Opinion
5-22-CV-01354-FB-RBF
11-13-2023
JAY GOEBEL, Plaintiff, v. ERIC PEREZ, SAN ANTONIO AIRPORT POLICE; AND JOSE LUIS LEDESMA, SAN ANTONIO AIRPORT POLICE; Defendants.
To the Honorable Fred Biery United States District Judge:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
RICHARD B. FARRER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This Report and Recommendation concerns (1) the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Jose Luis Ledesma, see Dkt. No. 11; and (2) the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Eric Perez, see Dkt. No. 20. All pretrial matters in this action have been referred for resolution pursuant to Rules CV-72 and 1 of Appendix C to the Local Rules for the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. See Dkt. No. 4. Authority to enter this recommendation stems from 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). For the reasons set forth below, the motions to dismiss, Dkt. Nos. 11 & 20, should be GRANTED.
Factual and Procedural Background
On November 10, 2021, pro se Plaintiff Jay Goebel traveled to the San Antonio Airport via a United Airlines flight. Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”) at 1; see also Dkt. No. 11. United Airlines personnel notified airport police concerning an alleged disturbance that had occurred en route. Dkt. No. 11 at 1 (“Mot.”). The alleged incident involved two possibly intoxicated passengers, one of whom was Goebel. When he got off the plane, Goebel was met by Defendant Officer Perez, who had been sent to investigate the alleged incident.
Ledesma's and Perez's motions to dismiss are substantively identical. The Court will make all citations to Ledesma's motion. See Dkt. No. 11. Additionally, although Goebel only specifically filed a response to Ledesma's motion, the Court considers the response as to both motions.
Upon meeting Goebel, Perez immediately requested that Goebel provide his identification. See Compl. at 3. According to Goebel, when he asked why identification was necessary Perez responded, “because I'm questioning you.” Id. Goebel then refused to provide the requested identification, id., and Perez then questioned Goebel about the incident on the plane.
Explaining his side of the story, Goebel stated that he had not been drinking on the plane but acknowledged there had been some issues regarding the airline's mask-wearing policy. Id. at 9-10. According to Goebel, Perez again requested identification from Goebel, explaining that Perez needed it for his report. Id. at 4. And Perez indicated that once Goebel provided his identification, Goebel would be free to go. See id. Goebel refused. And according to Goebel, Perez told Goebel that because Goebel was being detained, “you have to identify yourself.” Id.
Things then escalated further. Goebel requested to see a supervisor, and Defendant Ledesma, Perez's supervisor, arrived on the scene. Ledesma reiterated that they needed the identification for their report. Ledesma told Goebel “[y]ou're being detained, we're not saying you committed a crime or anything, but because we're making contact with you, at this time we have to ID you.” Id. at 5. Goebel continued to refuse, and Ledesma told him “[i]f you don't want to ID yourself, we can go get your ID, it's that simple . . . because I'm going to arrest you for failure to ID, and you're going to go to jail.” See id.; Mot. at 2 (“Officer Ledesma . . . informed [Goebel] that if he failed to identify himself, he would be arrested.”). Goebel responded that if he were going to be arrested, then he would provide the identification, but he maintained his belief that he was not required to do so. Compl. at 5-6. Goebel provided his identification and was permitted to leave.
Goebel filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Compl. at 6-7. The Complaint also at times seems to raise a claim of false or unlawful “arrest,” but at other points indicates that Goebel was not arrested. Compare Compl. at 6 (Count I heading labeled “unlawful arrest”), and id. ¶ 57 (alleging “illegal arrest”), with id. ¶ 43 (alleging “threat of arrest”), and id. ¶ 56 (alleging unreasonable seizure based on threat of arrest without probable cause).
Defendant Ledesma filed his motion to dismiss on June 21, 2023. When Goebel failed to file a response within the applicable deadline, see Local Rules CV-7(d) and CV-15(a), the Court ordered Goebel to file a response if he wished the Court to take up the motion with the benefit of a response, or alternatively to amend his pleading in response to the motion to dismiss. See Dkt. No. 16. Goebel filed a response on August 12. See Dkt. No. 18. Perez filed his motion to dismiss on August 21. Both motions to dismiss are essentially identical. Defendants argue that the claims should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and they each raise the affirmative defense of qualified immunity.
Analysis
The parties agree in large part on many of the pertinent facts. All agree that Perez initially arrived on the scene in response to a report that an incident had taken place on the plane involving possibly intoxicated passengers. All agree that Perez initially detained Goebel to question him about the incident, and Goebel acknowledges that Perez first requested identification at this point. Defendants acknowledge that at some point they determined the incident did not amount to criminal conduct, and that it “was more of a customer service issue.” See Mot. at 2. All parties agree that Goebel continued to refuse to provide identification, and that Ledesma told Goebel that if he failed to identify, himself he would be arrested. See Compl. at 5; Mot. at 2. It is not clear precisely when Defendants determined Goebel was not involved in any criminal wrongdoing, relative to when they threatened Goebel with arrest for failure to identify, but at this stage the Court must take the facts as alleged in the Complaint as true. Therefore, the Court assumes for the purposes of ruling on the motions to dismiss that Perez and Ledesma had already concluded Goebel was not involved in any criminal activity on the plane when they threatened him with arrest for failure to identify. See Compl. at 2, 4-5. Finally, the parties agree that Goebel was never placed in handcuffs, never brought to any detention facility, and was never subjected to any physical force or restraint.
