Opinion
CIVIL NO. 02-1364 (JAG)
August 7, 2003
OPINION AND ORDER
Presently before the Court is co-defendants Yolanda Zayas' and Victor Maldonado's (hereinafter Zayas and Maldonado respectively) motion for summary judgment ( Docket No. 42.) Plaintiff Migdalia Gonzalez De Blasini (hereinafter Gonzalez) duly opposed the motion for summary judgment. ( Docket No. 49.)
Gonzalez' alleges she suffered political discrimination at work, reason for which she was demoted from her career position, harassed, and forced into early retirement. Gonzalez pleads causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986. Zayas and Maldonado claim that plaintiff has been unable to meet the burden of proof necessary to support her political discrimination claims. In addition, Zayas and Maldonado claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity for actions conducted during the discharge of their public official duties. After a careful review of the record, the Court finds that Gonzalez does not meet the necessary burden of proof to support a claim of political discrimination and that Zayas and Maldonado are entitled to qualified immunity, thus warranting summary disposition in favor of co-defendants.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, sets forth the standard for ruling on summary judgment motions: "The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The critical question is whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. A genuine issue exists if there is sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute to require a choice between the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial. Morris v. Government Dev. Bank of Puerto Rico, 27 F.3d 746, 748 (1st Cir. 1994); LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 841 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1018 (1994). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.Morrisey v. Boston Five Cents Say. Bank. 54 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 1995); Maldonando Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir. 1994). On a motion for summary judgment, the court must view all evidence and related inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Springfield Terminal Ry. v. Canadian Pac. Ltd., 133 F.3d 103, 106 (1st Cir. 1997) Nonetheless, the court is free to "ignore `conclusory allegations, improbable inferences and unsupported speculation.'" Súarez v. Pueblo International, Inc., 229 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990)).
DISCUSSION
The original complaint in the instant action was filed on March 11, 2002. ( Docket No. 1.) The following facts are undisputed and supported by the evidence submitted by the parties. Gonzalez was a former career employee of the Puerto Rico Family Department (hereinafter "PRFD") until her retirement in 2001. She is a supporter of the N.P.P. party. In 1993, Gonzalez held a career position as Local Service Director I, position number 2453, with a salary of $1,380.00 per month. On January 22, 1993 Gonzalez was promoted to the trust position of Regional Director III, position number 2253. On June 21, 2000, Gonzalez requested reinstatement in her previous career position. The career position Gonzalez had formerly occupied had been eliminated and new replacement positions of Director of Integral Services I-III were created on or around 1997.
Although there is a discrepancy between the parties as to the exact number of years, they range from 27 to 29 years. The exact number of years is irrelevant for disposition of the motion for summary judgment.
The exact evolution of these positions is not necessary for decisional purposes.
On September 1, 2000, Gonzalez was reinstated from her trust position as Regional Director III at a salary of $4,402.00 per month to a career position 2256 as Executive Director IV, at a salary of $4,308.00 per month. In January 2001, there was a change of administration due to the November 2000 election results. After the change of administration in January of 2001, the Puerto Rico Family Department conducted an audit of its Human Resources Office that covered personnel transactions from July 1, 1998 through December 31, 2000. In February of 2001, Gonzalez was informed that she had been improperly reinstated to the career position of Executive Director IV, and that she would be moved to a different position. On April 4, 2001, Gonzalez was reinstated to a career position of Executive Director I, at a salary of $1,806.00. She was approved for early retirement on April 21, 2001.
The issue in controversy is purely legal in nature. In essence, it hinges on three factors: (1) whether or not Gonzalez was subjected to political discrimination, (2) whether the reinstatement of Gonzalez deprived her of a constitutional right, and (3) whether or not Zayas and Maldonado are entitled to qualified immunity. 1) Plaintiff's claim of Political Discrimination
In political discrimination cases, plaintiff's must demonstrate that party affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor for the challenged action. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. Of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 576, 50 L.Ed.2d 471, (1977): Ortiz-Pinero v. Rivera-Arroyo, 84 F.3d 7, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1996). Gonzalez claims that she suffered "a pattern of political discrimination, harassment, and hostile work environment" because of her political affiliation. To support her contention, Gonzalez asserts that she was denied work, excluded from meetings, and that she heard comments from coworkers as to whether her office was still occupied. In addition, Gonzalez claims Zayas encouraged her to retire, and informed her that otherwise she would be demoted and her salary reduced. As to Maldonado, Gonzalez claims she informed him of her situation, and that he refused to believe her. Gonzalez' assertions, however, are of a very general nature, and she has not offered specific incidents and/or evidence that go beyond vague inferences and speculation. Moreover, Gonzalez has failed to show that there is a causal connection between defendant's conduct, and Gonzalez' political beliefs. See LaRou v. Ridlon, 98 F.3d 659, 662 (1st Cir. 1996). Once more, there is no evidence on record except for Gonzalez' own sworn statement.
Gonzalez, in fact, has not even established that her political affiliation was known to Zayas and Maldonado. Rather, she asserts that they "must have known" because of her previous trust position and the proximity in time of the personnel actions and the 2000 PR General Elections. This is not sufficient, however, to establish political discrimination. Kauffman v. P.R. Telephone Co., 841 F.2d 1169 (1st 1988). A claim of civil rights violations cannot: be established "simply by asserting an inequity and tacking on the self-serving conclusion that the defendant was motivated by a discriminatory animus."Correa-Martinez v. Arrillacra-Belendez, 903 F.2d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 1990). While this Court must construe "all evidence and related inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,"Springfield Terminal Rv. v. Canadian Pac. Ltd., 133 F.3d 103, 106 (1st Cir. 1997), there is simply not enough evidence on record to support the allegation that party affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor for Gonzalez' reinstatement. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. Of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471, (1977).
