Opinion
Docket No. 016191-2012
07-10-2014
Re: Goldfarb et al. v. City of Long Branch
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT APPROVAL OF
THE TAX COURT COMMITTEE ON OPINIONS
Mala Sundar
JUDGE
BY ELECTRONIC MAIL
Richard J. Schwartz, Esq.
Schwartz & Schwartz
998 Holmdel Road
Holmdel, New Jersey 07733
Frederick C. Raffetto, Esq.
Ansell Grimm & Aaron, P.C.
1500 Lawrence Avenue, CM 7807
Ocean, New Jersey 07712
Block 87, Lot 9.021 (21 Riviera Drive)
Dear Counsel:
This letter constitutes the court's decision following trial. Plaintiffs contests the local property tax assessment for tax year 2012 on the above captioned property ("Subject"), in defendant City of Long Branch ("City"). The contested assessment is as follows:
Land: $500,000The 2012 Chapter 123 ratio was 87.91%, with an upper limit of 101.1% and a lower limit of 74.72%. PROCEDURE
Improvements: $416,100
Total: $916,100
The matter was tried along with two valuation appeals on the same day. The other two appeals were Miller et al. v. City of Long Branch (Dkt. No. 016189-2012), and Strulowitz et al. v. City of Long Branch (Dkt. No. 014559-2012). All three appeals involved townhomes in the same complex (Renaissance on the Ocean), located on the same street (Riviera Drive). All plaintiffs had retained the same real estate appraiser, who prepared a report for each appeal, each of which was admitted into evidence without objection. The above captioned plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs in Miller were represented by the same counsel. Plaintiffs in Strulowitz were self-represented, with Mr. Strulowitz (an attorney) conducting direct examination of his wife (the co-plaintiff) in his case, and cross-examination of the City's expert.
The City's expert had prepared reports in the above captioned matter and in Strulowitz, both of which were admitted into evidence without objection. She could not prepare a report in Miller as she had not inspected the Subject due to plaintiffs' absence. Plaintiffs' counsel objected to any extension of time for trial but consented to the City's expert using the information and value conclusion of her report in the Strulowitz matter since the assessments in both those appeals were the same.
Plaintiffs' counsel noted that the three units at issue in the three valuation appeals "are in the same development, are the same model and located within thirty (30) yards of each other," and similar to almost 80 of the units in the development, and "strictly summer residences." He objected to delaying the trial on grounds of waste of time and money for plaintiffs because all three units were "appraised at the same value" and would therefore merit the "same reduction" based on the one expert's testimony of the three units "at the same time."
The parties consented to each expert testifying once (as to all matters) rather than three separate times. The parties also agreed that any evidence proffered and accepted by the court in the three appeals would be applied equally to all three cases. Nonetheless, the court will issue three separate opinions for each appeal. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IN THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER
Plaintiffs' expert opined the value of the Subject to be $795,000 as of the October 1, 2011 valuation date by analyzing the Subject under the sales comparison approach. This would fall outside the upper limit ($916,100/$795,000 = 115.2%), and thus his value conclusion would reduce the assessment to $698,885.
The City's expert opined the value of the Subject under the sales comparison approach to be $1,015,000 as of the valuation date. Since this would result in an assessed-to-true value ratio of 90.25% ($916,100/$1,015,000), her value conclusion would result in an affirmance of the assessment.
The fundamental issue was plaintiffs' expert's use of 10 Riviera Drive, a townhouse located on the same street as the Subject, as a viable comparable. Plaintiffs' expert placed heavy reliance on the same on grounds it was most proximate and bore close similarity in physical characteristics to the Subject. The City's expert rejected the sale as a reliable indicator of the Subject's value because the comparable sold within one day of its re-listing at $195,000 lesser than the re-listed price of $995,000, by which time the seller had already purchased an even more expensive townhome with a high mortgage while carrying the mortgage on the comparable. These two factors tended to show that the seller was unduly motivated to make a quick sale although the comparable was on the market for approximately seven months before it was re-listed (with the same realtor). Plaintiffs disagreed and contended that since the seller had allegedly paid $600,000 as down payment for her new home, it proved that the seller was capable of carrying two mortgages, thus, the sale was a viable comparable.