The parties no longer agree once we come to questioning whether the Fourth Amendment can be or was violated under these circumstances. It is not necessary to answer this somewhat nuanced, fact-bound question, however, because Goebel has failed to carry his burden to overcome the officers' assertions of qualified immunity.
A. Goebel Has Failed to Overcome Defendants' Assertions of Qualified Immunity.
When qualified immunity is asserted at the motion to dismiss stage, like here, a court has an “obligation . . . to carefully scrutinize [the complaint] before subjecting public officials to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery.” Longoria Next Friend of M.L. v. San Benito Indep. Consol. Sch. Dist., 942 F.3d 258, 263-64 (5th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omitted and alterations in original). Once the defense is invoked, the burden is on the plaintiff to show qualified immunity does not apply. Waltman v. Payne, 535 F.3d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 2008). Taking the pleadings as true at the motion-to-dismiss stage, the plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant violated a statutory or constitutional right and (2) the defendant's actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the challenged conduct. Kelson v. Clark, 1 F.4th 411, 416 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 37071 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc)); Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 410-11 (5th Cir. 2007). In other words, a court must determine whether a plaintiff's pleading “asserts facts which, if true, would overcome the defense of qualified immunity.” Backe v. LeBlanc, 691 F.3d 645, 648 (5th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted); Carswell v. Camp, 54 F.4th 307, 311 (5th Cir. 2022) (same). A court has discretion to determine which of the two prongs of this qualified-immunity test should be addressed first. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
It is well-settled that officers may conduct a brief, investigatory detention of a person if they have “reasonable suspicion” that the person is involved in criminal activity. United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 507 (5th Cir. 2004). Perez had reasonable suspicion to initially detain and question Goebel because Perez had been called to the scene to investigate an alleged public disturbance on the plane. But “[u]nder the Fourth Amendment, police officers may not require identification absent an otherwise lawful detention or arrest based on reasonable suspicion or probable cause.” Johnson v. Thibodaux City, 887 F.3d 726, 733 (5th Cir. 2018). And “while officers are free to demand identification in the circumstances of a lawful stop or arrest [or encounter], they ‘may not arrest a suspect for failure to identify himself if the request for identification is not reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the [encounter].'” Id. (quoting Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nevada, Humboldt Cnty., 542 U.S. 177, 188 (2004)). Under Texas law, a person commits the offense of “failure to identify” if the person refuses to identify him or herself to a peace officer who has lawfully arrested the person and requested the information. Tex. Pen. Code § 38.02.
Here, even assuming arguendo that the complaint sufficiently states a constitutional violation, Defendants' assertion of qualified immunity requires the Court to determine whether Perez and Ledesma's actions were objectively unreasonable in light of “clearly established” law. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009); Goodson v. City of Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 2000); Freeman, 483 F.3d at 410-11. Goebel must therefore “‘point to controlling authority-or a robust consensus of persuasive authority-that defines the contours of the right in question with a high degree of particularity.'” Rogers v. Hall, 46 F.4th 308, 312-13 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Morgan, 659 F.3d at 371-72); Hanks v. Rogers, 853 F.3d 738, 747 (5th Cir. 2017). While prior cases providing the right's contours need not be factually identical to the case at hand, they must be sufficiently similar to give “reasonable warning that the conduct” at issue violated a right. Trammell v. Fruge, 868 F.3d 332, 339 (5th Cir. 2017).
Attempting to carry this burden, Goebel's response points to two cases. First is Alexander v. City of Round Rock, 854 F.3d 298, 306-07 (5th Cir. 2017), cited for the proposition that “the right not to be arrested was clearly established” at the time. Second is Davidson v. City of Stafford, Tex., 848 F.3d 384, 392 (5th Cir. 2017), as revised (Mar. 31, 2017), cited for the proposition that it was clearly established that officers lack actual or probable cause to arrest a person for failure to identify when the person has not yet been lawfully arrested for some other offense. See Resp. at 1 (Dkt. No. 18). Alexander is not relevant here; the right not to be arrested without probable cause is not at issue, nor is it in dispute. Goebel, in any event, was never arrested. He was instead permitted to leave once he provided the requested identification, albeit following a threat that he would be arrested if he failed to comply.
Davidson is more applicable. Had Goebel continued with his refusals and then actually been arrested, the facts here would line up well with those in Davidson. At that point the question would become whether probable cause supported Goebel's arrest independent of his refusal to identify. See Davidson, 848 F.3d at 392, 394 (finding violation of clearly established right to be free from arrest without probable cause where plaintiff was arrested solely for failure to identify). But, as mentioned, Goebel wasn't placed under arrest. Neither Alexander nor Davidson clearly established a right to be free from a threatened arrest for failing to identify oneself.
