Opinion
A22-1399
04-18-2023
Scott Michael Gold, petitioner, Respondent, v. Chelsey Dodge Frawley, Appellant.
Goodhue County District Court File No. 25-FA-16-886
Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Slieter, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
Randall J. Slieter, Judge
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. Appellant argues that the district court failed to apply the endangerment standard to a de facto change of custody and failed to make sufficient best-interest findings. Because the district court properly applied the best-interest standard and the record supports its determination, we affirm.
2. Appellant Chelsey Dodge Frawley and respondent Scott Michael Gold are the unmarried parents of two children. In 2016, after Frawley and Gold ended their relationship, the district court entered a stipulated order granting the parents joint legal custody and Frawley sole physical custody of the children. The district court also entered a stipulated parenting-time schedule, which it modified in August 2017, May 2018, and July 2019.
3. In November 2021, after Frawley informed Gold that she planned to move to Minnetonka and Gold filed a motion to modify the parenting-time schedule, the district court issued an order modifying parenting time. Frawley appealed this order and, as is relevant here, our court remanded because the order lacked any factual findings to illuminate "whether it used the correct standard and whether it applied the standard correctly." Gold v. Frawley, No. A21-1658, 2022 WL 3149075, at *2 (Minn.App. Aug. 8, 2022). On remand, the district court added 15 findings of fact and ordered the same parenting-time schedule.
The district court amended its November 2021 order to clarify that Gold's school-year parenting time was on alternating weekends. We understand that the same clarification applies to the order on appeal here.
4. District courts have broad discretion when deciding parenting-time issues. Hansen v. Todnem, 908 N.W.2d 592, 596 (Minn. 2018); see also Shearer v. Shearer, 891 N.W.2d 72, 75 (Minn.App. 2017). "A district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record." Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted).
5. A parenting-time order that results in a de facto modification of custody will be treated as a custody modification. Christensen v. Healey, 913 N.W.2d 437, 441-42 (Minn. 2018). Physical custody involves "the routine daily care and control and the residence of the child." Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3(c) (2022). As is relevant here, modifications of physical custody require the district court to apply the endangerment standard unless the parents have consented either to the modification or to apply the best-interest standard. Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d) (2022); Christensen, 913 N.W.2d at 440-41. Changes to parenting time, however, generally require the district court to apply a best-interest standard. Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5(b) (2022); Christensen, 913 N.W.2d at 440-41. We review the district court's "ultimate determination" of whether a change in parenting time constitutes a de facto modification of custody for an abuse of discretion. Bayer v. Bayer, 979 N.W.2d 507, 512 (Minn.App. 2022). Whether a change in parenting time is a de facto modification of custody depends on the totality of the circumstances, including "the apportionment of parenting time, the child's age, the child's school schedule, and the distance between the parties' homes." Christensen, 913 N.W.2d at 443.
6. Frawley argues that the change in parenting time was a de facto modification of custody and the district court erred by not applying the endangerment standard and by not making sufficient best-interest findings.
7. Although the district court's findings are minimal and focus mainly on procedural history not relevant to the children's best interests, they sufficiently illuminate the district court's reasoning to allow appellate review. Cf. Stich v. Stich, 435 N.W.2d 52, 53 (Minn. 1989) (remanding spousal-maintenance order with no findings on the parties' expenses or the paying party's ability to pay); see Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 249 N.W.2d 168, 171 (Minn. 1976) (noting, in the context of an initial custody award, that findings of fact should show that the district court considered the relevant factors, allow appellate review of its decision, and assure the parties that the district court fairly reached its decision). The district court found that Gold was concerned that Frawley's move would impair his ability to participate in the children's school activities and "[i]t is in the children's best interest to spend more time with their father during non-school periods, so long as he abstains from the use of alcohol or other non-prescribed chemicals." The record supports the district court's determination.
8. The July 2019 parenting-time order equally divided summer parenting time via an alternating-week schedule and, once Gold moved to Prescott, Wisconsin, granted him school-year parenting time every Thursday night and alternating weekends extending the Thursday overnight to Sunday afternoon. Holidays were divided evenly, on an alternating-year schedule. This resulted in Gold's parenting time with the children constituting approximately 39% of the year.
9. The parenting-time order on appeal adjusted the summer parenting-time schedule so that Gold has the children every week and Frawley has parenting time on alternating long weekends from Thursday night through Monday morning and two consecutive weeks of uninterrupted vacation. The order eliminated the school-year Thursday overnights with Gold, which the parents agreed "were difficult for the children and should be eliminated." Gold received school-year parenting time on alternating weekends from Friday night to Monday morning and an additional ten days of parenting time split between the fall MEA school break and the week after Christmas. Holidays remained equally divided on the alternating schedule. This results in Gold's parenting time with the children constituting approximately 32% of the year.
10. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the district court acted within its discretion to treat the modification as a change in parenting time and apply the best-interest standard. The change in overall parenting time is minimal, with Gold losing parenting time, and it takes into account the children's school schedule and the distance between the parties' homes by eliminating school-year Thursday overnights with Gold. See Suleski v. Rupe, 855 N.W.2d 330, 337-38 (Minn.App. 2014) ("The modification also took into account the child's best interests, allowing the child to attend school without what, on this record, would be the disruption associated with midweek parenting time with father requiring the child to travel 150 miles roundtrip."). These changes reinforce Frawley's "routine daily care and control" of the children during the school year, and we are not convinced that the loss of six overnights per month during the summer (which does not consider Frawley's additional two weeks of summer-vacation time) constitutes a loss of daily care and control. Christensen, 913 N.W.2d at 442.
11. Additionally, and contrary to Frawley's argument, the district court was not required to make specific findings on the 12 best-interest factors set forth in Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a) (2022). Modifications to a parenting-time order are governed by Minn. Stat. § 518.175 (2022). Hansen, 908 N.W.2d at 596. Section 518.175, subd. 5(b) allows modification of a parenting-time order "[i]f it will serve the best interests of the child." As discussed, the modification eliminates Thursday overnights, which serves the best interests of the children by reducing disruption on a school night.
12. On this record, we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's order is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.