For the reasons stated below, the court finds that the plaintiffs' proofs have failed to persuade the court that the sale of 10 Riviera Drive is a reliable indicator of the Subject's value. There was no verification of the sale by the expert to show that it was an arms-length sale. He did not even know that the comparable had a mortgage on it at the time of the sale. Without more (such as mortgage/buy-sell deeds, or the HUD closing statements), the allegation that that the seller of 10 Riviera Drive supposedly paid $600,000 as down payment for her new house does not prove that she was not motivated to make a quick sale.
The court also finds that plaintiffs' expert's remaining two comparables are not viable indicators of the Subject's true value because, among other reasons explained below, they are one-story condominium units in contrast to the Subject (a three-level townhouse).
The court also finds that three of the five comparables used by the City's expert are reliable, but places more weight to two of the three comparables. The court finds the true value of the Subject as $995,000. Since this is within the 15% corridor, the court affirms the assessment. FACTS
(A) Subject's Description
The Subject is a three-level townhouse. It was built sometime 2001 and was purchased in June of 2005 for $857,000. It is located in the C-4 resort commercial zoning district and is legally conforming in this respect.
The Subject is located in a gated private residential complex called "Renaissance on the Ocean." There is a full-time security guard at the gate. It is bound by Ocean Avenue on one side and Brighton Avenue on the opposite. The complex has about 89 varying types of residential units such as three-level townhouse units; one-story condominiums in mid-rise buildings; and single-family homes. Common amenities include pool, tennis courts, club house, and exercise room. Homeowner's association fees range about $1,000 to $1,275 per month. The complex is north of the Elberon Section of the City with its own downtown area comprised of several restaurants.
The Subject's gross living area ("GLA") is 2,317 square feet ("SF") with 3 bedrooms and 4 full baths as evidenced by the photographs in the City's expert report. The first floor consists of a family room, full bath, laundry room and mechanical room. The second floor has a foyer, living room (with fireplace), dining room, kitchen (with granite countertops, wood cabinets and glass tile backsplash) full bath and an office/den. The third level has three bedrooms (the master bedroom has a fireplace) and two full baths. There are partial ocean views from the second and third floor balconies, and from the rear second floor deck. It has direct access to the beach. It has a built-in one-car garage below the second level balcony, an open porch in front of the house, and a private exterior entrance. It has no basement.
Plaintiffs' expert's report noted that the Subject had three full and one half bathrooms. His report contained no photographs whatsoever. The court therefore accepts the City's expert's description in this regard.
Based on the photographs in the City's expert's report, the court finds the Subject's conditions, both exterior and interior, as good. There was no dispute that the Subject's highest and best use as vacant was residential, and as improved was its current use.
(B) Comparable Sales Description
(i) Plaintiffs' Expert's Comparables
Plaintiffs' expert used three sales which closed around the valuation date as indicators of the Subject's fair market value. His information source was the Multiple Listing Services ("MLS") and tax records. All sales were located in the City and within the Renaissance complex, with the same amenities, and similar age, condition and quality of construction. He made adjustments for GLA at $60 per SF; $5,000 for additional garage; and for additional bedrooms and/or bathrooms. He claimed the adjustment amounts were market derived. He testified that he could have but chose not to provide an adjustment for ocean view due to the sheer subjectivity for the same, and absence of paired sales of units with windows and without (the former offering better oceanic views than the latter).
Plaintiffs' expert's report was titled as being prepared for a "borrower;" titled the form report as "Individual Condominium Unit Appraisal Report;" indicated the Subject's sale as having occurred August 2008; had almost all information on pages 1 and 2, such as information about zoning, neighborhood description, or the Subject's description, blank. He maintained that since the Subject "met" all the requirements he felt it was irrelevant to fill in the details. While this response undermines his responsibilities as a real estate appraiser, it does not impact or impair his valuation methodology or value conclusion, therefore, the court does not discard his report as inherently unreliable.
His first comparable was at 334 Riviera Drive, 0.09 miles northwest of the Subject, which sold September 26, 2011 for $725,000 (cash). A one-story condominium (on the third floor of a mid-rise building), it had 2,099 SF of GLA with two bedrooms and 2.5 baths. After upward adjustments of $13,080 for GLA and the $6,000 for the Subject's extra bedroom and bathrooms, he arrived at an adjusted sales price of $744,080.
He used the same comparable in the Miller and Strulowitz matters but included a fireplace in his sales comparison grid only in the latter case.