By the same token, Gonzalez' has produced insufficient evidence to support a claim of a hostile work environment. To establish a hostile work environment action, Gonzalez must prove that: (1) she belongs to a protected group; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on her political affiliation; (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take remedial action. Cruz v. Radtec, Inc., 70 F. Supp.2d 77, 82 (D.P.R. 1999). Gonzalez' allegation of a hostile work environment is predicated on the same facts that fail to support her claims for political discrimination. Even with a generous reading of said facts, Gonzalez fails to establish a pattern of conduct levied against her because of her political affiliation.
For the reasons specified above, this Court finds that Gonzalez has failed to establish both a claim of political discrimination and of a hostile work environment.
2) Plaintiff's claim of deprivation of a constitutional right
In their motion for summary judgment, Zayas and Maldonado assert that Gonzalez did not have a constitutionally protected right to her position as Executive Director IV. They present, two arguments: (1) that Gonzalez' transfers were done during the Puerto Rico's 2000 General Elections Personnel Transaction Prohibition Period and were thus illegal, and (2) that regardless of the timing of the transactions, Gonzalez was reinstated to a career position three levels higher than she was entitled to.
From the uncontested facts, it has been established that Gonzalez was reinstated to the position of Executive Director IV on September 1, 2000. The prohibition period for transfers is "two months before and two months after General Elections are held in Puerto Rico", 3 L.P.R.A. § 1337. In the year 2000, elections were held on November 6, and thus the reinstatement on September 1 was outside of the specified two month period and not illegal.
A fact that is being contested is Gonzalez' position between October and November of 2000. Zayas and Maldonado claim that on October 2, 2000, while Gonzalez was holding the career position of Executive Director IV, she was again transferred to her previous trust position of Regional Director III, only to be transferred once more to the career position of Executive Director IV on November of 2000. Gonzalez claims that said transfer never occurred, proffering as evidence the fact that the transfer order has been stamped "Cancelled", and that she only covered informally some of the duties assigned to the trust position. Nevertheless, Gonzalez then goes on to argue that she was entitled to the position of Executive Director IV, because that was the career position she held prior to holding the trust position from October to November of 2000. If that were the case, said transactions would clearly fall within the prohibited period of the general elections and would be illegal. Therefore, any findings as to those transactions would only serve to further undermine Gonzalez' position. Regardless, it is this Court's opinion that whether or not Gonzalez was actually transferred or informally discharged the functions of said trust position from October to November of 2000, the outcome of the suit under governing law would be the same.
Zayas' and Maldonados' argument that Gonzalez was improperly reinstated, however, is supported by the facts on record. Under Puerto Rico law, reinstatement from a trust position to a career position must occur within certain parameters: "Whenever a regular employee in a career position passes to hold a confidential position and is subsequently removed therefrom, [s]he shall be entitled to be reinstated in a position equal or similar to the one [s]he held in the career service at the time [s]he passed to hold the confidential position," 3 L.P.R.A. § 1350. It is clear that, according to Puerto Rico law, Gonzalez would have a property interest in a position equal or similar to the one she held prior to her trust position. See Aponte Melendez v. Ortiz Otero, 964 F.2d 1225, 1226, (1st Cir. 1992). Gonzalez claims that the career position she held in 1993 was eliminated and replaced by that of Director of Integral Services II, position number 2453, and that in 2000 was occupied by Ms. Elsa Ortiz. It is important to note, however, that Gonzalez fails to present a single argument to the extent that the Executive Director IV position was equal or similar to the one she held in 1993. Such a contention, in fact, would be unsupported by the facts on record.
An examination of the documents submitted as evidence, applicable law, and established precedent confirms that Gonzalez was entitled to a position equal or similar to the one she held prior to 1993. At the same time, the audit conducted by the PRFD of the Human Resources office revealed that Gonzalez had been improperly reinstated to a position three levels above that which she was entitled to, and it is certainly not this Court's role to second-guess an administrative personnel decision taken and implemented pursuant to applicable law. This Court concludes that Gonzalez' reinstatement on September of 2000 to a position of Executive Director was improper, and therefore she had no property interest in that position.
3) Qualified immunity
Zayas and Maldonado contend that they are shielded by the doctrine of qualified immunity, as their conduct was objectively reasonable and undertaken as part of their official public duties. See Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 878 F.2d 1500 (1st 1988); Lowincrer v. Broderick, 50 F.3d 61 (1st 1995). In the case at hand, an audit conducted by the Human Resources office revealed that Gonzalez, as well as other employees, had been improperly reinstated to career positions. Zayas and Maldonado had the official duty to reassign said employees, among them Gonzalez, so as to comply with the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Because their actions fall within what is reasonably expected of public officers in such positions, this Court finds that Zayas and Maldonado are entitled to qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION
The Court concludes that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that Gonzalez has failed to establish a case of political discrimination. Zayas and Maldonado have clearly demonstrated that Gonzalez' did not have a property interest in the career position of Executive Director IV, and in addition, that they are protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity. Therefore, the Court hereby GRANTS Zayas and Maldonado's Motion for Summary Judgment ( Docket No. 42) and dismisses the claims against defendants. Judgment will be entered accordingly.
IT IS ORDERED.
JUDGMENT
Judgment is hereby entered dismissing this action with prejudice pursuant to this Court's order of August 7, 2003.
All pending motions are hereby MOOT.
This case is now closed for statistical purposes.
IT IS ORDERED.