Opinion
00 Civ. 7096 (SAS).
November 21, 2000.
EDUARDO GONZALEZ, New York, New York, For Plaintiff (Pro Se):
Laura H. Corvo, Assistant Corporation Counsel, New York, New York, For Defendants:
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Eduardo Gonzalez, a former New York City police officer, has once again brought suit against the New York City Police Department ("NYPD") and the City of New York ("City"), claiming that defendants violated his constitutional rights and unlawfully discriminated against him in connection with events occurring subsequent to an off-duty incident that took place on March 27, 1999. Because the allegations in this complaint are both barred by the doctrine of res judicata and frivolous, this action is hereby dismissed.
Pursuant to the New York City Charter ("Charter"), the NYPD is a non-suable entity. Section 396 of the Charter proscribes that "[a]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties . . . shall be brought in the name of the City of New York and not that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law." Charter, Ch. 17 § 396; see also Jeffreys v. City of New York, No. 99 Civ. 4602, 2000 WL 1459845, at *3 (S.D.N Y Sept. 29, 2000) (organizational subdivisions of the City, such as the NYPD, "lack independent existence and as such cannot be sued"); Fannelli v. Town of Harrison, 46 F. Supp.2d 254, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (court found the Town of Harrison Police Department to be "merely [an] administrative arm of the municipality," and as such, under New York law it could not sue or be sued).
On the morning of March 27, 1999, Gonzalez was subjected to a traffic stop and subsequently detained at the 19th Precinct station house in Manhattan. The sequence of events surrounding this stop and detention will be referred to as the "off-duty incident" throughout this decision. The facts and legality of the off-duty incident were discussed extensively in Gonzalez v. City of New York, No. 99 Civ. 9128, 2000 WL 1678036 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2000), familiarity with which is assumed.
I. Background
A. The First Action
On August 24, 1999, Gonzalez, who was represented by counsel, brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1983, and 1985, against the NYPD, the City, and three individual officers, alleging that the defendants violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in connection with the off-duty incident. Gonzalez further claimed, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, that defendants wrongfully terminated him from the NYPD based on his race. At the close of discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims. Because Gonzalez produced no evidence that his constitutional rights had been violated or that he was a victim of unlawful discrimination, the case was dismissed on November 3, 2000. See Gonzalez v. City of New York, No. 99 Civ. 9128, 2000 WL 1678036 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2000).
B. The Current Action
On September 20, 2000, Gonzalez, now acting pro se, filed the present action against the NYPD and the City, essentially restating the allegations of discrimination contained in his first complaint. In this action, Gonzalez further alleged that the NYPD slandered him by filing false charges against him relating to the off-duty incident, that the NYPD engages in a pattern of discrimination against minority police officers in its disciplinary proceedings, and that the Advocate Office Assistant Commissioner prevented him from obtaining certain information in retaliation for his sending letters to Mayor Giuliani complaining about his treatment by the NYPD after the off-duty incident. See Complaint ¶¶ 5, 6.
In this suit, Gonzalez sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1983, and 1985. See Complaint at 1. Gonzalez again claims that he was unlawfully terminated by the NYPD because of his race. See id.
It is not clear exactly what information Gonzalez asserts was withheld. In the complaint, Gonzalez asserts that the Advocate Office Assistant Commissioner (described only as Mr. Lubin) was given instructions to obtain "a section 78 waiver and resignation from plaintiff" but instead "totally refused to inform [him]." Complaint ¶ 6.
II. Discussion
It is well established that a district court has the power to dismiss pro se complaints sua sponte when justified. See Fitzgerald v. First East Seventh Street Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000). It may do so if the case is determined to be frivolous, see id. ("district courts are especially likely to be exposed to frivolous actions, and thus have a great need for inherent authority to dismiss such actions quickly in order to preserve scarce judicial resources"), or on res judicata grounds. See Salahuddin v. Jones, 992 F.2d 447, 449 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Levin v. Chase Manhattan Bank Corp., No. 98 Civ. 7998, 1999 WL 669261, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 1999).
All of the facts supporting the instant claims arose prior to August 24, 1999, the date Gonzalez filed his first action. Although the facts alleged in this action are not identical to the facts alleged in the first action, this is not a prerequisite to dismissing a case on res judicata grounds. A court need only determine that the facts essential to the second suit were present in the first. See Waldman v. Village of Kirvas Joel, 207 F.3d 105, 110-11 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a "`final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.'" St. Pierre v. Dyer, 208 F.3d 394, 399 (2d Cir. 2000) (emphasis added) (quoting Federated Dep't. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981)). In order to ascertain whether a suit is barred by res judicata, a court must determine whether the second suit involves the same nucleus of operative facts as the first suit. See Waldman, 207 F.3d at 108 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Three factors crucial in making this determination are whether the "underlying facts [of both actions] are `related in time, space, origin or motivation, whether the [two actions] form a convenient trial unit, and whether . . . treatment [of the two actions] as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations.'" Interoceanica Corp. v. Sound Pilots, Inc., 107 F.3d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(2) (1982)).
Both of Gonzalez's actions against the NYPD and the City are grounded upon allegations of discrimination stemming from the events surrounding the off-duty incident. In this Complaint, Gonzalez has not alleged any facts that were not present at the time he filed the first action. Gonzalez had ample opportunity to litigate any claims of discrimination or retaliation by the NYPD and the City in the first suit. To allow Gonzalez to relitigate claims that have now been dismissed, or to now litigate claims that should have been brought in the earlier action, would only waste limited judicial resources. See Salahuddin, 992 F.2d at 449 ("[R]es judicata is a doctrine founded in part on the strong public interest in economizing the use of judicial resources by avoiding re-litigation."); see also Doe v. Pfrommer, 148 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1998). In addition, Gonzalez should not be allowed to expand his legal rights by filing a complaint asserting new claims arising out of the same events alleged in the first complaint. See Curtis v. Citibank, 226 F.2d 133, 140 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[D]istrict court correctly held that plaintiffs may not file duplicative complaints in order to expand their legal rights."); see also Waldman, 207 F.3d at 110 (a plaintiff cannot avoid the effects of res judicata by separating his claim into multiple suits based on different legal theories).
Although the allegations contained in the two complaints arise out of the same nucleus of common facts, on the civil cover sheet for this action Gonzalez did not indicate that he had previously filed a similar case within the Southern District of New York. Further, Gonzalez was represented by counsel in the first action. Now, as a pro se litigant, he is bringing claims previously asserted in the suit in which he was represented by counsel, and attempting to bring additional claims that should have been asserted in the prior suit. Allowing this action to proceed would permit Gonzalez to improperly capitalize on his status as a pro se litigant.
Further, having reviewed the record in the first action and having found that Gonzalez could not produce any evidence of unlawful discrimination by the defendants, there is no reason to allow this second action to proceed.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, Gonzalez's complaint is dismissed and the Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.