He used the same comparable in the Miller and Strulowitz matters but in Miller used $5,000 as an adjustment for the lack of an additional bathroom or bedroom (the subject property in Miller having 3 bedrooms and 3.5 bathrooms as he stated was the same as the Subject in this case). He also made upward adjustments for "underground parking" of $15,000, and $5,000 for "deck." Neither of these adjustments were made here (or in the Strulowitz matter) despite the physical description of the comparable as being the same and the physical description of that subject property was the same as the Subject here. Thus, his conclusion of the adjusted sale price for the same comparable was $744,080 here and in the Strulowitz matter but $761,080 in the Miller appeal.
His second comparable was at 10 Riviera Drive, which was 0.03 miles northwest of the Subject, which sold December 8, 2011 for $800,000 (cash). Similar to the Subject, it was a three-level townhouse with partial views of the ocean, the same GLA and room count. Unlike the Subject, it had a full finished basement (verified through the MLS only) for which he made a -$10,000 adjustment. He also made a +5,000 adjustment deeming its one-car garage as inferior to the Subject's two-car garage. His adjusted sales price was $795,000. He testified that this comparable was a corner unit, thus, had more windows which afforded more light, and better ocean views. He conceded that the comparable was farther away from the ocean and closer to the security gate but maintained that it did not lessen its desirability and a potential buyer would still prefer it to the Subject. He further conceded that the comparable had a one-car built-in garage like the Subject thus, his initial adjustment for lack of an additional garage was incorrect.
See, supra, n. 4.
He testified that per the MLS information the unit was initially on the market in April 2011 asking $1.1 million, was withdrawn in November 2011, re-listed within a week for $995,000, and sold within a day for $800,000. He stated that he verified that there was no mortgage involved and that the MLS also showed it was a cash sale. He found out later that the sale was marked non-usable by the assessor possibly because of this reason but was unsure why. He also discovered that the comparable's seller purchased a more expensive unit and "put down a great deal of cash" which he did not know was (or was not) relevant information, but claimed that the sale was not under duress because "she was putting down $600,000 without the benefit of this sale."
His third comparable was of 114 Riviera Drive, located 0.05 miles west of the Subject, which sold March 4, 2011 for $695,000. A one-story condominium, it had a GLA of 2,080 SF with three bedrooms, three full bathrooms, and a two-car garage. He made a +$20,000 adjustment because it had a "street" view claiming the adjustment was market-based but conceding he (or his report) had no such data. After adjustments for GLA and a +$2,000 for the Subject's extra half-bath, he arrived at an adjusted sales price of $731,220.
He placed most emphasis on comparable two (10 Riviera Drive) because it was most similar to the Subject in terms of physical characteristics. Consequently, his final value conclusion of the Subject was $795,000.
(ii) The City's Expert's Comparables
The City's expert used five comparables, all located in the City, and three on the same street as the Subject. They were all of the similar age, with "minor" ocean view, and townhouse style. She opined the Subject as being in a good location whereas all the comparables had an "average" location. Her five comparable sales were as follows:
(1) 36 Riviera Drive which sold April 5, 2011 for $995,000 and had GLA of 1,920 SF; 3.5 bathrooms, a full finished basement; one fireplace and a two-car garage;
(2) 17 Waterview which sold October 4, 2010 for $1,075,000 and had GLA of 2,589 SF; 3.5 bathrooms; no fireplace; and a one-car garage;
(3) 28 Riviera Drive which sold December 18, 2012 for $998,000 and had GLA of 1,920 SF; 3.5 bathrooms, a full finished basement; one fireplace and a two-car garage;
(4) 25 Riviera Drive which sold November 27, 2012 for $970,000 and had the same GLA
as the Subject (2,317 SF); 3.5 bathrooms and one fireplace;
(5) 18 Waterview which sold November 23, 2010 for $995,000 and had GLA of 1,812 SF; two bedrooms; 2.5 bathrooms, a full finished basement; no fireplace.
The expert did not consider the April 2011 sale (10 Riviera Drive, relied upon by plaintiffs' expert) because it sold for $195,000 less than the re-listed price of $995,000 within one day of the re-listing. She was told by the selling realtor that "the seller was under duress to sell." Upon further research, she found that the comparable had a mortgage of about $417,000 and that the seller had purchased another property within two weeks of listing the comparable, signed a contract on the new property on April 20, 2011, and closed on it July 14, 2011. The seller had a mortgage of $729,750 on the new house. The City's expert felt that while the seller may have thought she sold at a profit (purchased in 2009 for $660,000 and sold in 2011 for $800,000), the seller was possibly anxious to sell because carrying two mortgages is burdensome. She also found that the assessor had also marked it a non-usable sale for ratio purposes. She therefore felt that the sale did not reflect market value. The expert did not speak to the seller and was unable to verify the arms-length nature of the sale with the attorneys.
