its authority over the common elements of the Association. Therefore, plaintiff has alleged facts "that would entitle the plaintiff to relief pursuant to some legal theory" against both defendants. The motion to dismiss will be denied.
The entry is
Plaintiff James Goode's Motion to Amend his complaint is GRANTED.
Defendant Marston Road Slips, LLC's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
The Clerk is directed to enter this order into the docket by reference pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 79(a).