Opinion
Decided May 5, 1936.
The special statutory provision relating to service of process upon foreign insurance companies Laws 1933, c. 32 is cumulative and not exclusive of the mode of service applicable to service of process on foreign corporations generally.
ACTION, on the common counts. The plaintiff is a resident of Fitzwilliam, and the defendant is described in the writ as "a corporation with a principal place of business in Hartford, in the State of Connecticut."
The defendant, appearing specially, filed a plea in abatement, affirming therein its compliance, as a foreign corporation, with the requirements of Laws 1933, c. 32, s. 1, and praying that the plaintiff's writ might abate because "said writ was not served upon the defendant in the manner prescribed by law, to wit: — by Chapter 32, Section 1 of the Laws of 1933, which requires that service of process upon a foreign insurance company shall be made by leaving a copy of the process in the hands of the Insurance Commissioner of the State of New Hampshire, or in his office . . . ."
The court, without granting the defendant a hearing on this plea, made the following order: "Defendant's plea overruled. Case continued for further notice." A bill of exceptions was allowed by Young, J. on the defendant's exception to this order.
William H. Watson, for the plaintiff.
Thorp Branch (Mr. Branch orally), for the defendant.
The defendant's contention that service of the writ in the present action was void merely because it was not made upon the insurance commissioner is untenable. There is nothing in the language of any special statutory provision relating to foreign insurance companies (or in Laws 1927, c. 60) which has the necessary effect of repealing the general legislation applicable to service of process on foreign corporations. See P. L., c. 231, s. 9; Dinnin v. Hutchins, 75 N.H. 470. Such special provisions are cumulative and do not exclude other modes of service. 9 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp., p. 10356 and cases cited; 5 L.R.A. (N.S.) 298, note.
The order of the court that the case be "continued for further notice" is set aside. P. L., c. 331, s. 8. As to the remainder of the order
Exception overruled.
BRANCH, J., did not sit.