She made adjustments for GLA at $125 per SF (she could not recollect the details and did not bring the paperwork with her to court but claimed that the same was based on market data); $10,000 for a full bath; $20,000 for full basements; $10,000 for finished condition of basements; $5,000 for bedroom count; $5,000 per fireplace and for comparable five $5,000 adjustment for inferior functional utility on comparable 5 (since it had two bedrooms). Her report noted that some sales included furnishings but were or were not included in the recorded sale price, but since she was unable to verify this to her satisfaction, she made no adjustments in this regard.
She also made no adjustments for market conditions based on her review of all useable single-family residential sales in the City from 2004 to 2012, which included all new homes, high-end and low-end sales. Those sales indicated a decline in 2009 by about 26% (annual) and a slow but steady increase from 2010 to 2012 by about 4.4% with 2011 sales indicating a stable market. Her report showed a graph of the City's residential median sale price trend, with 2011 and 2012 at the same level.
The adjusted sales prices of her five comparable sales were $1,024,625; $1,056,000; $1,027,625; $980,000 and $1,058,125, respectively. She placed equal weight to comparables one, three and four and minimal weight to comparables two and five since they occurred a year before the assessment date. Her value conclusion was $1,015,000. She felt her conclusion was reasonable based on her review of recorded townhome sales (including non-usable sales) in the Subject's complex (all located on Riviera Drive) from 2005 to 2012. The prices ranged from a low of $660,000 (10 Riviera Drive in 2009) to a high of $1,600,000 (24 Riviera Drive in 2007). ANALYSIS
Her report noted that one townhouse was under contract as of November 4, 2013 for $1,199,000 (40 Riviera Drive), and two were listed for sale as of November 1, 2013 (14 Riviera Drive and 18 Riviera Drive) for $1,089,000 and $1,075,000 respectively. These properties were not included in her sales analysis grid nor used to conclude a value for the Subject.
(A) Standard of Review
"Original assessments and judgments of county boards of taxation are entitled to a presumption of validity." MSGW Real Estate Fund, L.L.C. v. Borough of Mountain Lakes, 18 N.J. Tax 364, 373 (Tax 1998). Due to the "strength of the presumption," a taxpayer has the burden of proving "that the assessment is erroneous" with evidence that must be "definite, positive and certain in quality and quantity to overcome the presumption." Ibid. (citations and quotations omitted).
Once the presumption of correctness is overcome, the court must determine the value "based on a fair preponderance of the evidence." Ford Motor Co. v. Township of Edison, 127 N.J. 290, 312-13 (1992). The court's "independent assessment" depends "on the evidence before it and the data that are properly at its disposal." F.M.C. Stores Co. v. Borough of Morris Plains, 100 N.J. 418, 430 (1985). The complainant continues to bear the burden of persuading the court that the "judgment under review" is erroneous. Ford Motor Co., supra, 127 N.J. at 314-15.
(B) Valuation Methodology
The sales comparable method is appropriate for valuation of a residential single-family property where, "sufficient recent, reliable transactions" exist to provide a "supportable indication of market value" through "value patterns or trends in the market." See Appraisal Institute, The Appraisal of Real Estate 297 (13th ed. 2008). Both experts used the sales comparison approach, which the court finds suitable.
(C) Credibility of Value Conclusions
The court finds that plaintiffs' expert's comparable sales one (334 Riviera Drive) and three (114 Riviera Drive) are problematic. Both were one-story condominium units. The expert conceded that a one-story condominium unit was less desirable than a three-level townhouse not only because there are units above or below a condominium unit unlike a townhouse, but also for room count, and the fact that such units have a common building entrance with front doors facing the interior in contrast to the Subject. Although he maintained that entrance to such units can also be through the communal underground parking garage, thus making up for the more desirable private exterior entrances as the Subject, he agreed that an adjustment for condominium versus townhomes can be justifiable because the market considers the latter more desirable than the former.
See also, supra, n.3 which notes that he provided an upward adjustment of $15,000 for the same comparable's underground parking (as well as for another such unit) in the Miller appeal. These adjustments also evidence the superiority and thus desirability of townhomes over condominium units, and thus raises the issue of the existence of credible comparability between one-story condominium units and three-level townhomes.