Yet the Complaint, construed in Goebel's favor as it must be at the stage, reflects that Goebel may have been effectively under arrest-if not formally placed under arrest; the Complaint alleges Goebel understood he was being detained. See Compl. at 4-5. This nuance complicates the Fourth Amendment question but doesn't assist Goebel in carrying his burden with respect to demonstrating a violation of clearly established law. The somewhat factually similar case of Gonzalez v. Huerta assists in reaching this conclusion. 826 F.3d 854 (5th Cir. 2016).
In Gonzalez v. Huerta, a man challenged his informal detention for failure to identify, and the Fifth Circuit found no violation of clearly established law. See Gonzalez v. Huerta, 826 F.3d at 855-856. The case involved a man waiting in his car to pick up his wife, an elementary school employee, when he was approached by a police officer called to the school parking lot in response to a report of a suspicious vehicle. Id. at 856. Upon arrival, however, the officer found only Gonzalez and his minor daughter waiting in their parked car. Id. The officer asked Gonzalez for identification, and Gonzalez asked for a justification for the request. Id. The officer asked again, and Gonzalez again asked why. Id. The back-and-forth continued until the officer handcuffed Gonzalez and held him in the patrol car-without formally arresting him-until Gonzalez's wife arrived. Id. At that point, the officer released Gonzalez, who later filed a § 1983 claim. Id. The Fifth Circuit had “serious doubts as to whether [the officer] had a reasonable basis to detain [Gonzalez],” reasoning the officer should have known Gonzalez was not involved in criminal activity before detaining him. Id. at 857. After all, Gonzalez “did not attempt to drive away or flee,” he was merely “sitting in his car in a public lot,” and his daughter was “calmly sitting in the back of the vehicle.” Id. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit found that the detention was not “objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law.” Id.; but see Edger v. McCabe, __ F.4th __, No. 21-14396 , 2023 WL 6937465, at *6 (11th Cir. Oct. 20, 2023) (finding no qualified immunity for officers demanding ID pursuant to misreading of an Alabama stop-and-identify law).
The facts in Gonzalez mirror the situation here such that Goebel cannot carry his burden to show a violation of clearly established law, at least in this circuit. In both Gonzalez and this case, an officer was called to the scene by a report of possible criminal activity. In both instances, however, the officer learned or should have realized shortly after arrival that no criminal activity was afoot. Similarly, both cases involved a back-and-forth about whether identification was required, with the back-and-forth in Gonzalez ultimately leading to an informal detention, and with the back-and-forth here leading to a threatened arrest and perhaps also an informal detention. In Gonzalez, the “clearly established” inquiry was complicated by the fact that the demand for ID took place on school property, where a provision of the Texas Education Code arguably authorized the demand. Id. at 858. The offense taking place on school property was relevant, the Gonzalez majority opinion noted, because “the Supreme Court has routinely reconsidered the scope of individual constitutional rights in a school setting,” which in turn mandated that non-school-setting cases did not present the required “sufficiently high level of specificity necessary to put a reasonable officer on notice” that the officer's actions could be unlawful. Id. (quotations omitted). And here, events took place in an airport, another location in which Fourth Amendment rights can be curtailed. E.g., United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44, 51 (5th Cir. 1973) (“[W]e think that the airport, like the border crossing, is a critical zone in which special fourth amendment considerations apply.”). Gonzalez demonstrates that even if Goebel believed he was effectively under arrest, or even if he had been informally detained, Officer Ledesma's conduct was not “objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law,” particularly because these events took place in an airport. Id.; see also Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.
Goebel has therefore failed to carry his burden to “point to controlling authority-or a robust consensus of persuasive authority-that defines the contours of the right in question with a high degree of particularity.” Rogers, 46 F.4th at 312-13 (quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, Defendants' motions to dismiss should be granted.
Conclusion and Recommendation
For the reasons discussed above, it is recommended that Defendants' motions to dismiss, Dkt. Nos. 11 & 20, be GRANTED.
Having considered and acted upon all matters for which the above-entitled and numbered case was referred, it is ORDERED that the above-entitled and numbered case is RETURNED to the District Court for all purposes.
Instructions for Service and Notice of Right to Object/Appeal
The United States District Clerk shall serve a copy of this report and recommendation on all parties by either (1) electronic transmittal to all parties represented by attorneys registered as a “filing user” with the clerk of court, or (2) by mailing a copy by certified mail, return receipt requested, to those not registered. Written objections to this report and recommendation must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of same, unless this time period is modified by the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). Objections, responses, and replies must comply with the same page limits as other filings, unless otherwise excused by the district court's standing orders. See Rule CV-7. The objecting party shall file the objections with the clerk of the court, and serve the objections on all other parties. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings, conclusions, or recommendations to which objections are being made and the basis for such objections; the district court need not consider frivolous, conclusory, or general objections. A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the district court. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-52 (1985); Acuna v. Brown & Root, Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 340 (5th Cir. 2000). Additionally, failure to timely file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report and recommendation shall bar the aggrieved party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
IT IS SO ORDERED.