Such circumstances, however, are relevant to the issue of probable consumer confusion, which plaintiffs must prove to win an injunction. American Shops, Inc., v. American Fashion Shops, etc., 13 N.J. Super. 416, 80 A.2d 575; Goldscheider v. Schnitzer, 3 N.J. Super. 425, 66 A.2d 457. Prior to defendants' use, plaintiffs had continuously used their name in connection with the sale of cheese and other Italian food products.
See Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour Co., 3 Cir., 1949, 175 F.2d 795, 796-797. Goldscheider v. Schnitzer, 1949, 3 N.J. Super. 425, 430, 66 A.2d 457, 460; 3 Callman, Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks, 2nd ed., § 81.1; 1 Nims, Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks, 4th ed., § 221d. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 1879, 100 U.S. 82, 92, 25 L.Ed. 550; Hanover Star Mill Co. v. Metcalf, 1916, 240 U.S. 403, 413, 36 S.Ct. 357, 60 L.Ed. 713; Mishawaka Rubber Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 1942, 316 U.S. 203, 205, 62 S.Ct. 1022, 86 L.Ed. 1381.
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188; Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 59 S. Ct. 109, 83 L.Ed. 73. "Unless there is * * * actual competition, there cannot be unfair competition." Goldscheider v. Schnitzer, Ch.Div. 1949, 3 N.J. Super. 425, 429, 66 A.2d 457, 459, citing National Grocery Co. v. National Stores Corp., 95 N.J. Eq. 588, 123 A. 740, affirmed 97 N.J. Eq. 360, 127 A. 925; and Baltimore v. Clark, 131 N.J. Eq. 290, 24 A.2d 30, affirmed 132 N.J. Eq. 374, 28 A.2d 169. I find no actual competition between Micturin tablets and Mictine.
See 51 West 51 st St.Corp. v. Roland, 139 N.J. Eq. 156 ( Ch. 1946); Goldscheiderv. Schnitzer, 3 N.J. Super. 425 ( Ch. Div. 1949); AmericanShops, Inc. v. American Fashion Shops of Journal Square, Inc., 13 N.J. Super. 416 ( App. Div. 1951), certification denied, 7 N.J. 576 (1951); Annotation, 148 A.L.R. 12, 22 (1944). The present-day approach may be said to have been anticipated in Edison Storage Battery Co. v. EdisonAutomobile Co., 67 N.J. Eq. 44 ( Ch. 1904) and Cape MayYacht Club v. Cape May Yacht and Country Club, 81 N.J. Eq. 454, 456 ( Ch. 1913).
This specific set of facts does not meet the factors that the Appellate Division enumerated in evaluating unfair competition claims, namely: (1) actual confusion in the public, or (2) an actual intent by a party to practice deception. See Goldscheider v. Schnitzer, 3 N.J.Super. 425, 433 (Ch. Div. 1994). Defendants' have not demonstrated that Plaintiff's actions caused "actual confusion in the public, nor [do Plaintiff's actions evidence] an actual intent by Plaintiff to practice deception, [with] either of those factors [bearing] significance in determining whether [defendants] are entitled to equitable relief."
11(d) specifically provides that the use of a surname in connection with the operation of a funeral establishment does not render the surname a trade name, we do not believe that means that the owner is not entitled to protection under common law principles. While on remand plaintiffs need not demonstrate actual confusion in the public, nor an actual intent by defendants to practice deception, the existence of either of those factors is of significance in determining whether plaintiffs are entitled to equitable relief. Goldscheider v. Schnitzer, 3 N.J. Super. 425, 433 (Ch.Div. 1994). In addition, on remand, the number of instances of confusion shown is not controlling since the extent of actual confusion is difficult to demonstrate.
Where the necessary and probable tendency of the defendant's simulation or resemblance of plaintiff's trade name is to mislead the public into believing that the defendant's business is that of or connected with plaintiff's, then neither actual confusion nor actual fraudulent intent need be shown, for the court is then concerned with the consequences of defendant's act and not the motive for them. Eureka Fire Hose Co. v. Eureka Rubber Mfg. Co., 69 N.J. Eq. 159 ( Ch. 1905), affirmed 71 N.J. Eq. 300 ( E. A. 1906); Cape May Yacht Club v. Cape May Yacht Country Club, 81 N.J. Eq. 454 ( Ch. 1913); 51 West 51st Corp. v. Roland, 139 N.J. Eq. 156 ( Ch. 1946); Goldscheider v. Schnitzer, 3 N.J. Super. 425, 429 ( Ch. Div. 1949); American Shops, Inc., v. American Fashion Shops of Journal Square, Inc., 13 N.J. Super. 416 ( App. Div. 1951), certification denied 7 N.J. 576 (1951); Annotation, 148 A.L.R. 12 (1944); 2 Nims, op. cit., supra, § 374, p. 1194. The rule is thus stated in Restatement, Torts, § 730, comment (a), at p. 597 et seq.:
Everyone should be required to depend for his success upon his own ability and character and the quality of his own production, and must not defraud the public through misrepresentation. Weiss v. The Stork Gift Shop, 137 N.J. Eq. 475 ( Ch. 1946); Goldscheider v. Schnitzer, 3 N.J. Super. 425 ( Ch. 1949). However, the mere copying of an article unprotected by patent or trademark does not in and of itself spell misrepresentation nor entitle the original designer to protection unless that copying is accompanied by conduct or circumstances constituting unfair competition.
1892); International Silver Co. v. William H. Rogers Corp., 67 N.J. Eq. 646 ( E. A. 1905); Eureka Fire Hose Co. v. Eureka Rubber Mfg. Co., supra; Busch v. Gross, 71 N.J. Eq. 508 ( Ch. 1906); O'Grady v. McDonald, 72 N.J. Eq. 805 ( Ch. 1907); Rubber, c., Co. v. Rubber-Bound Brush Co., 81 N.J. Eq. 419 ( Ch. 1912), affirmed, 81 N.J. Eq. 519 ( E. A. 1913); Cape May Yacht Club v. Cape May Yacht and Country Club, 81 N.J. Eq. 454 ( Ch. 1913); National Biscuit Co. v. Pacific Coast Biscuit Co., 83 N.J. Eq. 369 ( Ch. 1914); Robert H. Ingersoll Brother v. Hahne Co., 89 N.J. Eq. 332 ( Ch. 1918); Hilton v. Hilton, 90 N.J. Eq. 564 ( E. A. 1919); Bayuk Cigars, Inc., v. Fine, 112 N.J. Eq. 166 ( Ch. 1933), affirmed, 114 N.J. Eq. 83 ( E. A. 1933); A. Hollander, c., Inc., v. Philip A. Singer, c., Inc., 119 N.J. Eq. 52 ( Ch. 1935), affirmed, 120 N.J. Eq. 76 ( E. A. 1936); J.B. Liebman Co., Inc., v. Leibman, 135 N.J. Eq. 288 ( Ch. 1944); Weiss v. The Stork Gift Shop, 137 N.J. Eq. 475 ( Ch. 1946); Goldscheider v. Schnitzer, 3 N.J. Super. 425 ( Ch. 1949). We borrow from them a few apt quotations: "The jurisdiction of courts of equity to prevent injury from infringement of trade-names has been liberally exercised and applied in all circumstances whenever it appeared that the name was an established, distinctive and valuable adjunct to an undertaking, whether used to distinguish manufactured articles, a place of business, or a corporation, commercial, or one formed not for pecuniary gain.