The IJ denied her withholding of removal claim after making the dispositive finding that she "could avoid persecution by relocating to another part of Mexico, and, under all circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect her to do so." See id.; Gonzalez-Medina v. Holder, 641 F.3d 333, 337-38 (9th Cir. 2011). Ramirez-Alcaraz's testimony that her ex-husband could locate her anywhere in Mexico because of his connections to a cartel was speculative and unsupported, and no other evidence in the record suggests her husband would be able to find her anywhere in Mexico.
To state a valid claim under the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment, Plaintiff “must show that the statute in question results in members of a certain group being treated differently from other persons based on membership in that group.” Sagana v. Tenorio, 384 F.3d 731, 740 (9th Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gonzalez–Medina v. Holder, 641 F.3d 333, 336 (9th Cir.2011) (“To establish an equal protection violation, [the plaintiff] must show that she is being treated differently from similarly situated individuals.”). Plaintiff's FAC first alleges that she “is being treated differently from persons who are prescribed medical marijuana in states where the obtainment of a state-issued medical marijuana registry card is not required.”
Avendano-Barraza does not qualify for withholding of removal based on a clear probability of future persecution because the BIA properly concluded that he could relocate elsewhere in Mexico and that it is reasonable to expect him to do so. See Gonzalez-Medina v. Holder, 641 F.3d 333, 338 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that "[w]here the applicant has not established past persecution," he or she bears the burden of establishing that relocation is unreasonable within Mexico). Avendano-Barraza's evidence of generalized violence in Mexico is insufficient to challenge the BIA's relocation findings.
We also agree with the BIA that, to the extent that Romero Rivera failed to establish past persecution, she did not provide evidence that she is unable to relocate within Mexico, providing an alternative reason to conclude that she had failed to show a well-founded fear of persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(ii); Gonzalez-Medina v. Holder, 641 F.3d 333, 338 (9th Cir. 2011). Romero Rivera has not contended that, even if her asylum application was properly rejected, her application for withholding of removal should nonetheless have been granted.
As to withholding of removal, substantial evidence supports the agency's determination that Palacios-Palomares did not establish past persecution. See Gonzalez-Medina v. Holder, 641 F.3d 333, 337-38 (9th Cir. 2011) (abuse suffered in the United States does not establish past persecution in the country of removal). Substantial evidence also supports the agency's determination that she did not establish a clear probability of future persecution.
To establish an equal-protection violation, Marquez-Reyes must show that he is "being treated differently from similarly situated individuals." Gonzalez-Medina v. Holder , 641 F.3d 333, 336 (9th Cir. 2011). Where, as here, there is no assertion that the distinction "implicates fundamental rights or involves a classification along suspect lines, only rational basis scrutiny applies."
Perez was not in Mexico when his father was killed or when he learned about his father's killing. See Gonzalez-Medina v. Holder, 641 F.3d 333, 337 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)(i)). Thus, these events cannot constitute past persecution.
See § 1229b(b)(1)(D). Mendivil-Gutierrez's equal protection claim also fails because he has not shown that the classification between departures that break continuous presence and those that do not is irrational. See Gonzalez-Medina v. Holder, 641 F.3d 333, 336 (9th Cir. 2011).
And to the extent that Munoz Perez relies on the fact that he was stabbed in 2017 by an unknown group of people in New Jersey as evidence of past persecution, see Pet'r's Br. 5, as the BIA explained, "the claimed past persecution must occur 'in the proposed country of removal, '" A.R. 4 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)); see also Gonzalez-Medina v. Holder, 641 F.3d 333, 337 (9th Cir. 2011) ("[T]here is no logical nexus between persecution in the United States . . . and risk of persecution in the country of removal."). B. Convention Against Torture
Turning first to Petitioners' applications for asylum and withholding of removal, Petitioners failed to exhaust and have otherwise waived any argument concerning two dispositive agency findings, namely, that Petitioners failed to prove that Guatemalan authorities were unable or unwilling to protect them and that internal relocation was not feasible. See Velasquez-Gaspar v. Barr, 976 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2020); Gonzalez-Medina v. Holder, 641 F.3d 333, 338 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(ii), (b)(3)(i)). Petitioners failed to challenge either finding in their notice of appeal or appeal brief to the BIA.