Additionally, reliability of these two comparables are suspect because plaintiffs' expert was uncertain of the financing terms for either comparable. His report noted comparable one was a cash sale but he testified that he was unaware of a mortgage on the same date on that property. His report indicated that the finance terms for comparable three were "UNK" (or unknown). His testimony did not clarify this issue. In this connection, he was also unaware that comparable one was marked as non-usable by the assessor and he did not verify the fact of non-usability of sale one by the assessor or reasons for the same. His adjustments were unsubstantiated. Although he claimed they were market derived he provided no data in his report or testimony.
His $60 per SF for GLA is belied by the sale of the property he deemed most comparable, 10 Riviera Drive. That sold for $800,000 with a GLA of 2,317 SF which translates to $345.27 per SF.
As to his comparable two (10 Riviera Drive), the expert did not verify the terms of the sale and whether it was an arms-length transaction. In response to the question raised during cross-examination as to whether he verified "the sale with any of the attorneys or realtors that were involved with this transaction," the expert replied that he "verified the sale," but provided no details of the verification such as with whom or which parties he had spoken to, the information they provided him, or what (if any) documents he had reviewed or relied upon. His continued response, in fact, focused on whether or not there was a mortgage on the comparable at the time of sale, thus his verification was that someone told him "that there was no mortgage which led me [the expert] to assume that it was a cash deal," which was further borne out by the MLS that also stated it was a cash deal, and in his opinion a cash deal was insufficient reason to reject a sale. Thus, his verification was focused on whether or not the comparable sold for cash (which was contradicted by the City's expert who testified without contradiction that there was a mortgage on the comparable), and does not provide any credible information as to the veracity of the arms-length nature of the sale.
Plaintiffs' expert also did not provide any credible evidence as to the reliability of his second comparable (10 Riviera Drive) which had a one-day turn-around after a $195,000 price reduction. When asked whether he had made inquiries on whether "there was any duress associated with [the] sale" and whether the seller was motivated to "sell that unit for a price that might have been less than the fair market value," he replied that the comparable was initially listed at $1.1 million, re-listed for a reduced price of $995,000, and when it further dropped to $800,000, "it was sold almost immediately as a cash deal." Nonetheless, these chain of events did not "lead" him "to believe that it was [a sale] under duress." However, when asked whether he confirmed his opinion or as to whether there was duress or extraordinary motivation by the seller of the comparable, the expert replied "No." He conceded that he "since found out but at that time [when I did the appraisal] no."
Further, his testimony that "I don't think that [the seller] was under duress, because maybe she had an escape clause, and I don't think the money meant anything to her" due to her alleged $600,000 down payment on the new purchase prior to the comparable's sale is purely speculative. Indeed, he stated that he was not sure if such information (the seller's alleged down payment) was even "relevant." He did not provide or show any documents such as the mortgages, sale deeds, closing statements or the like (of the comparable or the newly purchased home by the seller) to show that the significant price reduction and next-day sale was unconnected with the seller's purchase of the new home or that there was this alleged "escape clause." He did not know the amount of the new mortgage. There was no proof of the alleged cash down payment or the amount of such payment. Merely asking the City's expert if she knew of such down payment, and her negative response does not establish the fact of the payment or that amount or even the source of the amount. There was no testimony of the offers, which were received on the comparable, if any. Indeed, the MLS re-listing sheet for the comparable which was proffered as evidence by plaintiffs notes that "lawsuit has been concluded." There is nothing explaining the import or context of this representation since neither plaintiffs' nor the expert provided any testimony or other evidence in this regard.
Under all these circumstances, the mere allegation of a supposed $600,000 down payment on another home by the seller of the comparable prior to the sale of the comparable, without more, does not prove or tend to prove in and of itself that the seller was not motivated to make a quick sale or that she was so wealthy she could easily carry two mortgages, and thus, did not need to sell the comparable one day after the price reduction.
An expert has a professional obligation to verify the details of a sale if he or she opines it is a reliable indicator of the market. See Appraisal Institute, The Appraisal of Real Estate, 301, 304 (13th ed. 2008) (an appraiser should "verify" sales information "by confirming that the data obtained is factually correct and that the transactions reflect arm's-length market considerations" with either the seller or buyer or with "brokers, closing agents or lenders"). An appraiser should "exercise[] caution when sales data is provided by someone who is not a party to the transaction, and should identify but rarely use non-arms-length sales. Id. at 303-04. Further, if "non-market conditions of sale are detected in a transaction, the sale can be used as a comparable sale but only with care." The Appraisal of Real Estate, supra, at 329. In this connection, the "circumstances of the sale must be thoroughly researched . . . [and any] adjustment should be well supported with data" without which the sale as a comparable should be "discarded." Ibid.
The burden is upon plaintiffs to show that the sale they deem comparable is a reliable indicator of their property's market value. Merely contradicting the City's expert's decision to reject the same in her analysis through her cross-examination does not satisfy or shift that initial burden to the City.
Of course, if plaintiffs show the court with credible evidence that the sale was verified as being arms-length despite existence of any factors indicating or implying a non-market sale, the City cannot simply rest on an opposition that the sale is unreliable because it was treated as non-useable by the assessor in developing the Chapter 123 ratios. See Greenblatt v. City of Englewood, 26 N.J. Tax 41, 54 (Tax 2010) ("[s]imply saying that a sale was determined by the assessor to be non-useable for purposes of the Director's sales ratio study does not render the sale non-useable for valuation purposes"). But plaintiffs must first satisfy this court of the sale's reliability. Here, this was not done.
Because plaintiffs' expert's two of the three sales were single-story condominium units, and further because plaintiffs were unable to prove that 10 Riviera Drive was a reliable sale, none of their comparables are reliable indicators of the Subject's value. When questioned why he did not use the sale of 36 Riviera Drive (also located in the complex) which sold April of 2011 (thus in proximity of the valuation date), plaintiffs' expert responded that he had no information on the sale and did not know of it. He maintained that he focused his search on three-bedroom units, however, the City's expert's report listed the home as having three bedrooms. Consequently, plaintiffs have failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the assessment for each year is incorrect. See J.C. Penney Co., Inc. v. Lawrence Tp., 8 N.J. Tax 473, 488 (Tax 1986) ("[t]he requisite standard of proof . . . is that of the preponderance of the evidence"), aff'd, 9 N.J. Tax 635 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 108 N.J. 664 (1987). As noted before, the plaintiffs continue to carry the burden of proof "throughout the entire case." This is so regardless of whether the "the defendant has asserted a counterclaim or, without a counterclaim, seeks an adjustment in the assessment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:51A-6(a)." MSGW, supra, 18 N.J. Tax at 376-77.
Plaintiffs provided an MLS informational sheet with an e-mail cover letter from the realtor that he was attaching the "expired MLS listing" for 36 Riviera Drive, however, the attachment referenced details of some other property located at 5 Winhar Place, Oceanport.
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Of the City's expert's five comparables, the court disregards the two sold in 2010 not only because they were one year prior to the assessment date but also because the expert herself placed minimal reliance on their use as the Subject's value indicator. Plus, both were at a considerable distance from the Subject.
The expert's reliance on the 2012 sales within the same complex are not automatically suspect due to lack of proximity to the assessment date. Comparable four is virtually the same as the Subject with the same physical characteristics and GLA and required virtually no adjustments. Although her graph notes that home prices in the City went up in 2012 by about 1.5%, her conclusion that the rise was minimal due to a stable market for 2011 and 2012, warranting no market conditions adjustment is reasonable and un-contradicted. Even if the unadjusted prices of the three sales in the complex in 2011-2012 (not including the sale of 10 Riviera Drive) show a similar price range (high $900,000s), they tend to support a lack of time adjustment. Cf. Glen Wall Assocs. v. Twp. of Wall, 99 N.J. 265, 283 (1985) (generally a sale should not be too "remote" because the "benefit of . . . comparison is lost if the effects of time have altered the factors which result in a determination of value"). But see Newport Center v. City Jersey City, 17 N.J. Tax 405, 425-427 (Tax 1998) (accepting a sale after two years of the assessment date but rejecting a sale more than two/three years after the assessment date since the expert had "failed" to show that "flat" market conditions during that time).
Although she failed to explain her arrival of the $125 per SF GLA adjustment, that number is not unreasonable. Even the one sale in 2011 which had a smaller GLA than the Subject reflects a per SF price of over $400 (adjusted or unadjusted), while the November 2012 sale of the comparable virtually the same as the Subject reflects a per SF price of $418. Her other adjustments were un-contradicted, and the court finds the same reasonable.
Placing equal weight to comparables one and four, lesser to comparable three, and none to comparables two and five, the court finds the true value of the Subject as $995,000. The assessed-to-true value ratio is 92.1% which is within the 15% corridor. Therefore, the assessment is affirmed. A judgment will be entered affirming the assessment.
Very truly yours,
Mala Sundar, J.T.C.